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1 
Foreword 
 
Identifying individuals caught up in major natural disasters and reconnecting them to their 
families and communities is a challenging task. Earthquakes can destroy communications 
infrastructure. Floods can inundate storehouses of official records. Planners rarely know where 
and when a disaster will strike. After a disaster strikes, those who can do so flee. Those who 
cannot may be hidden in debris and seriously injured or worse. Access to the disaster zone may 
be difficult for days or weeks. The position may change from hour to hour. Many further 
challenges could be listed.  
 
Individuals believed to be in a disaster zone may be listed as missing. People on the list may later 
be discovered alive or be positively identified as deceased. Some may never be found. 
 
It may be an understatement to say the task of assembling and maintaining reliable information 
about missing people in the wake of a major disaster is difficult. 
 
However, it is essential in the cause of common humanity. The first response to a major natural 
disaster must be to save life without regard to who the victims are. But any well-organized 
response must quickly take steps to seek to identify the missing.  
 
The human emotions involved are intense. The stress of not knowing whether one’s family 
member is alive or dead is agonizing. The agony may persist for a prolonged period. To digress 
from natural to man-made disasters, one may ponder the analogy of the mechanized destruction 
of the Western Front, where many bodies went unidentified. Communities made memorials to 
meet the human need for something tangible to remember the missing. One thinks also of the 
challenge to natural grieving when someone is advised that a solider is “missing in action.” A 
denial of information about the fate of a family member may be a kind of torture. Think of the 
cruelty of regimes in the various “dirty wars,” which informed families that their loved ones had 
“disappeared” rather than reveal the sordid truth.  
 
In recent years, one innovation in the processing of information has been the growth of social 
media. This has manifested itself in many useful ways during natural disasters. Through the 
assistance of ‘digital volunteers,’ crowdsourced information has enabled real time mapping of 
the effects of a disaster zone where traditional means might have required days or weeks to 
compile something similar. Social media has been used to deploy volunteers productively in 
recovery efforts. 
 
Social media has also been engaged to create crowdsourced missing persons registries. From a 
privacy perspective, this is a much more challenging proposition than mapping the physical 
infrastructure of a district or organising relief volunteers. Creating registries of missing persons 
raises a host of data protection and privacy issues. One central challenge is to ensure the 
reliability of information since inaccurate information about the fate of a person may be more 
distressing than saying nothing. Other challenging issues revolve around control and 
accountability.    
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We are fortunate that the authors of this report have reviewed the issues of privacy and missing 
persons registries, and other data protection aspects following from natural disasters. I 
congratulate the organizations supporting its publication and the authors for addressing such an 
important issue. The research and the legal and policy analysis will be an important contribution 
to understanding the subject and help prepare for future disasters in ways that are respectful of 
privacy.  
 
Blair Stewart  
Assistant Privacy Commissioner 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
Auckland, New Zealand 
January 25, 2013  
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Executive Summary 
 
When a natural disaster occurs, government agencies, humanitarian organizations, private 
companies, volunteers, and others collect information about missing persons to aid the search 
effort. Often this processing of information about missing persons exacerbates the complexities 
and uncertainties of privacy rules.   
 
This report offers a roadmap to the legal and policy issues surrounding privacy and missing 
persons following natural disasters.  
  
The report first identifies the privacy challenges in the disaster context and provides some recent 
examples that demonstrate how disaster relief information sharing raises unique privacy 
concerns and issues. It then outlines current missing persons information sharing activities in the 
context of disaster relief work and discusses how those information systems strike different 
balances between privacy and ease of use.   
 
The report then proceeds to identify some key legal privacy issues and examines in detail how 
these legal requirements apply to missing persons organizations and what interpretative 
challenges privacy rules present. For the analysis, this report focuses on privacy law in the 
European Union and the United States because these jurisdictions serve as important examples of 
privacy regulation around the globe. The report offers a general analysis rather than a detailed 
assessment of any particular activity that would depend on the application of the law of a specific 
jurisdiction.   
 
The report concludes with a set of options and strategies that organizations and policy makers 
involved in missing persons activities and in privacy could pursue to help address some of the 
privacy concerns:  
 
• For the Missing Persons Community of Interest, an independent group of humanitarian 
organizations, companies and volunteers, options include assisting in the selection of 
privacy-friendly designs for missing persons databases, better coordination of privacy 
policies for its collaborators, and working with data protection authorities to address 
privacy issues. 
 
• For missing persons organizations, options include assuring compliance with privacy 
rules, coordination of privacy policies, and sharing of relevant privacy resources. These 
organizations may have already addressed some of these challenges in their current 
activities. 
 
• For EU data protection authorities, options include fulfilling the agenda set out in the 
2011 resolution by the international data protection commissioners on data protection and 
major natural disasters, issuing clearer and more flexible data protection rules in response 
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to natural disasters, and providing interpretive guidance of the most important and 
uncertain existing rules to support missing persons activities. 
 
• For the European Union’s Article 29 Working Party, options are issuing interpretive 
guidance for disaster activities and reporting on progress in implementation of the 2011 
resolution. 
 
• For the European Commission, options are expressly addressing missing persons 
activities in the data protection regulation currently being drafted and providing more 
specific direction for the existing application of current rules to missing persons 
activities. 
 
• For the US government, options include clarification of federal agency authority to share 
personal information for missing persons activities following disasters through executive 
or legislation actions. 
 
• For other national or sub-national governments, options are adjusting or amending 
laws to allow for appropriate use of personal information for missing persons purposes 
following natural disasters. 
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I. Introduction 
 
When a natural disaster occurs, information sharing among governments, relief organizations, 
and the public is critical to identify those affected and to provide necessary assistance and 
support. Information sharing about missing persons is one critical part of relief efforts that arise 
after every disaster. Missing persons information systems offer important tools for helping 
people reconnect during stressful circumstances by making critical information more easily 
accessible. The implications, though, for the processing of personal information are global. 
Victims, their relatives, and their friends all have a common need for information, but they may 
be located in different countries with different data protection regimes. 
 
A number of organizations around the world—both for-profit and non-profit—work separately 
and collaboratively on ways to make information about missing persons in natural disasters 
available to appropriate individuals and institutions. Privacy is a concern for these organizations 
because they are often required to comply with privacy laws, yet these laws only occasionally 
include specific provisions accommodating information needs in emergency circumstances. In 
many countries, privacy rules protect fundamental rights and the right to privacy does not 
evaporate because of a natural disaster. As a result, in many disaster situations, privacy laws and 
policies intended to protect personal information have the potential to impede the useful sharing 
of critically needed information about missing persons. In effect, existing privacy laws and 
policies can create complex, international barriers to the way missing persons organizations 
collect, use and share information.  
The report is designed to help the Missing Persons Community of Interest (MPCI), an 
independent, informally organized group of humanitarian organizations, companies, and 
volunteers, address privacy in their work to aid victims in coping with natural disasters. The 
report also seeks to assist privacy regulators and policy makers in understanding and addressing 
the special needs of the disaster relief context.1 
Broadly speaking, the report seeks to examine the legal and policy issues surrounding the 
information sharing needs of missing persons activities and to identify and discuss the privacy 
issues implicated by those activities as they exist today and as they might change in the future. 
More specifically, the objectives are to:  
 
• Describe generally privacy issues relevant to missing persons information activities; 
• Provide more detailed descriptions and analysis of legal requirements for privacy as they 
relate to missing persons activities for selected but representative jurisdictions; and  
                                                
1 For information about the Missing Persons Community of interest, see 
http://wiki.crisiscommons.org/wiki/Missing_Persons, accessed Jan.10, 2013. 
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• Offer options and strategies to missing persons organizations and privacy policy makers 
for the design, organization, location, and other features of missing persons information 
activities and for laws and policies regulating the privacy of missing persons information.   
 
The report reflects the perspective that anticipation, cooperation, and adjustment can balance all 
interests involved and can achieve a reasonable, proportional, and appropriate result that will 
support human needs in disasters while respecting privacy objectives to the extent practicable 
under the circumstances surrounding natural disasters. This approach recognizes that sharing 
information about missing persons is a legitimate objective in emergency situations, that data 
protection laws should accommodate this objective, and that the emergency circumstances 
require special exceptions to privacy rules that are proportional to the circumstances, including 
appropriate safeguards, and that remain in place only as long as the emergency circumstances 
necessitate.   
This report provides a roadmap to the intersection of privacy issues and missing persons 
activities in the context of natural disasters. In Part II, the report sets out generally the privacy 
issues that arise from missing persons activities and provides some real world examples of how 
privacy laws can affect disaster relief efforts. Part III describes a recent effort of several 
organizations to improve information sharing for missing persons activities and highlights the 
additional privacy issues implicated by such activities. In Part IV, the report identifies some key 
privacy principles and provides an analysis of how those principles affect missing persons 
information system activities. Finally, Part V provides a set of options and strategies for 
stakeholders to address some of the issues identified throughout the report.   
 
II. Privacy Challenges in the Disaster Context 
 
This section sets out the basic privacy challenges for the disaster context. It first discusses two 
key definitions that are critical to frame the scope of the issues that will be addressed in this 
report. The section then articulates basic privacy issues and how they are raised in the disaster 
context. The section finishes by providing a series of recent real world examples that 
demonstrate how those issues have played out in actual disaster experiences.   
 
A. Key Definitions 
 
The definitions of “missing person” and “natural disaster” are important for understanding the 
scope of this report and the privacy interests implicated by missing persons activities. These 
definitions also provide the reference points for applying any special privacy rules or policies. 
1. Missing Person 
 
The term missing person can mean different things depending on the context. The status of 
individuals included in a missing persons database may range from unknown, found, missing to 
some, or simply out of communication. The organizations in the MPCI use several different 
formulations. One set of specifications, for example, uses a data model that accepts “missing 
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persons” entries for persons “sought or found.”2 Thus, a person’s whereabouts need not be 
entirely unknown for him or her to be in a missing persons database. The Red Cross Safe and 
Well database allows people to register themselves in the database as “safe and well,” enabling 
concerned family and friends to search for that person in the database.3 Under this formulation, a 
missing person could simply be an individual out of communication. 
 
Definitions from other sources help identify the critical elements frequently used to classify an 
individual as missing and to clarify which missing persons should fall within the scope of this 
report. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for example, defines missing 
persons in the context of man-made disasters, such as armed conflict, as “those whose 
whereabouts are unknown to their families and/or who, on the basis of reliable information, have 
been reported missing in connection with an international or non-international armed conflict, a 
situation of internal violence or disturbances or any other situation that may require the 
intervention of a neutral and independent intermediary.”4   
 
Other definitions exist for individuals who may be missing for reasons entirely unrelated to 
disaster, including criminal activity and voluntary departure. For example, a New Mexico statute 
defines a missing person as “a person whose whereabouts are unknown to the person's custodian 
or immediate family member and the circumstances of whose absence indicate that (1) the 
person did not leave the care and control of the custodian or immediate family member 
voluntarily and the taking of the person was not authorized by law; or (2) the person voluntarily 
left the care and control of the custodian without the custodian's consent and without intent to 
return.”5 This class of missing person may include a woman absent from home who may have 
been kidnapped or a teenager who may have run away from home. These various definitions 
indicate that the critical element for purpose of this report is that an individual’s whereabouts are 
unknown to those ordinarily close to the individual during a crisis period. 
 
This report does not make a distinction between missing persons and “found” persons. A missing 
persons information system may have no way to know if a person is missing or has been found 
by any or all who have an interest in the missing person. It may not be practical or meaningful 
for a missing persons information system to mark individuals as found or to remove their 
information. Information about an individual may need to remain in the system until disaster-
related activities end, even if the person has been “found” by friends and family. 
 
Finally, while in the legal context, a person includes natural persons, corporations, agencies, and 
other types of associations, this report uses the term solely to refer to a natural person or 
individual because corporations, agencies, and other legal persons cannot be missing in the same 
                                                
2 “People Finder Interchange Format 1.4 Specification;” “full_name field,” Ka-Ping Yee, last modified May 29, 
2012, http://zesty.ca/pfif/1.4/. 
3 “American Red Cross Safe and Well,” accessed Aug. 7, 2011, 
https://safeandwell.communityos.org/cms/index.php. 
4 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Missing Persons and Their Families: Recommendations for Drafting 
National Legislation 1 (Oct. 2003), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/missing_and_recommendations_missing.pdf.    
5 Missing Persons Information and Reporting Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 29-15-2 (2010), 
http://www.conwaygreene.com/nmsu/lpext.dll?f=FifLink&t=document-
frame.htm&l=query&iid=6b5281ff.52f15c16.0.0&q=%5BGroup%20%2729-15-2%27%5D. 
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way that an individual might be. While a more precise term for this report would be missing 
individual, the phrase missing persons is too well-established to change.  
 
For the general purposes of this report, therefore, a missing person is someone not in contact 
with his or her family and friends due to a natural disaster.   
2. Disaster 
 
Within the disaster relief community, no universal definition of disaster exists. The United 
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction defines a disaster as a “serious disruption 
of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human, material, economic 
or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected community or 
society to cope using its own resources.”6 The International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies have a similar definition, adding that a disaster may develop suddenly or 
because of long-term processes.7   
 
The Stafford Act, the law governing most US Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
programs, defines a major disaster as any natural catastrophe (e.g., hurricane, tornado, or storm), 
or any fire, flood, or explosion in the United States that the President determines to have caused 
damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance.8 The President 
of the United States must declare a “major disaster” to activate federal disaster assistance from 
FEMA.  
 
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies identifies three 
classifications of disasters: natural disasters, natural hazards increased by humans, and disasters 
directly caused by humans. Natural disasters are tropical storms, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, 
and the like. Natural hazards increased by humans are disasters arising from natural hazards that 
would not have occurred or would have been substantially mitigated if not for certain human 
actions. Some examples are deforestation that results in a landslide during heavy rainfall, and 
unnecessary tsunami and storm damage resulting from excessive building near beaches. 
Examples of disasters directly caused by humans are armed conflict and industrial events, such 
as explosions.9 
 
While organizations involved in disaster response or missing persons activities typically have 
their own definitions of “disaster,” the various definitions contain three core elements: (1) 
serious disruption of functioning of society. (2) threatened or actual significant harm, and (3) the 
                                                
6 United Nations Int’l Strategy for Disaster Reduction, Terminology on DRR (Disaster Risk Reduction), s.v. 
“Disaster,” last modified Aug. 30, 2007, http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology#letter-d.   
7 Int’l Disaster Response Laws, Rules & Principles Programme [IDRL], Int’l Fed’n of Red Cross & Red Crescent 
Societies, Introduction to the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of Int’l Disaster Relief and 
Initial Recovery Assistance 14 (2011), available at http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/41203/1205600-
IDRL%20Guidelines-EN-LR%20%282%29.pdf. 
8 42 U.S.C. § 5122 (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/5122. 
9 Johns Hopkins Bloomberg Sch. of Pub. Health & Int’l Fed’n of Red Cross & Red Crescent Societies, Johns 
Hopkins and Red Cross Red Crescent Public Health Guide in Emergencies 26-27 (2d ed. 2008), available at 
http://www.jhsph.edu/refugee/publications_tools/publications/_CRDR_ICRC_Public_Health_Guide_Book/Chapter
_1_Disaster_Definitions.pdf. 
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insufficiency of local capacity to respond, thereby requiring outside assistance. The missing 
persons activities within the scope of this report result from natural disasters that meet these 
three criteria. 
 
B. Basic Privacy Risks and Issues for Missing Persons Activities 
 
Privacy is not a new issue to many engaged in missing persons activities. For example, in the 
context of armed conflict or internal national violence, the ICRC conducted an electronic 
workshop on The Legal Protection of Personal Data & Human Remains in 2002.10 The ICRC 
also has and is currently revising a set of Guidelines on Protection in Violent Situations: 
Standards for Managing Sensitive Information.11 This effort seeks to “draft the basic principles 
to be followed in any situation and by all the entities concerned”12 in armed conflict situations. 
Missing persons following natural disasters, however, raise context-specific issues and needs. 
 
After a natural disaster, people can be identified as missing for a number of reasons. For 
example, disasters injure or kill some people, while others flee to neighboring countries. 
Similarly, evacuation procedures may separate families and tourists who arrive just before a 
disaster strikes causing them to be hard to trace. Often a natural disaster is accompanied by 
outages in communication technologies making it difficult for people located in a disaster area to 
find each other or to communicate with their relatives, friends, and acquaintances outside of the 
affected area.  
 
As people are identified as missing, there is an urgent demand to find them that often leads to 
substantial information sharing. People affected by a disaster often attempt to contact and 
reconnect with friends and family and may share information about themselves through multiple 
sources located in different jurisdictions. Friends and family outside of the region may 
simultaneously search for information about their missing relatives by providing personal 
information about the missing persons to multiple organizations or online communities in order 
to inquire about their status. Similarly, humanitarian organizations aiding with disaster relief may 
supply personal information about the people they assist to members of the public in order to 
help reconnect victims with family and friends. It is a basic human response in an emergency to 
seek to communicate with loved ones, and unrestricted information sharing is often a natural way 
to address the information deficit that accompanies a missing status. 
 
Much of this information sharing is valuable but it often raises new and complex privacy risks 
because a natural disaster creates unpredictable and unexpected information sharing. Privacy 
                                                
10 The final report of the workshop is available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_themissing_072002_en_1.pdf. Unlike the ICRC effort, this report 
does not address identification of human remains because that is not an activity of the Missing Persons Community 
of Interest. For other relevant ICRC documents, see Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], The Missing and Their 
Families: Documents of Reference (Feb. 2004), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0857.pdf.  
11 http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0999.pdf. 
12 Int’l Comm .of the Red Cross [ICRC] Electronic Workshop on the Legal Protection of Personal Data & Human 
Remains, Apr. 2-May 6, 2002, The Legal Protection of Personal Data & Human Remains: Final Report and 
Outcome 6 (July 2002), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_themissing_072002_en_1.pdf. 
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risks will often be specific to the circumstances of the disaster. Well-intentioned or innocuous 
sharing for one purpose related to a missing person may create risks or dangers in another 
context.   
 
For example, a local resident concerned about the possibility of domestic violence may find that 
carefully guarded information about her location is no longer under her control because official 
and missing persons databases include her location information in public or unprotected systems. 
A foreign worker displaced by a disaster may fear that the sharing of information about his new 
circumstances may affect his right to work or reside. A refugee from a natural disaster may 
worry that her ability to remain in a new location may be affected if the local government 
becomes aware of her presence. A political dissident may be concerned that her location is now 
available to a government or an enemy. Health or financial information might simply be 
accessible more broadly than would otherwise be the case. An individual may find that his or her 
confidential health information is shared with family members as part of a missing person 
identification process. Genetic information used for identification could pass beyond the control 
of an individual and family. A hospitalized tourist may find his medical information shared in 
places that he never anticipated.   
 
Other risks emerge from the retention of information by various third parties or from the 
incorporation of missing persons data in other unrelated databases through happenstance or 
aggressive data collection by commercial or government entities or through expansive 
processing by law enforcement. A government agency may decide that an individual’s new 
circumstance adversely affects the individual’s right, privileges, or benefits. A bank learning of 
the effect of a disaster on an individual may demand immediate payment of a loan. A business 
traveler may find that confidential travel arrangements are now public. 
 
At the same time, legal restrictions similarly pose complex challenges. First, the privacy laws of 
affected countries may place restrictions on information processing, including data collection and 
data sharing, that are likely to be challenging following natural disasters. Privacy laws often 
regulate how organizations may collect, use and share information. For example, many laws 
require that the data collector gives notice of collection and obtains consent from the data subject 
before processing or sharing information. When communications systems are down and people 
are missing, notice and consent is often not practicable or not possible. Complying with a notice 
and consent requirement would effectively limit many missing persons activities. Similarly, 
many privacy laws limit the purposes for which information may be shared with third parties 
without consent of the data subject and often missing persons activities do not fit neatly into any 
of the permissible purposes. Again the default privacy rules may create a barrier to desirable 
missing persons information functions. 
 
Second, information sharing may simultaneously implicate the laws of various countries making 
legal compliance a challenge. Disasters often affect multiple national jurisdictions and require 
the consideration of multiple legal regimes. For example, people may leave disaster areas, 
moving to jurisdictions not directly affected by the disaster and those with an interest in learning 
the status of missing persons may live anywhere in the world. Similarly, independent 
organizations and agencies involved in assisting or locating missing persons may be located in 
multiple countries and maintain missing persons information in separate information systems 
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meaning that records about missing persons may be held almost anywhere. Each entity involved 
may be subject to its own national privacy laws or, perhaps, to no law at all. Information shared 
among organizations will likely flow across international borders, raising complex questions 
about the rules governing data exports. Similarly, as people affected by a disaster attempt to 
contact and reconnect with friends and family, they may share information through multiple 
sources located in different jurisdictions. Disaster-related activities and the data flows that result 
cross many jurisdictional borders, often in unanticipated ways.  
 
Finally, information processing following natural disasters is time-sensitive, upsetting 
established policies and practices. Missing persons data processing generates new types of data, 
new demands for data, and urgency not always present in routine processing. The 
unpredictability and immediacy of a natural disaster may make it impossible to rely on tools or 
procedures commonly used in the processing of personal information that balance privacy 
interests against competing concerns. For example, traditional notions of notice and consent for 
information sharing are unlikely to work. Urgency also may prevent the use of proper analysis of 
privacy implications through privacy impact assessments or other methods. 
 
The privacy concerns implicated by missing persons activities are multifaceted. Information 
processors must consider the national laws of multiple jurisdictions as well as complicated issues 
of personal security and safety while acting under urgent time constraints.   
 
C. Recent Real World Examples 
 
Several recent natural disasters around the world illustrate the interplay between missing persons 
information processing and privacy laws. Australia, New Zealand, and the United States each 
encountered well-documented challenges under their privacy laws when responding to the needs 
of missing persons activities caused by a tsunami, earthquake, and hurricane respectively. In 
each case, privacy laws raised issues or created barriers with respect to efforts to share critical 
information in order to provide emergency services to those affected by the disaster. In each 
case, the government and humanitarian organizations involved in disaster relief believed that 
some modification of the law or clearer guidance was necessary to ensure that relief efforts could 
continue effectively. This Part reports on these experiences and the trade-offs adopted. 
1. Australia   
 
Australia may have been the first country to formally address privacy issues arising from natural 
disasters and emergencies. The 2002 Bali bombing and the 2004 Boxing Day tsunamis 
demonstrated the obstacles created by privacy laws and the need for remedial measures. 
 
On October 12, 2002, terrorists bombed a nightclub area in the tourist island of Bali, killing 
approximately 202 people, mostly tourists. The victims hailed from 21 countries, with the 
greatest number from Australia.13 Efforts by government agencies and humanitarian 
                                                
13 “Bali Death Toll Set at 202,” BBC News, last modified Feb. 19, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/2778923.stm. 
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organizations to share information about victims encountered obstacles under Australia’s Privacy 
Act. 
 
During a post-crisis review of the Australian Privacy Act, the Australian Red Cross (ARC) told 
the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee that the Act “imposed significant 
impediments” to its relief efforts, particularly in distributing assistance to the Australian victims. 
Notwithstanding the close liaison between ARC and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DFAT), the Australian Privacy Act prevented ARC from accessing lists of deceased, injured, 
and missing people held by DFAT. Instead, the ARC had to develop its own list of deceased and 
injured by compiling data from a multitude of sources, including advertisements, media, web 
searches, word of mouth, and referrals.   
 
Under Australian law, the ARC could not share its own lists of deceased and injured people with 
some state and territory governments that requested them. Some victims registered on ARC’s 
computerized victim registration and inquiry system could not give permission for the sharing of 
their information due to the severity of their injuries. Other victims needed to consent to the 
sharing of basic information about assistance provided.14 As Robert Tickner, Secretary General 
of the ARC, later told a Senate Committee, traumatized people with moderate to severe injuries 
had to tell their story again and again to different relief agencies, undoubtedly compounding their 
stress levels.15  
 
Two years later on December 26, 2004, an undersea earthquake triggered multiple tsunamis 
along the coasts of countries bordering the Indian Ocean, killing over 225,000 people in 11 
countries. Following the tsunamis, DFAT received over 87,000 phone calls from Australians 
concerned about the whereabouts of family members and friends. DFAT developed a list of 
14,000 Australians who may have been in the area the tsunamis affected.   
 
Privacy restrictions made it more complicated to track down these individuals to confirm their 
status. Specifically, the Australian Privacy Act limited information sharing between DFAT and 
private sector organizations. For example, because of the Act, airlines and travel agents were 
unable to disclose personal information to DFAT.16 The Federal Privacy Commissioner 
acknowledged that the disclosures by airlines to families and friends reporting whether missing 
people boarded planes after the tsunamis hit “would normally appear to be a breach” of National 
Privacy Principle 2. Although National Privacy Principle 2 contains health and safety exceptions, 
                                                
14 Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 2005, 2 
(Australian Red Cross), 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=legcon_ctte/completed_inquir
ies/2004-07/privacy/submissions/sub44.pdf. 
15 Cth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 22 Apr. 2005, 30-31 (Austl.), available at 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/commsen/8219/toc_pdf/3832-2.pdf. 
16 Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 8 Mar. 
2005, 6 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=legcon_ctte/completed_inquir
ies/2004-07/privacy/submissions/sub39.pdf. 
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the Commissioner’s interpretation suggests that the exceptions were not sufficient to permit 
information sharing following the natural disaster.17   
 
For the most part, the Australian Privacy Act did not allow DFAT to automatically share 
information on victims in an overseas disaster with other government agencies helping the 
individuals.18 DFAT noted in a submission to a Senate Committee that information sharing 
between government agencies was generally good, with the caveat that information sharing was 
not always as quick as would have been optimal due to the need to confirm that the Act 
authorized the information sharing in question.19 For example, the Act impeded DFAT’s ability 
to share personal information with government agencies such as Centrelink, which sought to 
avoid canceling regular social security payments to victims or pursuing victims for overdue 
payments.20 
 
In 2005, a Committee of the Australian Senate conducted a broad inquiry into the effectiveness 
of Australia’s Privacy Act in protecting privacy. The inquiry included a review of the Act’s 
effect on responses to overseas emergencies. The Senate Committee acknowledged the concerns 
that ARC and DFAT had raised and urged the government to implement the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner’s recommendations.21 
  
The following year, the Australian Parliament amended the Australian Privacy Act to address the 
practical issues that arise in disaster situations.22 The amendment inserted Part VIA into the Act 
to make special provisions for the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information 
following an emergency or disaster.23 Part VIA authorizes the government to make an 
emergency declaration that allows sharing of information otherwise restricted under the Act.24 
Events in Australia or overseas could trigger an emergency declaration, which takes effect 
immediately.25 The declaration ceases to have effect at the earliest of three dates: (1) the end date 
                                                
17 Office of the Privacy Comm’r, Australia, Getting in On the Act: The Review of the Private Sector Provisions of 
the Privacy Act 1988, at 234 (2005). 
18 Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 8 Mar. 
2005, 6 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=legcon_ctte/completed_inquir
ies/2004-07/privacy/submissions/sub39.pdf. 
19 Cth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 20 May 2005, 4 (Rod Smith, First Assistant Secretary, Public Diplomacy, 
Consular and Passports Div., Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) (Austl.), available at  
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/committees/commsen/8383/toc_pdf/3913-2.pdf. 
20 Submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 8 Mar. 
2005, 6 (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade),  
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=legcon_ctte/completed_inquir
ies/2004-07/privacy/submissions/sub39.pdf. 
21 Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Parliament of Australia, The Real Big Brother: Inquiry 
Into the Privacy Act 1988, at 160 (2005), available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=legcon_ctte/completed_inquir
ies/2004-07/privacy/report/report.pdf. 
22 Revised Explanatory Memorandum, H.R. Privacy Legis. Amendment (Emergencies and Disasters) Bill 2006 (Cth) 
1 (Austl.), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill_em/plaadb2006523/memo_0.html. 
23 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 80F (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012C00414. 
24 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) ss 80J, 80K (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012C00414. 
25 Prior to the amendment, the Privacy Act granted the Privacy Commissioner power to make an urgent temporary 
public interest determination (TPID) if the public interest in a disclosure breaching the Act clearly outweighs the 
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specified in the declaration, (2) the revocation of the declaration, or (3) twelve months after 
issuance of the declaration. While an emergency declaration is in effect, the collection, use, or 
disclosure of personal information authorized in Part VIA does not breach the Privacy Act’s 
Information Privacy Principles, approved privacy codes, or National Privacy Principles.26   
 
When an emergency declaration is in force subsequent to a disaster, an entity has the authority to 
collect, use or disclose personal information27 relating to an individual if (1) the entity 
reasonably believes that the individual may be involved in the disaster; and (2) the collection, use 
or disclosure of personal information is for a permitted purpose28 related to the disaster. The 
disclosure authority does not allow disclosures to media organizations. The authority to disclose 
is more permissive for government agencies than for other organizations or persons. If the entity 
making a disclosure is an agency, the disclosure must be to an agency, a State or Territory 
authority, an organization, an entity that is otherwise involved in managing or assisting in 
management of the disaster, or to a person responsible for the individual.29 On the other hand, if 
the entity making a disclosure is an organization or another person, the disclosure must be to an 
agency, an entity directly involved in providing humanitarian disaster relief services to affected 
individuals, a person or entity prescribed by the regulations, or a person or entity specified by the 
Minister or a legislative instrument.30  
2. New Zealand  
 
On February 22, 2011, a 6.3 magnitude earthquake struck Christchurch, New Zealand’s second 
largest city. 31 It caused an estimated $25 billion in widespread damage, killed 185 people, and 
injured thousands more.32 The earthquake destroyed thousands of homes33 and broke or damaged 
                                                                                                                                                       
public interest in adherence to the Act. An agency or organization must initiate a TPID, making it insufficient for 
handling a large-scale disaster that requires a quicker response.. (Cth) ss 80A, 80B (Austl.), available at 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012C00414. 
26 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 80P (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012C00414. 
27 For the purposes of Part VIA of the Privacy Act, personal information relates to both living and deceased 
individuals.  
28 A permitted purpose is a purpose directly relating to the government response to the disaster for which the 
emergency declaration is in force. Permitted purposes include, but are not limited to, the identification and 
assistance of individuals who may be affected, assisting law enforcement, coordinating, or managing the disaster, 
and ensuring people responsible for affected individuals are appropriately informed of matters relevant to: the 
individuals’ involvement in the disaster or disaster response as to these individuals. Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 80H 
(Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012C00414. 
29 A person is responsible for an individual if they are a parent, a child or sibling at least 18 years old, a spouse or de 
facto partner, a relative at least 18 years old and a member of the individual’s household, a guardian, a person with a 
power of attorney exercisable in relation to health decisions, a person who has an intimate personal relationship with 
the individual, or a person the individual nominated as an emergency contact. Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 3(2.5) 
(Austl.). 
30 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 80P (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012C00414. 
31 “New Zealand Earthquake Report-Feb 22 2011 at 12:51 pm (NZDT),” Geonet, last modified Feb. 22, 2011, 
http://www.geonet.org.nz/earthquake/quakes/3468575g.html. 
32 “Christchurch earthquake-22 February 2011,” Christchurch City Libraries, accessed June 12, 2012, 
http://christchurchcitylibraries.com/Kids/NZDisasters/Canterbury-Earthquakes/22-February-2011/. 
33 Nick Perry, The Associated Press, “Christchurch Earthquake 2011: New Zealanders Hold Memorial for 185 
Killed in Devastating Temblor,” Huffington Post, Feb. 21, 2012, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/22/christchurch-earthquake-memorial_n_1292755.html. 
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water pipes, roads, bridges, power lines, cell phone towers, and landlines.34 Phone lines and 
roads became jammed as confused and panicked people raced to contact their loved ones and 
return home.35 The government immediately activated its National Crisis Management Centre 
and declared a national state of emergency the next day.36   
 
New Zealand law provides comprehensive privacy protections that would have impeded 
necessary information sharing regarding missing persons during the disaster relief efforts. New 
Zealand’s Privacy Act contains twelve Information Privacy Principles37 governing the collection, 
use, storage, and disclosure of personal information by agencies38 (public or private 
organizations and individuals). Generally, these principles require (1) that an agency collect 
personal information directly from the individual; (2) that personal information obtained for one 
purpose not be used for any other purpose; and (3) that personal information not be disclosed to a 
third party without consent or for one of the purposes for which the information was obtained.39   
 
The Privacy Act did provide exceptions to these restrictions (a) when disclosure is necessary to 
prevent or mitigate a “serious and imminent threat” to public health or public safety, or the life or 
health of the individual concerned;40 (b) when an organization has consent from the individual;41 
and (c) when the disclosure directly relates to one of the purposes for which the information was 
collected.42 However, it was unclear whether these exceptions would apply to all necessary 
information sharing and therefore agencies were hesitant to rely upon them.  
 
The New Zealand Privacy Commissioner, aware of the legal barriers that others had encountered 
in large-scale disasters such as the Boxing Day tsunamis, acted swiftly and within 24 hours of 
the emergency declaration issued a temporary information sharing code to assist in the relief 
effort.43 The temporary code, issued under statutory interpretive powers granted to the Privacy 
Commissioner, provided greater certainty and gave broader discretion to emergency services and 
                                                
34 “Christchurch earthquake-22 February 2011,” Christchurch City Libraries, accessed June 12, 2012, 
http://christchurchcitylibraries.com/Kids/NZDisasters/Canterbury-Earthquakes/22-February-2011/. 
35 “Christchurch earthquake-22 February 2011,” Christchurch City Libraries, accessed June 12, 2012, 
http://christchurchcitylibraries.com/Kids/NZDisasters/Canterbury-Earthquakes/22-February-2011/. 
36[2011] 670 NZPD 16948 (N.Z.), available at http://www.parliament.nz/en-
NZ/PB/Debates/Debates/0/a/d/49HansD_20110223_00000064-Ministerial-Statements-Earthquake-
Christchurch.htm. (John Carter, Minister of Civil Defence, Ministerial Statement, Feb. 23, 2011). 
37 Privacy Act 1993, § 6 Information Privacy Principles (N.Z.), available at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0028/latest/DLM297038.html. 
38 Privacy Act 1993, §2(1) (N.Z.), available at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0028/latest/DLM296645.html. 
39 Privacy Act 1993, § 6 Information Privacy Principles (N.Z.), available at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0028/latest/DLM297038.html. 
40 Privacy Act 1993, § 6: Information Privacy Principle 11(f) (N.Z.), available at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0028/latest/DLM297038.html. 
41 Privacy Act 1993, § 6: Information Privacy Principle 11(c) (N.Z.), available at  
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0028/latest/DLM296639.html. 
42 Privacy Act 1993, § 6: Information Privacy Principle 11(a) (N.Z.), available at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0028/latest/DLM296639.html. 
43 New Zealand Privacy Comm’r, Proposed Civil Defence National Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code 
(information paper), available at http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Information-paper-
National-Emergencies-Information-Sharing-Code-April-2012.doc. 
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government agencies responding to and managing the disaster.44 Because of the cultural and 
privacy law similarities of Australia and New Zealand, the Commissioner modeled the 
Christchurch Code closely on the amendment the Australian Parliament made to the Australian 
Privacy Act after the Boxing Day tsunamis.45   
 
The temporary code authorized agencies in certain circumstances to collect, use or disclose 
personal information for permitted purposes, purposes directly related to the government 
response to the Christchurch earthquake emergency.46 The permitted purposes included 
identifying individuals injured, missing, or dead; assisting individuals to obtain repatriation 
services, medical treatment, financial and humanitarian aid, and other services; assisting law 
enforcement; coordinating and managing the emergency; and providing information to people 
responsible for affected individuals.47 The code enumerated eight specific categories in which a 
person would be considered responsible for an individual.48 
 
As initially promulgated, the temporary code expired on the earlier of two dates: May 24, which 
was three months after the temporary code’s issuance, or on the date, which the national 
emergency declaration terminated.49 The Privacy Commissioner made two separate amendments 
                                                
44 Letter from Marie Shroff, New Zealand Privacy Comm’r, to Hon Charles Chauvel, MP, Chair of the Regulations 
Review Committee, Mar. 2, 2011, http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Letter-to-Chair-of-
Regulations-Review-Committee-2-03-11.doc. 
45 Letter from Marie Shroff, New Zealand Privacy Comm’r, to Hon Charles Chauvel, MP, Chair of the Regulations 
Review Committee, Mar. 2, 2011, http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Letter-to-Chair-of-
Regulations-Review-Committee-2-03-11.doc. 
46 Christchurch Earthquake (Information Sharing) Code 2011 (Temporary) (N.Z.), Feb. 24, 2011, available at 
http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Christchurch-Earthquake-Information-Sharing-Code-
2011-Temporary-incorporating-Amendments-No-1-and-No-2.doc. This authorization applied if the agency believed 
on reasonable grounds that (a) the individual concerned may be involved in the emergency; and (b) the collection, 
use, or disclosure is for a permitted purpose in relation to the emergency; and the disclosure is to a public sector 
agency; to an agency that is or is likely to be involved in managing or assisting in the management of the 
emergency; to an agency directly involved in providing repatriation services, treatment, health services or financial 
or other humanitarian assistance services to affected individuals; or to a person responsible for the individual. The 
temporary code provided that the broader disclosure authority for personal information did not cover disclosures to a 
news medium. Id. 
47 Christchurch Earthquake (Information Sharing) Code 2011 (Temporary) (N.Z.), Feb. 24, 2011, available at 
http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Christchurch-Earthquake-Information-Sharing-Code-
2011-Temporary-incorporating-Amendments-No-1-and-No-2.doc. 
48 According to the Code, a person is responsible for an individual if the person is (a) a parent of the individual; (b) a 
child or sibling of the individual and at least 18 years old; (c) a spouse, civil union partner or de facto partner of the 
individual; (d) a relative of the individual, at least 18 years old and a member of the individual’s household; (e) a 
guardian of the individual; (f) exercising an enduring power of attorney granted by the individual that is exercisable 
in relation to decisions about the individual’s health; (g) a person who has an intimate personal relationship with the 
individual; or (h) a person nominated by the individual to be contacted in case of emergency. Christchurch 
Earthquake (Information Sharing) Code 2011 (Temporary) (N.Z.), Feb. 24, 2011, available at 
http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Christchurch-Earthquake-Information-Sharing-Code-
2011-Temporary-incorporating-Amendments-No-1-and-No-2.doc. 
49 Letter from Marie Shroff, New Zealand Privacy Comm’r, to Hon Charles Chauvel, MP, Chair of the Regulations 
Review Committee, Mar. 10, 2011, http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Letter-to-Chair-of-
Regulations-Review-Committee-10-03-11.doc. 
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adjusting the expiration date.50 The first delinked the expiration of the code from the emergency 
declaration termination date, fixing May 24, 2011 as the expiration date for the temporary 
code.51 A later amendment extended the life of the code by five weeks.52   
 
In issuing the first amendment to delink the expiration of the code with the emergency 
declaration, the Privacy Commissioner realized that if the code were to expire on the same day as 
the emergency declaration, the result could be unduly disruptive. Termination of the emergency 
could occur without much advance notice, possibly affecting ongoing information sharing 
arrangements.53 Tying the expiration of the code to a fixed date provided greater certainty. 
 
The second amendment allowed several agencies, particularly government departments, more 
flexibility to transition away from reliance upon the temporary code.54 The end of the state of 
national emergency by no means signaled the end of intensive government efforts in its response 
to the earthquake and in missing persons activities. 
   
Shortly before the temporary code expired, the Privacy Commissioner sponsored a research 
report on the code’s practical usefulness. The report found that some government agencies relied 
upon the code as a lawful basis for collection, use, and disclosure of information, and that 
government agencies felt reassured by the code to share information as necessary in the 
circumstances.55   
 
The code turned out to be useful in a diverse range of situations. It was particularly helpful to the 
Ministry of Social Development (MSD), the government agency in New Zealand that had the 
most current contact details for individuals.56 Without the code, MSD may not have had a legal 
basis for sharing client information with other government agencies to meet the needs of the 
                                                
50 Christchurch Earthquake (Information Sharing) Code 2011 (Temporary) (N.Z.), Feb. 24, 2011, available at 
http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Christchurch-Earthquake-Information-Sharing-Code-
2011-Temporary-incorporating-Amendments-No-1-and-No-2.doc. 
51 Amendment of the Christchurch Earthquake (Information Sharing) Code 2011 (Temporary) (N.Z.), Mar. 9, 2011, 
available at http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Amendment-No-1-to-the-Christchurch-
Earthquake-Information-Sharing-Code-2011-Temporary-with-explanatory-note2.doc. 
52 Extension of the Christchurch Earthquake (Information Sharing) Code 2011 (Temporary) (N.Z.), May 13, 2011, 
available at http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Amendment-No-2-to-Christchurch-
Earthquake-Information-Sharing-Code-2011-Temporary-with-explanatory-notes.doc. 
53 Amendment of the Christchurch Earthquake (Information Sharing) Code 2011 (Temporary) (N.Z.), Mar. 9, 2011, 
explanatory note, available at http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Amendment-No-1-to-
the-Christchurch-Earthquake-Information-Sharing-Code-2011-Temporary-with-explanatory-note2.doc. 
54 Letter from Marie Shroff, New Zealand Privacy Comm’r, to Hon Charles Chauvel, MP, Chair of the Regulations 
Review Committee, May 17, 2011, http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Letter-to-Chair-
Regulations-Review-Committee-17-05-11.doc. 
55 New Zealand Privacy Comm’r, Proposed Civil Defence National Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code 
(information paper), available at http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Information-paper-
National-Emergencies-Information-Sharing-Code-April-2012.doc. 
56 New Zealand Privacy Comm’r, Christchurch Earthquake Code of Practice—Questionnaire Results: Public 
Version, 9 May 2011, at 5, available at http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Questionnaire-
Results-Public.pdf. 
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clients for repatriation, as well as for health, financial, and other services.57 For example, MSD 
disclosed information to Housing New Zealand to assist with prioritizing emergency housing in 
particularly vulnerable or damaged areas.58 MSD also assisted a medical alarm service provider 
in contacting some of its elderly medical alarm users after the earthquake damaged and destroyed 
many residential care facilities.59 
 
The temporary code also provided a legal basis for disclosing student information.60 The 
Ministry of Education provided information to the Red Cross and to Civil Defence on student 
movements.61 The code also allowed sharing of information with the Minister of Education and 
foreign embassies regarding international students enrolled in the language school in the 
Canterbury Television building.62 
 
Some Christchurch state rental tenants also benefited from the temporary code. The Housing 
New Zealand Corporation agreed to suspend rent payments for its tenants for three weeks to help 
alleviate hardship in the aftermath of the earthquake. The code provided legal authority for the 
Housing New Zealand Corporation to give tenant names and addresses to Work and Income, in 
order to facilitate rent suspensions by Work and Income.63 
 
The code also facilitated case management of high-risk community-based offenders on 
probation. The Christchurch Recovery Department of Corrections shared information with 
agencies to locate offenders who could not be found at their usual addresses. This information 
                                                
57 New Zealand Privacy Comm’r, Christchurch Earthquake Code of Practice—Questionnaire Results: Public 
Version, 9 May 2011, at 4, available at http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Questionnaire-
Results-Public.pdf. 
58 New Zealand Privacy Comm’r, Christchurch Earthquake Code of Practice—Questionnaire Results: Public 
Version, 9 May 2011, at 3, available at http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Questionnaire-
Results-Public.pdf. 
59 New Zealand Privacy Comm’r, Christchurch Earthquake Code of Practice—Questionnaire Results: Public 
Version, 9 May 2011, at 6, available at http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Questionnaire-
Results-Public.pdf. 
60 New Zealand Privacy Comm’r, Christchurch Earthquake Code of Practice—Questionnaire Results: Public 
Version, 9 May 2011, at 4, available at http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Questionnaire-
Results-Public.pdf. Without the emergency Code, the disclosures made by the Ministry of Education would have 
breached Privacy Principle 11.  
61 New Zealand Privacy Comm’r, Christchurch Earthquake Code of Practice—Questionnaire Results: Public 
Version, 9 May 2011, at 2, available at http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Questionnaire-
Results-Public.pdf. 
62 New Zealand Privacy Comm’r, Christchurch Earthquake Code of Practice-—Questionnaire Results: Public 
Version, 9 May 2011, at 2, available at http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Questionnaire-
Results-Public.pdf. The collapse of the Canterbury Television building accounted for 115 of the 185 fatalities caused 
by the Christchurch earthquake. Kurt Bayer, APNZ Service, “CTV Building Collapse Like ‘War Zone,’” New 
Zealand Herald (Jun. 26, 2012, 8:00 PM), 
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10815547.   
63 New Zealand Privacy Comm’r, Christchurch Earthquake Code of Practice—Questionnaire Results: Public 
Version, 9 May 2011, at 3, available at http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Questionnaire-
Results-Public.pdf. 
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sharing helped the effort to manage the risk of the offenders committing new offenses, and to 
monitor offenders’ compliance with conditions of release.64 
 
The code was useful not only for government agencies but for private sector agencies as well. 
For example, it allowed an airline to disclose to police, family members and friends whether 
individuals had flown into or out of Christchurch.65  
  
Largely due to the success of the Christchurch temporary code, the Privacy Commissioner of 
New Zealand proposed the Civil Defence National Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code, a 
regime of provisions that would come into effect automatically when a state of national 
emergency is declared, lasting until the end of the state of emergency. The objective of the 
proposed Code is identical to that of the temporary Christchurch Code, namely to provide 
agencies with broader discretion to collect, use and disclose personal information following a 
major natural disaster, so as to promote the vital interests of individuals during disaster relief 
efforts.66 The proposed Code would benefit New Zealanders in two ways that the Christchurch 
code could not. It would come into effect immediately upon the declaration of a state of national 
emergency, and government agencies could rely on it when planning for emergencies.     
3. United States  
 
On August 23, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, causing mass flooding as the levee 
system failed. Floodwaters submerged much of the city. The scale and extent the destruction 
from Hurricane Katrina was unprecedented, with a total estimated damage of over $81 billion, 
and a death toll of over 1,464 people.67 The hurricane destroyed 275,000 homes as well as 
telephone landlines, cell phone towers, bridges, and highways.68   
 
The hurricane disrupted communication and transportation infrastructures throughout southeast 
Louisiana.69 The flooding incapacitated nine of eleven hospitals in New Orleans,70 leaving 
                                                
64 New Zealand Privacy Comm’r, Christchurch Earthquake Code of Practice—Questionnaire Results: Public 
Version, 9 May 2011, at 3-4, available at http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-
materials/Questionnaire-Results-Public.pdf. 
65 Katherine Gibson, “Large scale emergencies and personal information—can the Privacy Act cope?” (LLM post-
graduate paper, University of Auckland, 2011), 19, http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-
materials/Katherine-Gibson-paper-on-Earthquake-code-10-05-11.pdf. Unless a police request related to the 
investigation of an offense, Information Practice 11 would bar disclosure.  
66 New Zealand Privacy Comm’r, Proposed Civil Defence National Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code 
(information paper), available at http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Information-paper-
National-Emergencies-Information-Sharing-Code-April-2012.doc. 
67 The official death toll of Hurricane Katrina is highly disputed. Lise Olsen, “5 years After Katrina, Storm’s Death 
Toll Remains a Mystery,” Houston Chronicle, Aug..31, 2010, available at http://www.chron.com/news/nation-
world/article/5-years-after-Katrina-storm-s-death-toll-remains-1589464.php. 
68 David L. Johnson, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin. [NOAA], Nat’l Weather 
Serv. [NWS], Service Assessment: Hurricane Katrina Aug. 23-31, 2005, at 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/assessments/pdfs/Katrina.pdf 
69 David L. Johnson, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Nat’l Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin. [NOAA], Nat’l Weather 
Serv. [NWS], Service Assessment: Hurricane Katrina Aug. 23-31, 2005, at 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/assessments/pdfs/Katrina.pdf. 
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National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) medical response teams as the main source of 
medical care for tens of thousands of displaced patients. NDMS worked out of a temporary 
hospital set up at the New Orleans airport, administering first aid, triaging victims, and moving 
them to health care facilities outside the flood zone. At its peak, NDMS processed approximately 
15,000 patients per day.71 The coordination of medical treatment and reimbursement of medical 
expenses became especially difficult as thousands of Katrina victims left the area without their 
health records and moved to other health care facilities in a wide area of the South Central 
United States.72 
 
Under these circumstances, strict compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA) privacy rule became impractical. To facilitate the provision of 
health care, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) declared a public health 
emergency73 in nine states that hosted evacuees in need of health care.74 When the Secretary of 
HHS declares a Public Health Emergency in conjunction with a Presidential National Disaster 
Declaration, the Secretary may issue a Section 1135 Waiver.75 This waives sanctions and 
penalties arising from noncompliance with the following provisions of the HIPAA privacy 
regulations: 
 
1. The requirement to obtain a patient's agreement to speak with family members or 
friends involved in the patient’s care (as set forth in 45 C.F.R. § 164.510[b]); 
2. The requirement to honor a patient's request to opt out of the facility directory (as set 
forth in 45 C.F.R. § 164.510); 
3. The requirement to distribute a notice of privacy practices (as set forth in 45 C.F.R. § 
164.520);  
4. The patient’s right to request privacy restrictions (as set forth in 45 CFR § 
164.522[a]); or 
5. The patient’s right to request confidential communications (as set forth in 45 C.F.R. § 
164.522[b]).76 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
70 Crystal Franco et. al., “Systemic Collapse: Medical Care in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,” Biosecurity and 
Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 4, no. 2 (2006): 135-146, available at 
http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/bsp.2006.4.135. 
71 Crystal Franco et. al., “Systemic Collapse: Medical Care in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,” Biosecurity and 
Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 4, no. 2 (2006): 135-146, available at 
http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1089/bsp.2006.4.135. 
72 Sarah A. Lister, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33096, Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response 11 
(2005), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/54255.pdf. 
73 U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs, HHS Declares Public Health Emergency for Hurricane Katrina: Waiver 
Under Section 1135 of the Social Security Act (2005), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/katrina/ssawaiver.html. 
74 Sarah A. Lister, Cong. Research Serv., RL 33096, Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response 11 
(2005), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/54255.pdf. 
75 The authority to waive some legal requirements comes from 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-5, and the Secretary responded to 
Katrina by waiving provisions of other laws in addition to HIPAA. 
76 “Is the HIPAA Privacy Rule Suspended During a National or Public Health Emergency?,” U.S. Dep’t of Health 
and Human Servs., accessed June 12, 2012, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/faq/disclosures_in_emergency_situations/1068.html. 
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The waiver had limitations. It remained in effect “for a period of time not to exceed 72 hours 
from implementation of a hospital disaster protocol.” It applied only in the geographic area 
covered by the President’s declaration of national disaster. It was not effective “with respect to 
any action taken thereunder that discriminates among individuals on the basis of their source of 
payment or their ability to pay,” and it did not cover actions of fraud or abuse. 77 
 
The HIPAA waiver for Hurricane Katrina is another example of an accommodation made in 
response to a natural disaster that affects implementation of an existing privacy law. 
                                                
77 “Is the HIPAA Privacy Rule Suspended During a National or Public Health Emergency?,” US Dep’t of Health 
and Human Servs., accessed June 12, 2012, 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/faq/disclosures_in_emergency_situations/1068.html. 
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Box 1. Proposed Canadian Amendment to PIPEDA 
	  
In Canada, the Privacy Act governs the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information for federal 
government institutions,78 while the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act 
(PIPEDA) applies to private sector organizations.79 Both laws are relevant to disaster-related information 
processing. 
 
Following the 2004 Boxing Day tsunamis, Prime Minister Paul Martin and officials of the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade cited Canada’s Privacy Act as the basis for refusing to release 
the names of 146 Canadians who were either missing or dead as a result of the tsunamis.80 Jennifer 
Stoddard, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, clarified that such a disclosure would fall within the public 
interest exception contained in the Privacy Act.81 According to the Act, a disclosure is allowed when the 
public interest in disclosure outweighs any resulting invasion of privacy, or when it would clearly benefit 
the individual whom the information concerns.82   
 
The authority to disclose personal information is less broad for private sector organizations. For the most 
part, PIPEDA requires the knowledge and consent of the individual for collection, use, and disclosure of 
personal information.83 Disclosure is permitted without consent under some circumstances, including 
where “made to a person who needs the information because of an emergency that threatens the life, 
health or security of an individual and, if the individual whom the information is about is alive, the 
organization informs that individual in writing without delay of the disclosure.”84 Whether this language 
is broad enough to address all emergency disclosures is uncertain. 
 
An amendment proposed in 2011 would change the PIPEDA exception. Under the amendment, 
disclosure of personal information would be permitted for the “purpose of communicating with the next 
of kin or authorized representative of an injured, ill or deceased individual”85 or if “necessary to identify 
the individual who is injured, ill or deceased, the disclosure is made to a government institution, a part of 
a government institution or the individuals’ next of kin or authorized representative.”86   
 
While still a proposal, the amendment illustrates that the need to reconsider elements of privacy 
restrictions to accommodate emergency circumstances continues to gain recognition around the world.	  
 
                                                
78 Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21, s 2 (Can.), available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/P-21.pdf. 
79 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, s 4 (Can.), available at 
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/P-8.6/page-2.html. 
80 David Fraser, “Commissioner Speaks Up on Interpretation of the Privacy Act and Naming Tsunami Victims,” 
Canadian Privacy Law Blog, Jan. 6, 2005, http://blog.privacylawyer.ca/2005/01/commissioner-speaks-up-on.html.   
81 David Fraser, “Commissioner Speaks Up on Interpretation of the Privacy Act and Naming Tsunami Victims,” 
Canadian Privacy Law Blog, Jan. 6, 2005, http://blog.privacylawyer.ca/2005/01/commissioner-speaks-up-on.html.   
82 Privacy Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-21, s 8(2)(m) (Can.), available at http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/P-21.pdf. 
83 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c.5, sch1(4.3) (Can.), available at 
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/P-8.6.pdf. 
84 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act S.C. 2000, c.5, s 7(3)(e) (Can.), available at 
http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/P-8.6.pdf. 
85 Bill C-12, 41st Parl. (1st Sess. 2011) s 7(6)(iv) (Can.), available at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=5144601. 
86 Bill C-12, 41st Parl. (1st Sess. 2011) s 7(9)(d.3) (Can.), available at 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=5144601. 
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D. The International Response to the Privacy Problem 
 
In November 2011, the 33rd International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy 
Commissioners met in Mexico City, Mexico. The Commissioners represented countries from 
around the world. At the meeting, the Commissioners specifically examined how privacy laws 
can affect the sharing of personal information after a natural disaster and they adopted a 
resolution on data protection and major natural disasters.87 The Privacy Commissioner of New 
Zealand proposed the resolution with the co-sponsorship of several other privacy commissioners.      
 
The resolution included a statement that data protection and privacy laws:  
 
• Limit the permissible purposes for disclosure of personal information held by 
organizations; but  
• Allow the disclosure of information in certain exceptional circumstances, 
although such exceptions are often narrowly drawn.   
 
The resolution “encouraged” action by data protection authorities, government, and international 
organizations.88 Specifically, the resolution called on data protection authorities to review 
whether their domestic data protection and privacy laws are suitably framed and flexible to best 
serve the vital interests of individuals in the event of a major natural disaster and, if warranted, to 
recommend reform.89 
 
                                                
87 International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Mexico City, Mex., Nov. 2-3, 2011, 
Resolution on Data Protection and Major Natural Disasters, 2011/GA/RES/004 (Nov. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.privacyconference2011.org/htmls/adoptedResolutions/2011_Mexico/2011_GA_RES_004_Natural_Disa
sters_ENG.pdf. 
88 International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Mexico City, Mex., Nov. 2-3, 2011, 
Resolution on Data Protection and Major Natural Disasters, 2011/GA/RES/004 (Nov. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.privacyconference2011.org/htmls/adoptedResolutions/2011_Mexico/2011_GA_RES_004_Natural_Disa
sters_ENG.pdf. 
89 International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Mexico City, Mex., Nov. 2-3, 2011, 
Resolution on Data Protection and Major Natural Disasters, 2011/GA/RES/004 (Nov. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.privacyconference2011.org/htmls/adoptedResolutions/2011_Mexico/2011_GA_RES_004_Natural_Disa
sters_ENG.pdf. 
     The resolution also called on data protection authorities to periodically check their own preparations and consider 
whether they need take further administrative steps to be best able to serve their communities in advance of, or 
following, a major natural disaster; and, to provide advance guidance to their communities about the operation of 
data privacy law in natural disasters, including, in particular, aspects that will assist in ensuring effective public 
responses. 
     The Commissioners further called on governments to consider the data protection and personal information 
handling issues in their civil defense planning, including taking steps to ensure that public bodies are aware of 
provisions of data privacy laws that facilitate prompt and secure sharing of personal information essential to disaster 
response; to have effective information protection and recovery plans for public services that will be vital in the first 
responses to a disaster; to meet the needs of families to learn the fate of missing relatives; to ensure that any special 
measures that may limit the normal operation of data protection law are appropriately justified, proportional to the 
emergency, contain appropriate safeguards and endure only for so long as warranted by the disaster; and to continue 
to respect the privacy and dignity of disaster victims, survivors, and their families. The Commissioners asked that 
international organizations consider the issues arising from major natural disasters in their reviews of the 
international instruments on privacy and data protection. 
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The resolution of the Data Protection Commissioners illustrates that the international community 
is beginning to recognize that privacy laws can affect the use and sharing of personal information 
following natural disasters, that natural disasters create new demands for the processing of 
personal information and that data protection laws must be “flexible to best serve the vital 
interests of individuals following a natural disaster.”90 
 
III. Existing Programs to Promote Information Sharing 
 
 
In the wake of natural disasters, organizations and volunteers process missing persons 
information, often using varying information sharing protocols. At the same time, there is great 
diversity among the organizations and companies involved in missing persons activities 
following natural disasters. The entities involved are geographically dispersed and range from 
humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to for-profit technology companies. While 
most of these groups began their efforts independently of one another, they recognized after the 
2010 Haiti earthquake the critical importance of data sharing for missing persons activities. 
During that disaster, the posting of information about missing persons in so many different 
places online presented a significant obstacle to connecting people.91 In response to that 
experience, an independent community of humanitarian organizations, companies, and 
volunteers came together to form the MPCI.  
 
This section describes the MPCI, its current activities and then maps out the members’ existing 
programs, and discusses how the design of these new information sharing systems raises 
additional privacy considerations.   
 
A. The MPCI and Its Members’ Roles   
 
The MCPI formed to coordinate information sharing and cooperation among organizations and 
volunteers in order to improve information systems that assist in reuniting family and friends. 
The MPCI functions as an open forum to foster dialogue, education, and relationship building for 
the development of community technical standards. Participating organizations currently include: 
 
• American Red Cross 
• Casques Rouges 
• Crisis Commons 
• Facebook, Inc. 
• Google, Inc.  
                                                
90 International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Mexico City, Mex., Nov. 2-3, 2011, 
Resolution on Data Protection and Major Natural Disasters, 2011/GA/RES/004 (Nov. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.privacyconference2011.org/htmls/adoptedResolutions/2011_Mexico/2011_GA_RES_004_Natural_Disa
sters_ENG.pdf. 
91 Christopher P. Csikszentmihalyi, “Information on Haiti Is Getting Siloed,” Pogue’s Posts (blog), New York Times, 
Jan. 17, 2010, http://pogue.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/information-on-haiti-is-getting-siloed/.  
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• ICRC 
• Sahana Software Foundation 
• US National Library of Medicine  
 
The MPCI focuses primarily on online systems for people missing because of natural disasters.92 
Participants in the MPCI include both those who develop design specifications for online 
information collection systems and those who develop and operate directly database systems.  
 
Design specifications are prescriptive and tell database administrators how to construct a missing 
persons information sharing system, what data fields should be included, the contents of those 
fields, and other technical specifications. MPCI participants who develop design specifications 
include the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS), the 
Sahana Software Foundation, and Ka-Ping Yee, editor of a key protocol who is currently an 
engineer with Google.93   
 
Database systems and software, on the other hand, are instances of missing persons information 
sharing systems maintained or developed by particular individuals or institutions. Any specific 
database system may or may not adhere to a known design specification. MPCI participants who 
develop or operate data systems include Google, the American Red Cross, the ICRC, the US 
National Library of Medicine, the Sahana Software Foundation and the Red Helmets Foundation 
(in partnership with Bearstech and European Consulting Services).  
1. Design Specifications 
 
A major part of the MPCI’s efforts center on determining the main components for technical 
specifications that would enable all member organizations to participate in some level of 
information sharing. Two leading standards are currently in use and efforts are underway to 
negotiate a possible integration of the two standards to improve interoperability.94  Each standard 
is designed to be a universal format for missing persons databases that would simplify the 
automated processing of missing persons information and enable MPCI member systems to share 
missing person records. The utility of data standardization is analogous to the utility of language 
standardization. When a community speaks the same language, it reduces transaction costs 
associated with sharing and communicating. 
 
                                                
92 The MPCI has not addressed other missing person situations, such as those missing due to armed conflicts, 
missing children, or refugees. The MPCI limits its current work to the challenge of natural disasters in order to place 
realistic bounds on its activities and to make it easier for cooperating member organizations to collaborate 
constructively. Once MPCI members have greater experience working together, the community may broaden its 
scope to include additional missing persons situations. Some organizations that participate in the MPCI process 
undertake missing persons activities for circumstances other than natural disasters. 
93 Ka-Ping Yee (username “kpy”) also assists in the development of Person Finder. See “Google Person Finder 
Project,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://code.google.com/u/kpy@google.com/.  
94 Discussions between Ka-Ping Yee, developer of PFIF, and Glenn Pearson, member of the steering group 
responsible for the development of the new revision of the EDXL standard. See “PFIF v. EDXL,” Google Groups: 
PFIF, last modified Jan. 9, 2012, https://groups.google.com/d/topic/pfif/y0YhV5gjM18/discussion.  
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Specifically, the MPCI has encouraged the development of the People Finder Information 
Format (PFIF) as a data exchange format that could be integrated into all participating systems.95 
Ka-Ping Yee, then a graduate student at Berkeley, and a group of volunteers launched PFIF in 
2005 as a means of assisting the disaster relief efforts following Hurricane Katrina. PFIF was 
designed to reduce the difficulties associated with the automated aggregation and sharing of 
missing persons information.96 The specifications seek to address the informational needs of the 
public via the Internet.97 PFIF also standardizes data retention that is one aspect of information 
privacy.98 Currently, Google,99 the National Library of Medicine,100 and MISSING.NET 
routinely share missing persons information using PFIF, including 60,000 PFIF records created 
after the 2010 Haiti earthquake and 600,000 after the 2011 Japan earthquake.101 
 
The second leading design specification is the Emergency Data Exchange Language (EDXL). 
The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) originally developed the EDXL Distribution 
Element in partnership with private and public disaster response and national security 
organizations. OASIS, a non-profit consortium, publishes and currently maintains the standard. 
The purpose of the EDXL specification is to address the informational needs of professional 
emergency response and management workers.102 A variant still in process is EDXL-Tracking of 
Emergency Patients (EDXL-TEP)103 for medical professionals that would enable them to report 
the location of those involved in a disaster.104  
 
MPCI activities include the review of data formats used during disasters to determine if 
adjustments might be necessary to bring technical standards into alignment with the needs of the 
missing persons community.105 
 
Full descriptions of each design specification and additional technical details are provided in the 
appendices to this report. 
                                                
95 See Part IV.B.1(a). 
96 This purpose was articulated in a personal account of the development of the PFIF standard during the aftermath 
of Hurricane Katrina by David Geilhufe, a fellow participant in the disaster relief efforts. See David Geilhufe, 
“Personal History of the Katrina PeopleFinder Project Part I,” Social Source (blog), Oct. 1, 2005, 
http://socialsource.blogspot.com/2005/10/personal-history-of-katrina.html.  
97 Andy Carvin, “Using Google’s Haiti Missing Persons Widget,” Inside NPR.org (blog), National Public Radio, 
Jan. 17, 2010, https://www.npr.org/blogs/inside/2010/01/using_googles_haiti_missing_pe.html. 
98 See “People Finder Interchange Format 1.4 Specification,” Ka-Ping Yee, accessed July 23, 2012, 
http://zesty.ca/pfif/1.4/. 
99 “Google Person Finder FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://support.google.com/personfinder/?hl=en. 
100 US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file 
with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY.  
101 Ka-Ping Yee, interview by Adam Elewa, Aug. 11, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), PFIF Questionnaire, 
Fordham Law School, New York, NY.  
102 Org. for the Advancement of Structured Info. Standards [OASIS], Emergency Data Exchange Language (EDXL) 
Distribution Element (2006), 5-6, http://docs.oasis-open.org/emergency/edxl-de/v1.0/EDXL-DE_Spec_v1.0.pdf.       
103 “Emergency Management Tracking of Emergency Patients (EM TEP) Subcommittee,” Org. for the Advancement 
of Structured Info. Standards [OASIS], accessed July 23, 2012, https://www.oasis-
open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=emergency-tep.  
104 Org. for the Advancement of Structured Info. Standards [OASIS], EDXL-Tracking of Emergency Patients (TEP): 
Requirements and Draft Messaging Specification (2010), 7, http://xml.coverpages.org/EDXL-TEP-Reqs-Draft-
Messaging.pdf. 
105 See Part IV.B.1(b). 
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2. Database Systems and Software Design 
 
MPCI members also develop, maintain, and manage five different online database systems and 
software for identifying and locating missing persons during natural disasters. These systems 
were used following Hurricane Katrina (2006), the Haiti earthquake (2010), the Chile earthquake 
(2010), the Brazil earthquake (2011), the Japan tsunami (2011), Hurricane Irene (2011), the 
Alabama tornadoes (2011, 2012), the Arizona wildfires (2012), the Colorado wildfires (2011, 
2012), the Connecticut blizzard (2011), the Dallas-Fort Worth tornadoes (2011), the Minnesota 
floods (2012), and the Pakistan floods (2012). 
 
These systems are often at work simultaneously during a disaster relief effort and can therefore 
benefit significantly from sharing information.   
 
a) ICRC Family Links Service  
 
The ICRC is an international private humanitarian organization that “works worldwide to 
provide humanitarian help for people affected by conflict and armed violence and to promote the 
laws that protect victims of war.”106 The ICRC operates under a mandate from the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and its Additional Protocols of 1977.107  
 
In the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols, as well as in other resolutions adopted 
at some International Conferences of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Conferences, 
the ICRC has been entrusted by states to restore family links and clarify the fate of the missing in 
armed conflicts and other situations of violence.108 The ICRC also coordinates, advises, and 
strengthens the capacity of Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies in restoring family 
links in armed conflicts and other situations, such as disasters and migration. The use of online 
resources is one of the methods employed by the ICRC to restore family links, but the method 
remains a relatively minor part of the ICRC’s activities.109    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
106 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC] About page, accessed July 23, 2012, http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-
are/index.jsp. 
107 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC] About page, accessed July 23, 2012, http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-we-
are/index.jsp. 
108 Romain Bircher (head of Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red 
Cross), interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC 
Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
109 Romain Bircher (head of Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red 
Cross), interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC 
Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
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Figure 1. The ICRC Family Links service, available at http://familylinks.icrc.org. 
©2013 The International Committee of the Red Cross. Used with permission. 
 
The overall purpose of the ICRC family links website [Figure 1] is to put those who have lost 
contact with loved ones due to armed conflicts, violence, or natural disaster back in touch despite 
failures of the “postal service, telephone and other regular means of communication.”110 The 
ICRC uses two different databases for the online collection and dissemination of information 
about missing persons.111 The ICRC refers to both as the ICRC Family Links service.112 The first 
database contains only data collected and verified by official emergency workers and 
volunteers.113 The second database contains data submitted by registered Internet users looking 
for someone affected by a disaster or reporting on their own status.114 Both databases are 
accessible via a web browser.  
                                                
110 “What to do if you are looking for a relative,” Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], accessed July 23, 2012, 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/restoring-family-links-what-to-do-220208.htm.  
111Romain Bircher (head of Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red 
Cross), interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC 
Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
112 Romain Bircher (head of Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red 
Cross), interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP) ICRC 
Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
113 The table in Appendix 5 describes this as “publication of missing person list.” See Romain Bircher (head of Data 
Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red Cross), interview by Missing 
Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC Questionnaire, Fordham Law 
School, New York, NY.  
114Although the service mainly facilitates communication between web users, the ICRC does not allow a change in 
the status of a missing person to deceased without first verifying that the change is accurate. The table in Appendix 5 
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The databases operated by the ICRC are in Geneva, Switzerland. The ICRC enjoys an explicit 
exemption in the Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection from all regulations concerning the 
processing of personal information.115 However, the ICRC maintains and promotes internal 
standards regarding the missing persons activities.116 The ICRC seeks to craft data protection 
policies that are respectful of international privacy principles.117 
  
b) American Red Cross’ Safe and Well Service  
 
The American Red Cross is a US non-profit humanitarian organization that focuses on providing 
aid to victims of war and those devastated by natural disasters.118 The American Red Cross 
operates an Internet-accessible database known as Safe and Well [Figure 2] that allows anyone 
affected by a disaster to submit status updates through a web interface.119 Anyone concerned 
about someone located in a disaster area can look for a status message but only after supplying a 
phone number or home address that matches the one on record for the missing person.120 The 
database deliberately allows one-way communication from someone affected by a disaster to 
someone concerned about the affected individual.121 The database encourages minimal 
disclosure of personally identifying information by allowing users to provide as little information 
about their status as desired.122 An individual’s status can simply be “I am safe and well.” 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
describes this as “user driven service.” See also Romain Bircher (head of Data Management and Restoring Family 
Links unit, International Committee of the Red Cross), interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 
29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
115 Bundesgesetz über den Datenschutz [DSG] [Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection] June 19, 1992, SR 235.1, art. 
3 (Switz.), available at http://www.dataprotection.eu/pmwiki/pmwiki.php?n=Main.CH. 
116 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Professional Standards for Protection Work Carried Out by 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Actors in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence (Oct. 2009), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0999.pdf. 
117 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC] Electronic Workshop on the Legal Protection of Personal Data & Human 
Remains, Apr. 2-May 6, 2002, The Legal Protection of Personal Data & Human Remains: Final Report and 
Outcome 16-22 (July 2002), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_themissing_072002_en_1.pdf. See also Romain Bircher (head of 
Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red Cross), interview by 
Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC Questionnaire, Fordham 
Law School, New York, NY. (“The ICRC has a long-standing policy and practice of confidentiality. Confidentiality 
as a working method is derived from the principles of neutrality and impartiality under which the ICRC operates. 
This means that the ICRC requires confidential and bilateral communications, including written submissions, with 
the relevant authorities and that it expects such authorities to respect and protect the confidential nature of its 
communications. The International Community has accepted and recognized that confidentiality is necessary for the 
effective performance by the ICRC of its functions. This implies that the ICRC enjoys a privilege of non-disclosure, 
including a testimonial immunity for its staff before national and international courts. Therefore, for instance, the 
ICRC could not be compelled by a court to disclose information that has been collected in the context of activities 
for restoring family links.”) 
118 “American Red Cross About,”  accessed July 23, 2012, http://www.redcross.org/aboutus/.  
119 “American Red Cross FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://safeandwell.communityos.org/cms/faq.  
120 “American Red Cross FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://safeandwell.communityos.org/cms/faq.  
121 “American Red Cross FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://safeandwell.communityos.org/cms/faq.  
122 Users can choose from a list of preformed status updates (i.e., “I am safe and well”) or use a text box that allows 
the submission of any text-based data.  
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Figure 2. The American Red Cross’s Safe and Well website, available at 
https://safeandwell.communityos.org. 
©2013 American Red Cross. Used with permission. 
 
 
c) Google’s Person Finder  
 
Google operates a database, known as Google Person Finder, based on the PFIF standard.123 The 
involvement of a commercial enterprise in the missing person space illustrates the diversity of 
entities involved in open-source activities. Google engineers, including PFIF’s original 
developer, Ka-Ping Yee, built Google Person Finder. The database becomes searchable and open 
to new entries at the discretion of Google’s Crisis Response team.124 Google’s Crisis Response 
team analyzes the scale of impact of the disaster and then determines which of its tools would be 
most useful for responding to the given situation. Google may choose to deploy Person Finder as 
a part of its larger Crisis Response effort in a region. The database allows people to post 
information about someone they know who has been affected by a disaster, and people can 
search for information that others have posted. Google does not verify the accuracy of the 
information submitted or the identity of a submitter.125   
                                                
123 “Google Person Finder FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://support.google.com/personfinder/?hl=en.  
124 “Google Person Finder FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://support.google.com/personfinder/?hl=en.  
125 Dorothy Chou (Google), interview by Adam Elewa, Aug. 15, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), Google 
Interview, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
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A user can query information from the database by using the web interface or by writing 
software that talks to the database directly via the Application Programming Interface (API).126 
Google generally only grants access to its API to government, quasi-government, or established 
non-profits,127 and it only grants access to the API after considering the “motivation for the 
request and the likelihood that the request will meaningfully expand the usefulness of Person 
Finder and its accessibility to users.”128 In keeping in compliance with the PFIF specification, 
Google’s Person Finder respects the expiration date set on any submitted record by permanently 
deleting the record on the specified date, and it requires the same of any third parties who make 
copies of the records.129 Additionally, Google permanently deletes all records, regardless of 
expiration date, when the Google Crisis Response team determines the database to no longer be 
useful to disaster relief efforts.130 
 
Lastly, Google Person Finder is also an open-source application. Other organizations may use 
the application to establish their own databases without operational participation by the Google 
Crisis Response team. 
 
d) The US National Library of Medicine’s People Locator  
 
The US National Library of Medicine (NLM), a federal agency, is a component of the National 
Institutes of Health, which is part of the US Department of Health and Human Services. The 
NLM describes itself as the world’s largest biomedical library. It maintains and makes available 
worldwide its electronic information resources at no charge on a wide range of topics. The NLM 
also supports and conducts research, development, and training in biomedical informatics and 
health information technology.131  
 
The NLM operates a missing persons database known as People Locator as a part of its Lost 
Person Finder project.132 The NLM plans to deploy its People Locator service in two different 
contexts, with different rules guiding data submission and dissemination in each. The NLM 
refers to the different events that would prompt the launch of the database as community-based 
events and hospital-based events. The NLM decides when to activate an event on its service. 
 
                                                
126 An Application Programming Interface (API) can best be understood by contrasting it with a Graphical User 
Interface (GUI). Graphical user interfaces—the visual objects such as folders, buttons, and icons—allow humans to 
talk to computers via the familiar manipulation of visual objects (i.e., opening folders). An API, by contrast, 
provides a medium that allows software, rather than humans, to talk to other software. Getting software to talk to 
other software via the GUI is possible, but is typically more complex. See PC Magazine Encyclopedia, s.v. “API 
(Application Programming Interface),” accessed July 23, 2012, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/ (search 
“Search Encyclopedia” for “API”). 
127 Dorothy Chou (Google), interview by Adam Elewa, Aug. 15, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), Google 
Interview, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
128 “Google DataAPI,” last modified Aug. 8, 2012, https://code.google.com/p/googlepersonfinder/wiki/DataAPI.   
129 “Google Person Finder FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://support.google.com/personfinder/?hl=en. 
130 “Google Person Finder FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://support.google.com/personfinder/?hl=en. 
131 US National Library of Medicine Fact Sheet, accessed July 23, 2012, 
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/pubs/factsheets/nlm.html. 
132 US National Library of Medicine About page, accessed July 23, 2012, https://pl.nlm.nih.gov/about. NLM uses 
software from the Sahana Software Foundation. 
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In community-based events, data comes (1) through a web interface on the NLM web site, (2) by 
import from Google Person Finder using the PFIF protocol, (3) via submission through an NLM 
designed iPhone app, or (4) semi-structured email.133 The NLM has also “screen-scraped”134 data 
from CNN iReports135 and the ICRC Family Links service following the disaster in Haiti.136 
Users seeking to submit data via the NLM web interface or the NLM iPhone app must first 
establish a user account with NLM by providing personally identifying information.137  
 
During hospital-based events, only entities covered under the US health privacy rule (HIPAA) 
can submit or access data. During large-scale disasters, both HIPAA and the NLM allow for 
broader dissemination of health information to disaster relief organizations.138     
 
Hospital workers first capture a photo and minimal information using a Lost Person Finder-
developed Windows application called TriagePic when a victim arrives at the hospital’s triage 
station, with the option to add more information if time permits.139 As with community-based 
events, a user needs an account with the system before submitting information. Family 
reunification counselors and medical personnel in treatment zones can search the records 
contained in the database and use this information to answer queries from people seeking 
information.140 
 
To date, hospital-based events have been limited to simulated tests, as the NLM is still working 
with partner hospitals to develop appropriate privacy and operational guidelines. However, the 
NLM launched the community-based database in disaster events such as major earthquakes in 
Haiti, Chile, New Zealand, Japan, and Turkey, and the Joplin, Missouri, tornado.141  
 
 
 
                                                
133 This means that missing persons information emailed to NLM can be automatically parsed and input into the 
database, but it needs to be formatted in a particular manner. For instance, the database may require there to be a 
new line between every data element, or for each data element to be preceded by a descriptor (i.e., name, address, 
etc.), for the information to be parsed correctly.  
134 Scraping refers to the practice by which a computer program parses and stores data viewable on a website without 
the website owner necessarily being aware of, or consenting to, the data extraction. See PC Magazine, s.v. 
“scraping,” accessed July 23, 2012, http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/ (search “Search Encyclopedia” for 
“scraping”). 
135 CNN iReport is a social network that allows users to post and read stories created by other users. CNN allows 
posting of stories without any fact checking. See CNN iReport About page, accessed July 23, 2012, 
http://ireport.cnn.com/about.jspa.  
136 US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file 
with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
137 See table in Appendix 5. 
138 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(b)(4) (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-
2011-title45-vol1-sec164-510.pdf. See US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community 
of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
139 US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file 
with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY.  
140 US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file 
with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
141 US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file 
with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
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e) MISSING.NET 
 
MISSING.NET [Figure 3] is a missing person database system operated by the Red Helmets 
Foundation, chaired by Nicole Guedj (a former French minister) in partnership with Bearstech142 
and European Consulting Services,143 and with some engineering assistance from Google.144 
According to MISSING.NET, the purpose of the site is to “facilitate the action of humanitarian 
rescue workers and victims mainly in the first crucial hours of the crisis.”145  
 
Accessible via a web browser, the MISSING.NET database allows a visitor to create a user 
profile in advance of a disaster.146 A user creates the profile by submitting personally identifying 
information, including home address. MISSING.NET does not delete user profiles, but never 
publicly displays the profiles.147 Information about missing persons can be submitted only during 
an active “disaster event.” The website’s administrators determine when disaster events begin 
and end.148 Besides submissions by MISSING.NET users, the system updates its missing person 
records from Google’s database by means of the Person Finder API key.149 
 
f) Sahana Software Foundation 
 
The Sahana Software Foundation is a California not-for-profit organization. The mission of the 
foundation is to provide “management solutions that enable organizations and communities to 
better prepare for and respond to disasters.”150 The foundation develops both software and design 
specifications that can be used by missing persons systems. The software and design 
specifications are open source. Sahana Software Foundation products have been deployed for 
missing persons activities following many natural disasters, including the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami and the 2006 Kashmir earthquake. Other missing persons organizations use Sahana 
products as platforms, such as the NLM’s use of Sahana software in People Finder.151   
 
As indicated by these descriptions, each of the databases and the software are subject to unique 
designs and operate under distinct rules, so developing a sharing protocol is a complex project. 
Each system houses different types of data, has unique requirements about who may input data 
into the system, and has distinct rules on how users may access the information. For example, the 
                                                
142 Bearstech is a private web hosting company located in France. See Bearstech About page, accessed July 23, 
2012, http://bearstech.com/english/.  
143 European Consulting Services is a private technology consulting company located in France. See “Accueil,” 
European Consulting Services, accessed July 23, 2012, http://www.european-cs.com. 
144 MISSING.NET About page, accessed July 23, 2012, http://www.missing.net/pages/about.html. 
145 MISSING.NET About page, accessed July 23, 2012, http://www.missing.net/pages/about.html. 
146 MISSING.NET, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), 
MISSING.NET Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
147 MISSING.NET, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), 
MISSING.NET Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
148 MISSING.NET, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), 
MISSING.NET Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
149 MISSING.NET, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), 
MISSING.NET Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
150 Sahana Software Foundation, History, accessed Nov. 15, 2012, http://sahanafoundation.org/about-us/history/. 
151 Sahana Software Foundation, Deployments, accessed Nov. 15, 2012, 
http://sahanafoundation.org/community/deployments/. 
  
 
34 
Safe and Well system requires that a user input some personally identifiable information about a 
missing person before he or she is able to access the files about that person, while Google Person 
Finder has no similar access restriction. Similarly, some systems, like Family Links and 
MISSING.NET require users to register before they can submit information about missing 
persons, while others freely allow the public to access the database. The Google Person Finder 
system has a well-developed set of rules about record expiration and deletion while 
MISSING.NET has no set procedures about record deletion.   
 
After every disaster or usage of an MPCI member’s system, the group works together to 
document and share each organization’s experience. These reviews assess when and how the 
member organization decided to launch its system, how the system was used, what issues or new 
solutions the organization came across, and what lessons can be learned from the experience.152   
 
 
 
 
B. Privacy Considerations for MPCI Information Sharing Systems 
 
The design of the technical specifications for sharing and the structure of the database systems 
affect privacy. Choices made about what information will be stored, who will have access to the 
missing persons information and how that information will be shared with third parties has 
significant implications for privacy. Design decisions that minimize data collection to essential 
elements and place some restrictions on access or use will be more protective of individual 
privacy. 
 
However, privacy is not the sole concern for the members of the MPCI. These parties are 
primarily interested in aiding disaster relief efforts by helping to reconnect victims with their 
friends and family. That goal is best met when information is readily accessible in a timely 
manner. Missing persons organizations have a strong interest in sharing information broadly in 
order to help locate the missing. 
 
Achieving a balance between privacy and ease of access is an important objective for the MPCI 
community. This section discusses some of the design choices currently implemented by MPCI 
members in order to highlight how the choices implicate privacy interests. The differences 
among the various systems demonstrate that there is a wide variety of ways that organizations 
can choose to achieve the tradeoff between privacy and access. The differences reflect different 
priorities and values and illustrate how collaboration can be complex.    
 
Access. One design choice that implicates privacy is the determination regarding who will have 
access to the missing person information contained within a database system. Some systems 
share data liberally with Internet users while others share data only with those who can show a 
relationship to the missing person or membership in a medical or humanitarian organization. The 
American Red Cross’s database, for instance, tries to limit access to those who have preexisting 
                                                
152 Crisis Commons hosts the archive of MPCI materials at http://wiki.crisiscommons.org/wiki/Missing_Persons. 
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knowledge of the missing person by requiring searching parties to know the phone number or 
address of the missing person before displaying that person’s record.153 The database operated by 
MISSING.NET, on the other hand, allows a registered user to display all the missing person 
records contained in the database without knowing any information about the person in advance. 
The National Library of Medicine intends to limit access to data collected during a hospital-
based event to a select group of medical professionals, a limit required by law rather than by 
choice.154   
 
Record retention. Another design choice that impacts privacy interests is whether the database 
imposes any restrictions on data retention. Storing data only as long as necessary for missing 
persons activities is protective of data security and privacy. However, the time that records 
should be stored depends on the scope and purpose of a given missing person database. Some 
databases store missing person records for longer periods than others. Some limit the retention of 
missing person records to the approximate duration of the crisis155 which might end when 
conventional forms of communication resume or when the database administrator otherwise 
determines that the database is no longer useful. The ICRC, for example removes missing 
persons information from its database accessible through the Internet after conventional modes 
of communication have resumed, but it retains the removed data in its archives for research 
purposes.156   
 
Registration. Requiring registration is yet another design choice that can impact privacy. 
Requiring users to register before searching or submitting data has advantages and 
disadvantages. Registration protects records contained in the database as it presents a modest 
obstacle to the unauthorized automated copying of the database. This is especially true if 
registration requires a user to satisfy a Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell 
Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA).157 Registration may also simplify access for 
returning submitters.   
 
Many databases require those who submit missing person records to also submit their personal 
contact information. Registration may result in better quality data if submitters feel accountable. 
On the other hand, some submitters may be reluctant to share their own personal data while 
serving a public interest and may provide false or inaccurate data. Registering submitters 
imposes costs and complexity, and it may have some security disadvantages. For example, the 
long-term storage of user profiles may create a liability for disclosure of data resulting from a 
security breach. In addition, an applicable privacy law may apply differently to the processing of 
information about submitters than information about missing persons. 
 
Information sharing. Finally, decisions about how the database will gather or share information 
with third parties reflect different tradeoffs between privacy and access. Some databases 
routinely pull data from or push data to other databases. For example, the automated sharing and 
                                                
153 “American Red Cross FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://safeandwell.communityos.org/cms/faq.  
154 Missing Persons Community of Interest [MPCI] Docs. 
155 See Table in Appendix 5. 
156 MPCI Documents. 
157 CAPTCHAs are a widely used challenge-response system designed to frustrate the automated access of digital 
resources and services. See “CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing Test to tell Computers and Humans 
Apart),” SearchSecurity, accessed July 23, 2012, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/CAPTCHA.  
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copying of data are fundamental to the design of the PFIF standard158 and to Google’s Person 
Finder database using PFIF.159 The practice of routinely sharing missing person records has some 
clear advantages. If records are not freely shared, someone seeking a missing person may need to 
find and search multiple databases. This can become a significant obstacle when there are many 
missing persons databases.160 However, an advantage of not sharing information is that the 
system owner controls information storage and access, decreasing the chance of misuse and 
increasing accountability. Database operators can diminish security and privacy concerns by 
setting standards for cooperating databases. For example, Google requires all third parties who 
want access to their data to abide by the same privacy policy as Google does.161  
 
Striking an appropriate balance between privacy and utility calls for a series of choices that will 
be influenced by the emergency circumstances that result from natural disasters. A privacy 
option that may be improper for an organization to make under routine circumstances may 
nevertheless be appropriate when meeting the challenges of disaster response and the 
humanitarian needs that follow. Different organizations operating in different cultures and with 
different methods, objectives, values, and legal regimes may legitimately take different 
approaches.   
 
IV. Legal Analysis for Privacy and Missing Persons Activities 
 
 
This Part analyzes major privacy principles applicable to missing persons activities in order to 
demonstrate the issues that disaster relief organizations must consider as they develop their 
databases and begin to share information with third parties. For the analysis, this report focuses 
on privacy law in the European Union and the United States because these jurisdictions serve as 
important examples of privacy regulation around the globe. The report offers a general analysis 
rather than a detailed assessment of any particular activity that would depend on the application 
of the law of a specific jurisdiction.   
 
The European Union has a well-established and comprehensive approach to data protection that 
provides a high degree of commonality among its more than two dozen Member States. This 
commonality comes from the 1995 European Directive on Data Protection162 that requires each 
                                                
158 Design principles promote the convergence of data via the process of synchronizing or copying missing persons 
records from PFIF-compliant and non–PFIF-compliant sources. ”People Finder Interchange Format 1.4 
Specification,” Ka-Ping Yee, accessed July 23, 2012, http://zesty.ca/pfif/1.4/.   
159 “Google Person Finder FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://support.google.com/personfinder/?hl=en. 
160Director of the Center for Future Civic Media at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Chris 
Csikszentmihalyi, warned of the dangers that too many unconnected sites pose for successful reunions and discussed 
the role that Google’s Person Finder plays in alleviating that danger. Christopher P. Csikszentmihalyi, “Information 
on Haiti Is Getting Siloed,” Pogue’s Posts (blog), New York Times, Jan. 17, 2010, 
http://pogue.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/information-on-haiti-is-getting-siloed/.  
161 “Google Person Finder API Terms of Service,” last modified Mar. 15, 2012, 
https://code.google.com/p/googlepersonfinder/wiki/TermsOfService.  
162 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 28, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 47, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML.  
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Member State to have a national law establishing processing rules for personal information. 
Because privacy laws within each EU Member State are not identical, this report focuses on the 
principles of the EU Data Protection Directive that must be incorporated into the national law of 
each EU Member State.163 Changes to the EU privacy regime are pending,164 but the report’s 
analysis does not review proposed changes as they are too preliminary as of the publication of 
this report. EU policies are important worldwide not only because of the size and significance of 
the European Union, but because many nations that are not EU members model their privacy 
laws in varying degrees on standards of the 1995 EU Directive. 
 
The second jurisdiction analyzed here is the federal level in the United States, whose privacy 
laws offer a contrast with the EU approach. The United States was chosen because of the critical 
role that US-based actors play in disaster assistance, including the reach of US-based Internet 
organizations, communications services, and economic relief efforts. The United States lacks a 
comprehensive federal privacy law equivalent to EU national data protection laws, but instead 
has a series of discrete, narrowly focused privacy laws—often described as sectoral laws—that 
cover particular types of records or particular record keepers. Large sectors of the economy and 
many classes of record keepers are wholly unregulated for privacy by federal law. In addition to 
federal laws—the focus of this report—states within the United States sometimes have their own 
laws regulating the privacy of some types of records and some classes of record keepers.  
 
The United States contrasts with the European Union on other aspects of privacy. For example, 
EU policy addresses both the processing of personal information within its borders and the 
export of that information to other nations. The United States regulates only some domestic 
personal information processing, and its laws rarely address exports of personal data to other 
jurisdictions.   
 
The focus here on the European Union and the United States should not suggest that the laws of 
other nations are unimportant or irrelevant. For some disasters, it is foreseeable that neither US 
nor EU privacy rules will be of prime relevance. However, to the extent that a government 
agency, commercial enterprise, non-profit organization, or other entity in the United States or the 
European Union operates a missing persons information system, the privacy laws of these two 
jurisdictions may be inextricably entangled with missing persons activities even when the 
individuals whose data is primarily at issue may reside in other areas of the world. 
 
Section A provides an overview of privacy. Section B maps out the key legal privacy issues and 
discusses how they may impact missing persons activities. In each case, the report contrasts the 
application of EU law with US law to provide perspective on different legal approaches to 
privacy.  
 
 
                                                
163 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 5, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML.  
164 See Press Release, European Commission, “Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of the Data 
Protection Rules” (Jan. 25, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/120125_en.htm.  
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A. Overview of Privacy  
 
This section offers a brief introduction to information privacy issues relevant to missing persons 
and provides a basic outline to EU and US privacy law.   
 
To understand information privacy activities in the world today, it is helpful to use Fair 
Information Practices (FIPs) as a framework for describing privacy regulatory activities found in 
many nations.165 FIPs are a set of basic principles for addressing concerns about information 
privacy. FIPs form the basis of privacy laws around the world, including the United States, 
although reliance on FIPs in the United States is not as comprehensive as in other countries.166 
International policy convergence around FIPs has remained substantially consistent for several 
decades.   
 
FIPs originated in the 1970s with a report from a predecessor of the federal Department of 
Health and Human Services.167 A few years later, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) revised the original statement of FIPs.168 The OECD’s version 
became the most influential statement of the principles.169 
 
The eight principles set out by the OECD are as follows: 
 
1. Collection Limitation Principle. There should be limits to the collection of personal 
data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where 
appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject. 
2. Data Quality Principle. Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they 
are to be used and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, 
complete, and kept up-to-date. 
3. Purpose Specification Principle. The purposes for which personal data are collected 
should be specified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use 
limited to the fulfillment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with 
those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose 
4. Use Limitation Principle. Personal data should not be disclosed, made available 
or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with [the 
Purpose Specification Principle] except (a) with the consent of the data subject or 
(b) by the authority of law. 
                                                
165 For a short and general history of FIPs, see Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History (2012) 
(Version 1.91), http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf.  
166 Colin J. Bennett, Regulating Privacy: Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe and the United States, 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 6. 
167 Dep’t of Health, Educ. and Welfare, Records, Computers and the Rights of Citizens: Report of the Secretary's 
Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems (1973), 
http://epic.org/privacy/hew1973report/default.html.  
168 Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data (1980), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
169 The Asian Pacific Privacy Framework, an alternative international approach to privacy, has much in common 
with the OECD FIPs principles, available at http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committee-on-Trade-and-
Investment/~/media/Files/Groups/ECSG/05_ecsg_privacyframewk.ashx.  
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5. Security Safeguards Principle. Personal data should be protected by reasonable 
security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, 
use, modification or disclosure of data. 
6. Openness Principle. There should be a general policy of openness about 
developments, practices, and policies with respect to personal data. Means should 
be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and 
the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity and usual residence of the 
data controller. 
7. Individual Participation Principle. An individual should have the right (a) to 
obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the 
data controller has data relating to them; (b) to have communicated to them, data 
relating to them within a reasonable time; at a charge, if any, that is not excessive; 
in a reasonable manner; and in a form that is readily intelligible to them; (c) to be 
given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b) is denied, and to 
be able to challenge such denial; and (d) to challenge data relating to him and, if 
the challenge is successful to have the data erased, rectified, completed or 
amended. 
8. Accountability Principle. A data controller should be accountable for complying 
with measures, which give effect to the principles that have been stated. 
 
The substantive privacy provisions in the EU Data Protection Directive map well to the FIPs 
framework, with each FIP’s principle addressed in varying levels of detail. The Directive calls on 
each Member State to enact the Directive’s standards for the processing of personal data by data 
controllers within the Member State.170 Some state functions (e.g., defense and national security) 
fall outside the scope of the directive, and exceptions apply to individuals engaged in personal or 
household activities.171 The Directive allows special rules for the press and for artistic 
expression.172 Generally, however, the design of the Directive is that most organizations in an 
EU Member State that process personal data are subject to data protection rules that meet 
common EU standards. The mechanisms in national laws applying those standards may vary as 
long as they satisfy the basic requirements of the Directive.  
 
 
                                                
170 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 3, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
171 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 3(2), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
172 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 9, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 41, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
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The EU Data Protection Directive also requires Member States to limit the export of personal 
information to third countries177 (countries that are not EU Member States) and requires each 
Member State to have an independent privacy supervisory authority.178 Supervisory authorities, 
sometimes called data protection authorities, are important in the operation of many data 
protection laws as they enforce and interpret the laws. 
  
                                                
173 For an extended discussion of issues with the definition of personal information, see Paul M. Schwartz and 
Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U L. 
Rev. 1814 (2011), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1909366. 
174 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 2(a) (definition of ‘personal data’), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
175 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a)(4) (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
176 The laws in some European jurisdictions extend privacy rights to legal persons. Even where privacy laws do not 
apply to legal persons like corporations, legal persons still have confidentiality interests. These interests are beyond 
the scope of this analysis. 
177 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, arts. 25, 26, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 45-46, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
178 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 28, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 47, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
 
Personal Information and Personal Data 
 
Legal obligations for the protection of privacy generally attach only to information that is considered 
“personal information.” However, the definition of “personal information” has some variance.173 
 
The EU Data Protection Directive defines personal data to mean: 
 
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person ('data subject'); an identifiable 
person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification 
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity.174 
 
US laws use a variety of terms, including record found in the Privacy Act of 1974.175 In general, US 
law and practice emphasize the terms personal information or personally identified information. This 
report uses these terms—personal information, personal data, and record—interchangeably. 
 
 
Individuals, Data Subjects, and Persons 
 
The EU Data Protection Directive calls on Member States to provide protection for the personal data 
about identifiable natural persons (also called data subjects). The typical American equivalent is 
individual. In either jurisdiction, a person in some contexts can include an individual, government 
agency, corporation, and other legal entity.  Privacy generally protects the interest of individuals.176 
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Processing 
 
Processing generally means the collection, maintenance, use, and disclosure of personal information. 
Any aspect of the life cycle of personal information from creation to ultimate destruction falls within 
the term processing. The EU Data Protection Directive expansively defines processing as “any 
operation or set of operations which is performed upon personal data, whether or not by automatic 
means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, 
consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, 
alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction.”179   
 
 
Data Controller and Record Keeper 
 
Under the EU Data Protection Directive, the controller or data controller is responsible for 
compliance with data protection rules and for fulfilling the rights exercised by data subjects.180 The 
Directive defines controller as any person who determines the purposes and means of processing of 
personal data.181 US privacy laws take different approaches to defining the person responsible for 
processing personal data and complying with privacy law. A familiar US term used in this report as 
the equivalent of data controller is record keeper. 
 
 
 
The situation in the United States is markedly different.182 No general privacy statute covers all 
record keepers of personal information. At the federal level, a handful of privacy laws cover 
specific types of records or specific types of record keepers.183   
 
As illustrated by several examples of targeted privacy protections, few apply directly to 
information sharing systems for missing persons. The principal laws relevant to this report are:  
 
                                                
179 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 2(b) (definition of ‘processing of personal data’), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
180 See, generally, Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, 00264/10/EN, WP 169, Opinion 1/2010 On the Concepts of 
"Controller" and "Processor" (Feb. 16, 2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp169_en.pdf.  
181 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 2(d)(definition of ‘controller’), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
182 See Paul M. Schwartz and Joel R. Reidenberg, Data Privacy Law: A Study of U.S. Data Protection, 
(Charlottesville, VA: Michie, 1996). 
183 See, e.g., The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2006)(credit reporting), available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/1681; Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g 
(2006)(educational records), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/20/1232g; Video Privacy 
Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006)(video rental records), available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2710; Driver’s Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq. 
(2006)(driver license information), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/2721; Children’s Online 
Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6501 et seq. (2006)(collection of information from minors); Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §6801-6809 (notice of privacy policies for financial institutions). 
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The Privacy Act of 1974184 applies to most compilations of personal information 
held by federal agencies and by some agency contractors (see Section B [1][a]). 
The Act implements all elements of FIPs. Indeed, the advisory committee that 
originally proposed FIPs also proposed much of the wording that became the 
Privacy Act of 1974. Importantly in an international context, the Act generally 
grants privacy rights only to citizens of the United States and aliens admitted for 
permanent residence.185 Foreign nationals have no rights under the Act.186 This 
law is relevant for missing persons information processed by US federal agencies. 
 
The federal health privacy and security rules187 issued under the authority of 
HIPAA188 apply to covered entities, which are most health care providers and all 
health insurers and health clearinghouses. The rules also extend to business 
associates of covered entities. The privacy rule expressly seeks to establish a basic 
set of FIPs for health records.189 The privacy rule sets a nationwide floor of 
privacy protection and allows more stringent state laws to remain in force. In 
addition, some health record keepers are also subject to other federal health 
privacy rules covering specific categories of records, such as the rules governing 
the Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records.190 The HIPAA 
privacy rule does not cover many institutions that maintain health information 
such as schools, websites, banks, casualty insurers, health clubs, advocacy 
organizations, and others. The law applies to missing persons information sharing 
by covered entities. 
 
In the United States, the privacy protections that apply to a record in the hands of one record 
keeper typically do not apply if the original record keeper discloses the record to a third party. 
For example, if a medical provider shares a patient record with a missing persons organization, 
that organization will not be bound by HIPAA. For many record keepers and sectors of the 
economy, no privacy laws apply at all. For example, no federal information privacy laws cover 
most marketing activities, Internet records, records of non-profit organizations, or merchants of 
goods and services.   
 
 
                                                
184 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
185 5 U.S.C. § 552a (a)(2) (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
186 Foreign nationals can use the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552, to seek access to records held by federal agencies, but no other 
privacy rights are available under the FOIA. 
187 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-
2011-title45-vol1-chapA-subchapC.pdf.  
188 Pub. L. No. 104–191, tit. 2, § 264, Aug. 21, 1996, 110 Stat. 2033, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note, available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1320d-2.  
189 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,464 (Dec. 28, 
2000), 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2000-12-28/pdf/00-32678.pdf. 
190 42 C.F.R. pt. 2 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title42-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-title42-
vol1-part2.pdf.  
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The United States has no privacy supervisory agency comparable to those in Europe. The 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is an independent regulatory agency with a broad consumer 
protection jurisdiction whose privacy activities include specific regulatory authority over several 
privacy statutes.191 It also can take action against some commercial enterprises that engage in 
unfair or deceptive trade practices.192 The FTC sometimes uses this authority to enforce privacy 
promises made by companies through privacy policies on their websites. The FTC’s jurisdiction 
over privacy is not as broad as that of EU data protection authorities. For example, the FTC has 
limited or no authority over privacy activities of agencies of the federal government, agencies of 
state and local governments, most non-profit organizations, and many commercial entities 
engaged in transportation, insurance, banking, and telecommunications common carriage. The 
FTC’s jurisdiction over privacy activities of those engaged in missing persons activities may 
depend in part on location and the profit or non-profit status of participants. The FTC is an 
unlikely regulator or overseer of missing persons data activities. 
 
In the context, however, of both EU and US law, some limits of FIPs warrant attention. First, 
while a policy consensus around FIPs generally exists, statutory and other formulations of FIPs 
can vary considerably. 193 The number of principles and the descriptions of each principle can 
differ even when the overall content is similar. For example, the accountability principle for 
compliance with privacy principles can be fulfilled with criminal penalties, civil lawsuits, 
administrative enforcement, arbitration, internal or external audits, complaint processing, staff 
training, and more. The high-level FIPs principles do not prescribe implementation details, 
making the application of FIPs in a particular context more complex than a mechanical 
application of rules. And, second, some—especially in the United States—apply the term Fair 
Information Practices to shortened or amended collections of principles that diverge from the 
international consensus. Nevertheless, FIPs remain a key to understanding both the EU and US 
legal frameworks. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
191 The recently created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau now shares or exercises exclusively some FTC 
authority under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and other laws. The FTC retains its role under the Children’s Online 
Protection Act. 
192 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/45.  
193 Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 
1315 (2000), available at http://reidenberg.home.sprynet.com/international_rules.pdf. 
 
Information Privacy and Data Protection 
 
In the United States, the term information privacy describes concerns related to the collection, use, 
maintenance, and disclosure of personal information. The broader term—privacy—includes 
information privacy as well as many other concerns about freedom from intrusion or disturbance 
in private life or affairs. Most of the rest of the world typically uses the term data protection rather 
than information privacy. In this report, information privacy and data protection are equivalent.  
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Box 2: Do Privacy Rights and Interests Survive Death? 
 
Privacy is usually an attribute of living individuals. Whether privacy rights and interests survive 
death is a complex question that can vary from context to context. The Article 29 Working 
Party established under the EU Data Protection Directive wrote that because the protections 
afforded by the Directive apply to natural persons, personal data protected by the Directive is 
data relating to identified or identifiable living individuals.194 However, the Working Party also 
observed that it may not be clear if an individual is living, that information on dead individuals 
may also relate to living individuals, that rules other than data protection rules may extend 
specific privacy rights after death (noting that medical confidentiality obligations do not end 
with death), and that Member States may extend data protection to cover dead individuals. 
 
In the United States, the answer varies from law to law. For information held by federal 
agencies, the Privacy Act of 1974195 does not grant deceased individuals or their next of kin any 
privacy rights.196 The federal health privacy rule, however, offers a completely different 
approach. The rule issued under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA)197 currently provides that the right of privacy extends forever.198 
 
For missing persons purposes, it may be impractical for any dedicated system to function with a 
rule that terminates privacy interests at death. Even though data may come from sources or 
countries that have privacy-ends-at-death rules, some missing persons information, particularly 
health data, is likely to fall under a policy or law that extends privacy interests after death. 
Further, in the case of missing persons, whether an individual is dead or alive may be unknown. 
There may be a great deal of uncertainty for considerable amounts of data, and it is inevitable 
that some systems will at times wrongly describe individuals as either dead or alive. 
Commercial search engines and some other data systems may provide information regardless of 
the status of the data subject and may not be able to make determinations for data provided from 
disparate sources.   
 
It will likely be impractical for a dedicated missing persons system operating under the 
pressures that accompany disasters to function with privacy rules that vary based on the status 
of individuals. However, it may be possible to consider a different policy with respect to data 
once a disaster ends and missing persons activities for that disaster terminate. Much will depend 
on the longevity of the information in the missing persons data system. 
 
The identification of human remains, an activity often associated with natural disasters, is 
beyond the scope of this report. Even if privacy protections under a national law do not apply to 
dead individuals, legal protections and appropriate procedures will remain relevant. The 2002 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) report discussed commonly accepted 
principles applicable to the identification of human remains, and that report remains a valuable 
resource.199  
                                                
194 Art. 29 Working Party, 01248/07/EN, WP 136, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data 21-22 (June 20, 
2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf.   
195 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
196 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974, at 12 (2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opcl/1974privacyact.pdf.      
197 Pub. L. No. 104–191, tit. 2, § 264, Aug. 21, 1996, 110 Stat. 2033, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note (2006), available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1320d-2.  
198 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(f) (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-
2011-title45-vol1-sec164-502.pdf. The policy is under review. 
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B. Key Legal Privacy Issues 
 
An organization engaged in missing persons activities should consider several key privacy issues 
in order to evaluate whether its system and its information sharing practices conform to 
applicable law. In this section the report reviews these key issues, in each instance comparing the 
US and EU law in order to demonstrate the potential diversity of the legal analysis. The 
considerations for compliance with privacy laws are (1) identification of laws applicable to data 
controllers or record keepers; (2) recognizing the responsibilities of data controllers or record 
keepers (collection, purpose specifications and use limitations); (3) providing the required rights 
to data subjects (notice, consent, access and correction); (4) conforming to export controls; and 
(5) consideration of any special treatment for sensitive data (health information, race, religion). 
1. Data Controllers and Privacy Regulation 
 
The first step a missing persons organization must take is to establish which legal regime or 
regimes will apply to its data system. The location of a data controller or record keeper and the 
type of entity involved typically determine what privacy regime applies. For any missing persons 
organization located in the European Union, the policies set out in the EU Data Protection 
Directive apply through the applicable Member State law.200 However, for many organizations 
located in the United States, it is likely that no privacy statute applies at all. 
 
a) United States 
 
Since the United States lacks a uniform privacy law, organizations based in the United States 
will be subject to privacy regulation only if there is a specific sectoral law addressing their 
industry or type of data collection. No US privacy law applies generally to the data processing 
activities of a non-profit organization or to individuals.201 Federal laws apply, if at all, to 
particular records or record keepers based on the type of entity or the type of records maintained. 
Of existing federal laws, only two appear highly relevant. The first is the Privacy Act of 1974. 202 
The second is the health privacy and security rules issued under HIPAA .203  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
199 International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] Electronic Workshop on the Legal Protection of Personal Data 
& Human Remains, Apr. 2-May 6, 2002, The Legal Protection of Personal Data & Human Remains: Final Report 
and Outcome 16-22 (July 2002), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_themissing_072002_en_1.pdf. 
200 The analysis here assumes that the missing persons entity will not be operated by a defense, public security, or 
criminal law agency not covered by the Directive. See Article 3. 
201 It is possible that a missing persons organization could collect information online from children under 13, which 
would make COPPA relevant, although that result is far from clear. COPPA applies to websites anywhere in the 
world that collect information from children in the United States, but the law does not apply to a non-profit entity. 
See 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2012) (definition of operator), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-
title16-vol1/pdf/CFR-2012-title16-vol1-sec312-2.pdf. 
202 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006), http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
203 Pub. L. No. 104–191, tit. 2, § 264, Aug. 21, 1996, 110 Stat. 2033, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 note, available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/1320d-2.  
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The Privacy Act of 1974 applies to all federal agencies and to some federal contractors204 that 
maintain qualifying records on behalf of an agency to accomplish an agency function. The 
Privacy Act of 1974 requires agencies to comply with a set of FIPs. The Act does not apply to 
federal grantees, individuals or others working with federal agencies in non-contractual 
relationships, recipients of federal funds, non-profits, or other non-federal institutions such as 
corporations, state government, and unions. For missing persons organizations that are not 
federal agencies or contractors, the Privacy Act of 1974 does not apply.    
 
A second class of organizations that might occasionally play a role in missing persons activities 
includes health care providers and health care insurers.205 Most providers and all insurers are 
subject to the HIPAA health privacy and security rules.206 Most dedicated missing persons 
organization would not be considered a covered entity directly subject to the HIPAA rules.207 
However, a missing persons organization might cooperate with HIPAA covered entities in a 
variety of ways. For example, a hospital might be a source of information on the location of 
individuals receiving treatment or a clinic might play another role in coordinating missing 
persons activities for a local disaster. Accepting HIPAA records from a covered entity does not 
subject most recipients to any obligations under the HIPAA rules. 
 
Most US-based organizations and grassroots volunteer groups involved in missing persons 
activities, however, will not fall within the Privacy Act or HIPAA rules and will therefore not be 
subject to privacy regulation under US law with one caveat. In very rare or unlikely scenarios, 
other statutes might conceivably apply. For example, if a financial institution were to operate a 
missing persons database, the privacy rules of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act might apply. 
Similarly, if a commercial organization were to collect personal information through a website 
directed at children in the United States under the age of 13, the Children’s Online Privacy 
Protection Act would apply to its missing persons activities. In practice, these possibilities are 
quite remote. 
 
b) European Union 
 
Under the EU Data Protection Directive, the data controller is responsible for compliance with 
data protection rules and for fulfilling the rights exercised by data subjects.208 The Directive 
defines controller as the person who determines the purposes and means of personal data 
processing.209 Under this broad definition, any missing persons organization that processes 
                                                
204 5 U.S.C. § 552a (m) (2006), http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
205 The rule applies to personal health information held by covered entities, but its privacy protections generally do 
not follow with information disclosed to third parties.  
206 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-
2011-title45-vol1-chapA-subchapC.pdf. 
207 Most components of the US Department of Health and Human Services that provide treatment or pay for health 
care are covered entities subject to HIPAA rules. The National Library of Medicine, an HHS component, is not a 
HIPAA covered entity for its routine functions. 
208 See, generally, Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, 00264/10/EN, WP 169, Opinion 1/2010 on the Concepts of 
"Controller" and "Processor" (Feb. 16, 2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp169_en.pdf.  
209 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 2(d), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
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personal data in the European Union, whether government, corporate, or non-profit, is subject to 
the regulations set forth in the Directive.   
 
For missing persons information systems, the following organizations may qualify as data 
controllers: 
 
• Organizations maintaining missing persons databases 
• Organizations offering defined search parameters for third-party data 
• Organizations conducting online searches 
 
The location of a data controller is also essential for determining the application of national law. 
Within the European Union, a Member State applies its national law to processing “carried out in 
the context of an establishment of the controller on the territory of the Member State.”210 If a 
controller is established in more than one Member State, each establishment of the controller 
must comply with the applicable national law.211 A proposed European data privacy regulation 
would, however, result in a single applicable European level law. 
 
Modern information and communications technologies compound the problems of determining 
the applicable national law under the EU Data Protection Directive. The Article 29 Working 
Party (a group established by the EU Data Protection Directive and comprised of the national 
data protection agencies) expressed the difficulties well in a recent report: 
 
The complexity of applicable law issues is also growing due to increased 
globalisation and the development of new technologies: companies are 
increasingly operating in different jurisdictions, providing services and assistance 
around-the-clock; the Internet makes it much easier to provide services from a 
distance and to collect and share personal data in a virtual environment; cloud 
computing makes it difficult to determine the location of personal data and of the 
equipment being used at any given time.212 
 
Determining the location of data processing activities is a challenge in a world characterized by 
expansive Internet connectivity and global cloud computing. Not only is it hard to determine the 
actual location of some processing activities, but that location may vary from day to day or from 
minute to minute. Nevertheless, each data controller participating in missing persons data 
activities has a physical location somewhere that likely determines which national law (or laws) 
applies to that controller. 
 
While all EU Member State laws must meet the standards established in the Data Protection 
Directive, national privacy laws are not identical. For example, sensitive data protections are not 
                                                
210 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 4(1)(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
211 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 4(1)(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
212 Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, 0836-02/10/EN, WP 179, Opinion 8/2010 on Applicable Law 6 (Dec. 16, 
2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp179_en.pdf.  
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always identical, and laws may conflict. This presents strategic choices to a data controller that 
has the ability to select a location for its activities. The variance in national laws suggests that 
there may be an advantage for a data controller to be located in one country rather than another 
because of (a) the substantive requirements of one country’s law (e.g., presence or terms of a 
security breach notification requirement); (b) different penalties for noncompliance; (c) the Data 
Protection Authority that has primary jurisdiction to enforce the law or to grant broad processing 
authority; or (d) other strategic operational reasons.   
 
A complication arises if an organization in an EU Member State processes data under a 
contractual arrangement with an entity or person in the European Union or in a third country. 
That organization might be a processor rather than a controller with respect to the data. A 
processor is someone who processes personal data on behalf of a controller.213 Privacy 
obligations attach to processors through their contractual arrangements rather than by direct 
application of the EU Data Protection Directive’s standards. 
 
Determining whether an entity is a controller or processor can be difficult. For example, if an 
individual within Europe uses someone else’s data through an Internet link just as any other user 
around the world, the data protection status of the data does not change. However, if an EU 
entity uses, accesses, updates, or otherwise actively processes data from a third country in some 
independent fashion—perhaps because the data includes information about EU citizens or their 
relatives—the status may be more ambiguous. Merely processing data on the instructions of a 
foreign entity would likely leave processor status unchanged. However, if an EU entity on its 
own initiative modifies the data, it might no longer be a mere processor but rather become a data 
controller with respect to the data. The status of a controller and a processor depends on the 
relationship and the legal arrangements between them. The allocation of processing 
responsibilities among multiple parties determines the application of EU data protection rules.  
2. Collection, Purpose Specification, and Use Limitation 
 
Missing persons organizations collect, use, and disclose personal information to each other and 
to the public in order to assist individuals affected by disasters including the families and friends 
of those missing. Data protection rules and policies set some boundaries on this personal data 
processing. This section discusses some of the boundaries.  
 
Under US law, the Privacy Act and the HIPAA rules limit how information may be collected, 
what purposes the information may be used for, and to whom it may be disclosed. However, as 
discussed in the previous section, these restrictions apply only to a limited subset of missing 
persons organizations. 
 
                                                
213 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 2(e), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. A processor must be a separate 
legal entity from the controller for which it processes data. Art. 29 Working Party, 00264/10/EN, WP 169, Opinion 
1/2010 on the Concepts of "Controller" and "Processor" 25 (Feb. 16, 2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wp169_en.pdf. 
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In contrast, in the European Union, anyone processing personal data must adhere to regulations 
requiring that data is fairly and lawfully collected and processed only as provided under the 
Directive.   
 
a) United States 
 
Many US record keepers engaged in missing persons activities, and especially non-profit record 
keepers, are not subject to statutory limits on collection, use, or disclosure of the personal 
information they maintain. Where federal privacy laws apply, some impose restrictions on use, 
disclosure, or both. First, the Privacy Act of 1974 imposes some limits on collection, use, and 
disclosure for federal agencies engaged in missing persons activities.214 Second, the health 
privacy rules under HIPAA set some additional rules for certain health care entities.   
 
Several federal agencies utilize existing authority215 to coordinate missing persons activities 
within the United States and these agencies are subject to some restrictions under the Privacy 
Act. First, the Act requires collection of information “to the greatest extent practicable” directly 
from the data subject when the information may result in an adverse determination about the 
individual under a federal program.216 This restriction on information collection is not likely to 
be limiting in disaster situations because adverse determinations are not likely outcomes of 
missing persons databases, though they are possible if someone listed as missing loses benefits 
as a consequence. 
 
Second, the Privacy Act of 1974 generally limits an agency’s ability to disclose data to third 
parties, including other federal agencies. The Act does, however, authorize two broad categories 
of disclosure for records maintained in a system of records.217 The first category of authorized 
disclosure relevant to a missing person function is found in subsection (b)(8), which provides for 
disclosure   
 
to a person pursuant to a showing of compelling circumstances affecting the 
health or safety of an individual if upon such disclosure notification is transmitted 
to the last known address of such individual. 218 
 
                                                
214 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
215 The Act requires that an agency maintain in its records only information relevant and necessary to accomplish a 
purpose of the agency as determined by statute or Executive Order. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (2006), 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
216 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(2) (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
217 Most of the requirements of the Privacy Act of 1974 attach to a system of records maintained by a federal agency. 
A system of records is a group of records controlled by an agency from which information is retrieved by an 
individual identifier. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(5), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. The test set 
out in the law is a factual one. Whether an agency actually retrieves a record by individual identifier determines 
whether the Act applies to a collection of records. 
218 5 U.S.C. §552a(b), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. The Act does not cover all 
personal information held by federal agencies. The Act applies only to records maintained in a system of records if 
the agency actually retrieves the records by individual identifier. The definitions of the italicized terms are at 5 
U.S.C. § 552a(a). While personal information held by agencies that is not subject to the Privacy Act may often be 
unrestricted in how it can be disclosed, the likelihood is that most federal agency records relevant to disaster 
situations will be kept in systems of records subject to the Act. 
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Some disaster disclosures might qualify under this exception, but the mere sharing of location 
information in non-emergency situations may not meet the “compelling circumstances affecting 
the health or safety of an individual” test. Further, the requirement for sending notification of the 
disclosure would be troublesome and perhaps meaningless in disasters. The provision illustrates 
how an existing privacy law, even one containing an exception for emergency disclosures, does 
not adequately address the circumstances of missing persons. 
 
The second category of allowable disclosures gives each agency the ability to establish an 
additional legal basis for disclosure without consent.219 The Act allows each agency to define for 
itself a set of disclosures—called routine uses220—that the agency is authorized to make. Under 
this authority, an agency engaged in any type of disaster relief activity can decide within broad 
limits how to share information about missing persons. 
 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is frequently involved in disaster relief 
and provides an example of how this “routine use” exception can play out in a real disaster 
scenario. FEMA operates a system of records entitled National Emergency Family Registry and 
Locator System (NEFRLS) System of Records.221 Two of the routine uses articulated by FEMA 
for this system allow disclosure: 
 
I. To the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children and voluntary 
organizations as defined in 44 CFR 206.2(a)(27) that have an established disaster 
assistance program to address the disaster-related unmet needs of disaster victims, 
are actively involved in the recovery efforts of the disaster, and either have a 
national membership, in good standing, with the National Voluntary 
Organizations Active in Disaster, or are participating in the disaster's Long-Term 
Recovery Committee for the express purpose of reunifying families.  
 
J. To Federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, international, or foreign agencies that 
coordinate with FEMA under the National Response Framework (an integrated 
plan explaining how the Federal government will interact with and support state, 
local, tribal, territorial, and non-governmental entities during a Presidentially-
declared disaster or emergency) for the purpose of assisting with the investigation 
on the whereabouts of or locating missing persons.  
 
These routines uses are reasonable examples of how an agency with the requisite mission can use 
its Privacy Act authority to allow wholesale disclosures to fulfill that mission. In this case, those 
purposes are to reunite families and help to locate missing persons by cooperating with others 
engaged in missing persons activities. The FEMA system allows broad disclosure to voluntary 
organizations and to federal, state, and international agencies involved in missing persons 
                                                
219 An agency may always disclose a record with the written consent of the data subject. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b) (2006), 
available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
220 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3) (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. A routine use is a use 
compatible with the purpose for which the record was collected. Id. at § 552a(a)(7). 
221 “DHS/FEMA–001 National Emergency Family Registry and Locator System (NEFRLS) System of Records,” 
Office of the Federal Register, Privacy Act Issuances online database, accessed July 23, 2012, 
http://www.ofr.gov/Privacy/2011/fema.aspx#fema1. A statute expressly directs the establishment and operation of 
the system. 6 U.S.C. § 775 (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/6/775. 
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activities. The routine use exception also allows FEMA to disclose information as routine uses to 
the Department of Justice (for litigation); to the Congress (for constituent assistance); to the 
Department of Homeland Security (for computer security); and to federal, state, local, tribal, 
territorial, international, or foreign law enforcement agencies (for prosecuting violations of 
law).222   
 
These routine uses, commonly found in many Privacy Act systems of records, are in addition to 
routine uses that would allow disclosures for missing persons activities. Other federal agencies 
that engage in disaster relief activities by statutory mandate likely have similarly broad authority 
to define expansive routine uses and those that do not have a specific statutory mandate might 
establish a routine use authority under a presidential executive order issued in connection with 
the disaster. However, an agency seeking to establish a routine use must first publish a notice in 
the Federal Register and consider public comments, a lengthy process.223 This means that it is 
not practical to create a routine use following a disaster because a routine use normally cannot 
take effect until 30 days after publication. Ideally, an agency will anticipate the need for disaster 
disclosures. 
 
One noteworthy consequence of the FEMA routine use disclosure authority is that the Privacy 
Act of 1974’s disclosure restrictions do not apply to a third party, such as an individual 
volunteer, who receives a record disclosed under a routine use. Recipients of Privacy Act records 
can use and disclose the records without restriction under the Act. The only exception to this 
general rule is when a federal agency discloses a record to another federal agency that maintains 
the record in its own system of records.224 In that case, the disclosed record then becomes subject 
to the disclosure authority of the recipient agency’s system of records.  
 
The Privacy Act of 1974 has other relevant provisions. For example, the law allows an agency to 
maintain only information as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency as 
established by law.225 In addition, the Privacy Act limits internal agency use to officers and 
employees of the agency that maintains a record who have a need for the record in the 
performance of their duties.226   
 
Other specific laws applicable to an agency may further restrict an agency’s authority to disclose 
personal information pursuant to a routine use, or they may give the agency expanded authority 
to make disclosures. For example, the HIPAA health privacy rule narrows the authority to 
disclose records otherwise found in the Privacy Act of 1974 for certain entities. HIPAA 
generally applies to health care providers and health insurers, and some federal agencies are 
                                                
222 National Emergency Family Registry and Locator System, 76 Fed. Reg. 53,918 (noticed Aug. 30, 2011), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-08-30/html/2011-22167.htm.  
223 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4)(d), (e)(11), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
224 Disclosure under the Privacy Act of 1974 would not stop other laws from applying. Thus, information about an 
individual disclosed from a federal system of records to a hospital covered by the HIPAA privacy rule would 
normally be subject to the HIPAA rule in the hands of the recipient hospital. In addition, an agency might use a 
contract or other instrument to control reuse and redisclosure. 
225 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
226 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1) (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
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covered entities under HIPAA for some functions. 227 The health privacy rule limits use and 
disclosure without consent, but has many exceptions to those limitations. For example, 
disclosures of health records to law enforcement, national security agencies, public health 
agencies, research entities, and many others are allowable under varying procedures and 
conditions.228 The health privacy rule does not limit collection in any meaningful way. 
 
Of particular relevance, HIPAA gives a covered entity considerable authority to disclose patient 
information without patient consent in disaster situations.229 One provision expressly covers 
disaster relief: 
 
(4) Use and disclosures for disaster relief purposes. A covered entity may use or 
disclose protected health information to a public or private entity authorized by 
law or by its charter to assist in disaster relief efforts, for the purpose of 
coordinating with such entities the uses or disclosures permitted by paragraph 
(b)(1)(ii) of this section. The requirements in paragraphs (b)(2) and (3) of this 
section apply to such uses and disclosure to the extent that the covered entity, in 
the exercise of professional judgment, determines that the requirements do not 
interfere with the ability to respond to the emergency circumstances.230 
 
The effect of this provision is to allow a HIPAA covered entity to cooperate with public or 
private disaster relief organizations.231 Information disclosed to a disaster relief organization that 
is not a covered entity itself is not subject to HIPAA restrictions in the hands of the recipient. 
Thus, a recipient can use and disclose the information without regard to the HIPAA standards. 
 
                                                
227 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-
2011-title45-vol1-chapA-subchapC.pdf. 
228 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-
title45-vol1-sec164-512.pdf. 
229 In promulgating the health privacy rule, the Department of Health and Human Services said: “We encourage 
disaster relief organizations to protect the privacy of individual health information to the extent practicable in a 
disaster situation. However, we recognize that the nature of disaster situations often makes it impossible or 
impracticable for disaster relief organizations and covered entities to seek individual agreement or authorization 
before disclosing protected health information necessary for providing disaster relief. Thus, we note that we do not 
intend to impede disaster relief organizations in their critical mission to save lives and reunite loved ones and friends 
in disaster situations.” 65 Fed. Reg. 82,524 (Dec. 28, 2000), 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164, available at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2000/12/28/00-32678/standards-for-privacy-of-individually-identifiable-
health-information#h-148.  
230 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(b)(4) (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-
2011-title45-vol1-sec164-510.pdf. Paragraph (b)(2) effectively gives some patients the ability to prevent disaster 
relief disclosures, while paragraph (b)(3) gives covered entities discretion to disclose when the patient is not present 
or is incapacitated. The disclosure authority in the disaster relief section is broad, but the general HIPAA rule that 
disclosures must be limited to the minimum amount of information necessary to accomplish the purpose of the 
disclosure serves to limit the breadth of any disclosure. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-title45-vol1-sec164-502.pdf. 
231 In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Department of Health and Human Services published a 
bulletin reminding covered entities of their authority. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. Office for Civil 
Rights, Hurricane Katrina Bulletin: HIPAA Privacy and Disclosures in Emergency Situations (2005), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/special/emergency/katrinanhipaa.pdf.  
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A separate provision of HIPAA addresses disclosures to a public health authority. This provision 
allows a covered entity to disclose protected health information to:   
 
A public health authority that is authorized by law to collect or receive such 
information for the purpose of preventing or controlling disease, injury, or 
disability, including, but not limited to, the reporting of disease, injury, vital 
events such as birth or death, and the conduct of public health surveillance, public 
health investigations, and public health interventions; or, at the direction of a 
public health authority, to an official of a foreign government agency that is 
acting in collaboration with a public health authority.232 
 
Some public health functions are relevant to disaster activities, though it is not clear on the face 
of the rule whether public health activities include locating missing persons. However, HIPAA’s 
main disaster relief disclosure provision is broad enough to allow disclosures to public health 
authorities engaged in appropriate disaster relief efforts, including locating missing persons. 
 
For missing persons organizations that are neither federal agencies nor HIPAA covered entities, 
no federal privacy laws apply. Importantly, for the relevant federal agencies and health care 
providers engaged in disaster relief, the federal privacy laws are not likely to erect any 
insurmountable barriers to cooperation with missing persons organizations. 
 
b) European Union 
 
The standards in the EU Data Protection Directive require Member States to establish privacy 
rules covering collection, use, and disclosure. The general policy that the Directive implements is 
that anyone processing personal data must respect privacy, must process data fairly and lawfully, 
and must have consent or a lawful reason to process the data. The Directive states that “personal 
data must be collected for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes and not further processed 
in a way incompatible with those purposes.”233 This is a sharp contrast with the United States, 
where most record keepers face no similar statutory privacy barrier to processing. 
 
Another Directive provision lays out legitimate purposes for data processing. One basis for 
processing is the unambiguous consent of the data subject,234 but consent is infrequently an 
option for missing persons activities.   
 
                                                
232 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(1)(i) (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title45-
vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-title45-vol1-sec164-512.pdf. 
233 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 6(1)(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. The Directive’s 
incompatibility standard and the definition of a routine use under the Privacy Act of 1974 both suggest a significant 
degree of vagueness. A routine use is a disclosure “compatible with the purpose” for which a record was collected. 
The compatible standard and the incompatible standard share a common root. Both standards reflect the 
fundamental difficulty of establishing a bright-line rule defining allowable disclosures for disparate activities. 
234 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 7(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
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The Directive’s other processing justifications potentially relevant to missing persons 
organizations allow processing when it is necessary: 
 
• “for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller is subject”235  
• “in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject”236 
• “for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of 
official authority vested in the controller or in a third party to whom the data are 
disclosed”237  
• “for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by the third party 
or parties to whom the data are disclosed, except where such interests are overridden by  
the interests for fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject”238 
 
Under the first prong of this justification, the entity must find the processing necessary. While 
the meaning of necessary is subject to national interpretation and thought to be a high standard, 
the compelling urgency expressed by individuals worldwide to learn of the safety and location of 
their loved ones following natural disasters ought to rise to the level of necessity for most 
missing persons information processing.  
 
Next, the processing must satisfy either a vital interest, a public interest, or a legitimate interest. 
The processing of missing persons information could qualify under each of the interest standards 
in the context in which they appear.   
 
An Article 29 Working Party document discusses what it means to protect the vital interests of 
the data subject or of another person where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of 
giving his consent. The Working Party concludes: 
 
The processing must relate to essential individual interests of the data subject or 
of another person and it must—in the medical context—be necessary for a life-
saving treatment in a situation where the data subject is not able to express his 
intentions. Accordingly, this exception could be applied only to a small number of 
cases of treatment and could not be used at all to justify processing personal 
medical data for purposes other than treatment of the data subject such as, for 
example, to carry out general medical research.239   
                                                
235 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 7(c), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
236 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 7(d), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
237 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 7(e), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
238 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 7(f), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
239 Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, 00323/07/EN, WP 131, Working Document on the Processing of Personal 
Data Relating to Health in Electronic Health Records (EHR) 9 (Feb. 15, 2007), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp131_en.pdf.  
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This suggests that the vital interest test might be available to justify individual actions but not 
large-scale data activities. 
 
A strong case can be made that data subjects have a vital interest in sharing information about 
their status with remote relatives in disaster situations. Similarly, connecting individuals with 
missing relatives and friends appears to be a task in the public interest. Finally, a data controller 
seeking to connect families and missing persons pursues a legitimate interest. In addition, the 
non-profit nature of missing persons activities—no matter the actual profit or non-profit status of 
the data controller carrying out the function—underscores that both public and legitimate 
interests are involved. Under these standards, the processing of personal information by a 
missing persons organization would likely be consistent with the EU Data Protection Directive.   
 
However, many data controllers holding information that may be relevant to missing persons 
activities are not primarily missing persons organizations. Often these controllers have not 
established in advance that their data processing may have value following a natural disaster. 
Questions therefore arise whether the disclosure of their records for missing persons purposes is 
allowable under data protection rules.   
 
For EU purposes, missing persons processing by other data controllers would, hopefully, qualify 
under one or more of the vital interest, public interest, or legitimate interest standards just as 
processing by missing persons organizations would. The EU Data Protection Directive provides 
that information collected for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes may not be further 
processed “in a way incompatible with those purposes.”240 The processing of information not 
explicitly collected for missing persons purposes is potentially compatible with the original 
purposes in most cases because of the humanitarian objective of the disclosure. This 
interpretation, however, likely requires confirmation in each Member State. 
 
The issue is well-illustrated by the New Zealand temporary code, which expressly authorized 
data controllers to collect, use, or disclose personal information for purposes directly related to 
the government response to the Christchurch earthquake emergency.241 The code effectively 
authorized appropriate disclosures by other data controllers for disaster purposes. Whether the 
New Zealand code provided new authority or merely confirmed that existing law was broad 
enough to allow for disaster disclosures, the policy and the result are the same.   
 
There is a strong case to be made that processing of personal information by missing persons 
organizations and by other data controllers engaged in missing persons activities is permissible 
under the EU Data Protection Directive. However, in both cases, official clarification from 
national legislation or from a Data Protection Authority would be reassuring to all so that no one 
                                                
240 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 6(1)(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
241 Christchurch Earthquake (Information Sharing) Code 2011 (Temporary) (N.Z.), Feb. 24, 2011, available at 
http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Christchurch-Earthquake-Information-Sharing-Code-
2011-Temporary-incorporating-Amendments-No-1-and-No-2.doc.  
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need raise the question in the middle of a disaster.242 Confirmation would be particularly useful 
for disclosure models that provide broad public access to the missing persons information. 
Collecting personal information—especially information of the breadth included in missing 
persons databases—for public access is not a familiar model of data processing. Because it 
appears that at least some public access to the information may be essential to carry out the 
mission of reuniting families, clarification that the processing meets legal standards would be 
reassuring.   
 
This is not to suggest that a natural disaster is carte blanche to process data without any regard to 
privacy obligations. The processing of missing persons data is still subject to the privacy rules 
applicable to data controllers. An important element of these policies is the durational limit 
placed on processing activities. Policies that can adapt to allow processing activities in 
emergency circumstances need not remain loosened indefinitely. When an emergency ends, 
restoring traditional privacy standards and relying more on consent are part of an appropriate 
balance of interests. 
 
Missing persons organizations also may face more routine requests or demands for personal 
information from law enforcement agencies, public health agencies, health care providers, 
litigants, and others who may seek to avoid normal restrictions on their access to information. 
Here, too, missing persons organizations are in a similar situation to other data controllers, and 
they must take the range of possible disclosures into account in privacy policies and in operating 
rules. More traditional privacy analyses and balancing of interests are likely to apply to these 
disclosure possibilities. When these potential disclosures do not relate to emergency 
circumstances, traditional balancing of interests may apply as they would with any other record 
keeper. 
3. Rights of Individuals: Notice, Consent, Access, and Correction  
 
Missing persons organizations also must be aware of rights granted to data subjects by data 
protection regimes and must respect these rights where applicable. The rights typically include 
notice, access, the ability to seek correction of personal data, and the ability to give consent or 
object to processing of data. None of these rights is absolute, and exceptions typically exist. In 
the United States, there is no universal privacy law, and many data subjects have no legally 
required individual privacy rights. In the European Union, however, data subjects are granted a 
comprehensive list of rights that processors must respect.  
                                                
242 The 2002 ICRC Workshop reached a similar conclusion. International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] 
Electronic Workshop on the Legal Protection of Personal Data & Human Remains, Apr. 2-May 6, 2002, The Legal 
Protection of Personal Data & Human Remains: Final Report and Outcome 12 (July 2002), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_themissing_072002_en_1.pdf.  (“In obtaining data on natural living 
or deceased persons from private or public sources, assurances should thus be sought that the data may be disclosed 
because: 
• the data were collected to establish the identity, whereabouts or fate of missing persons; 
• disclosure is not incompatible with the purpose for which the data were collected or obtained; 
• the data are derived from publicly accessible sources (such as public or professional registers or published 
directories); or 
• the disclosure serves a vital interest of the data subject or a close relative of the data subject and the data 
subject is physically or legally incapable of consenting to the disclosure.”) 
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a) United States 
 
The absence of a universal data protection law in the United States means that data subjects have 
no uniform rights. For many types of records and for many types of record keepers, no law gives 
data subjects any privacy rights at all. 
 
A few laws do provide rights for certain types of records or data subjects. The Privacy Act of 
1974243 requires public notice of record keeping activities244 and mandates some disclosures to 
data subjects at the time of data collection.245 The law gives citizens and aliens lawfully admitted 
for permanent residence (but not foreign nationals) a right of access to many personal records 
held by federal agencies.246 The law provides the right to seek amendment of records as well.247 
A data subject may consent to disclosure, but the statute and agency implementation provide for 
nearly all disclosures so that agencies rarely seek consent in practice.248   
 
The HIPAA health privacy rule applicable to health care providers and health insurers gives all 
data subjects (including foreign nationals) rights of access,249 amendment,250 and consent.251 
HIPAA provides for a public notice of information practices.252 Data subjects may consent253 to 
or object to disclosures.254 As with the Privacy Act of 1974, the rights to consent or object often 
have limited practical value. A few other laws provide comparable rights for some other records, 
but legally enforceable data subject privacy rights are not common in the United States.  
 
Some private sector record keepers in the United States choose to give data subjects rights of 
notice, access, amendment, or consent. Because of variability in practice, it is difficult to 
describe the extent to which data subjects have these rights or whether they can enforce the rights 
                                                
243 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. The federal Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) provides a foreign national with a process to access federal agency records, including 
records about himself or herself. 5 U.S.C. § 552, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552. The law 
provides a partial substitute for rights available to citizens and resident aliens under the Privacy Act of 1974. 
However, the FOIA does not provide correction opportunities. At times, federal agencies will as a matter of 
discretion honor requests from foreign nationals for access and correction in accordance with Privacy Act of 1974 
procedures. However, even if an agency accepts a request on a discretionary basis, a foreign national may have no 
right to appeal or enforce an agency decision. 
244 5 U.S.C.§ 552a(e)(4) (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
245 5 U.S.C.§ 552a(e)(3) (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
246 5 U.S.C.§ 552a(d) (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
247 5 U.S.C.§ 552a(d)(2) (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
248 5 U.S.C.§ 552a(b) (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
249 45 C.F.R.§ 164.524 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-
title45-vol1-sec164-524.pdf. 
250 45 C.F.R.§ 164.526 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-
title45-vol1-sec164-526.pdf. 
251 45 C.F.R.§ 164.508 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-
title45-vol1-sec164-508.pdf. 
252 45 C.F.R.§ 164.520 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-
title45-vol1-sec164-520.pdf. 
253 45 C.F.R.§ 164.508 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-
title45-vol1-sec164-508.pdf. 
254 45 C.F.R.§ 164.524 (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2011-title45-vol1/pdf/CFR-2011-
title45-vol1-sec164-524.pdf. 
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in any effective way. On the Internet, it has become a more common practice in recent years for 
websites (commercial and non-commercial) to post privacy policies that offer data subjects 
notice of privacy practices, the ability to request access to records, and the opportunity to request 
amendment. These practices are not universal, and the promises offered in privacy policies may 
not be legally enforceable, especially for non-commercial websites. Further, voluntary privacy 
policies and terms of service are typically changeable at any time for any reason by a website 
operator. State laws occasionally impose requirements on commercial website operators to 
provide some data subject rights. 
 
It is possible for a website in the United States—particularly a non-commercial website—to 
process personal data without providing data subjects any rights at all. The processing of 
personal data for missing persons purposes by organizations that are neither federal agencies nor 
health care providers faces few, if any, statutory data protection mandates in the United States. 
 
b) European Union 
 
The EU Data Protection Directive provides data subjects with a range of rights that data 
controllers must respect. These rights include a right of access, right of correction, right to 
notice, and right to consent to processing. Each is discussed in turn below. 
 
The Directive provides subjects with the right to access their records and the right to correct the 
records if inaccurate or incomplete.255 A data subject may also ask for the erasure or blocking of 
data if processing does not comply with the Directive’s standards “in particular because of the 
incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data.”256   
 
Data subjects also are granted a right to notice of data processing, which can be complex for 
missing persons activities. When a data controller collects information from the data subject, the 
EU Data Protection Directive’s standards oblige the data controller to provide basic information 
about the processing, including the identity of the controller, the purposes of the collection, the 
                                                
255 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 12, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. The 2002 ICRC Workshop 
considered allowing third parties (e.g., relatives) to exercise data subject access rights for “humanitarian reasons.” 
This may be a possibility, although providing information to these third parties as a disclosure rather than as an 
exercise of data subject access rights may work just as well. See International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] 
Electronic Workshop on the Legal Protection of Personal Data & Human Remains, Apr. 2-May 6, 2002, The Legal 
Protection of Personal Data & Human Remains: Final Report and Outcome 6 (July 2002), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_themissing_072002_en_1.pdf.  (“For humanitarian reasons—to help 
locate missing persons and human remains—it may therefore be necessary for data protection legislation in some 
States to be amended to allow access by third parties to such personal information for humanitarian reasons. 
Provisions in data protection legislation that allow disclosure ‘in the public interest’ may be too vague to ensure that 
third parties seeking to locate missing persons can obtain access to the necessary information. These third parties 
could include family members or others with a legitimate interest in helping to locate the person. Alternatively, 
freedom of information legislation could be amended to allow certain persons a right of access to information about 
missing persons if that is in the interests of the missing person or family members, or if it would otherwise serve the 
public interest.”) 
256 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 12(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
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recipients of the data, and the rights of the data subjects, at the time of collection.257 When 
information comes from a source other than the data subject, the Directive’s standards call for 
notice “at the time of undertaking the recording of personal data” or at the time of the first 
disclosure to a third party.258 When data is collected from a third party, notice is not required if it 
would be “impossible” or “involve a disproportionate effort.”259 For data controllers of missing 
persons information, these exceptions to the notice requirement likely apply because the data 
subjects are, by definition, missing. However, to the extent that missing persons information is 
collected from known individuals (e.g., emergency workers, friends, etc.), those data subjects 
may be entitled to notice. 
 
When notice is required in a missing persons context, compliance will be a particular challenge. 
A missing persons organization may collect information from disparate sources, may process it 
in various locations, may share the information with governmental or other organizations, and 
may disclose the information publicly. Often many uses of the data will be unknown at the time 
of collection. An individual seeking information about another might be the source of some 
information. Public authorities or anyone else might publicly post information about found 
persons. Disclosure could occur through the publication of a list of found individuals with 
current locations, through sharing with other missing persons organizations, or through an 
inquiry–response system that supports queries about the location and status of individuals 
identified by the inquirer.  
 
For missing persons, notice to a data subject would in many circumstances be impossible 
because the location of the individual is unknown or because communications are not possible. 
Providing notice would also likely involve a disproportionate effort because of the difficulty or 
expense of providing notice to an individual at the site of a disaster. A data protection notice 
would be a low priority at a time when resources are scarce and communications are challenging. 
 
Data subjects also have a right to consent to processing. Like the right to notice, this right can 
pose logistical hurdles for missing persons activities. Missing persons organizations often 
process personal data about individuals without notice to the individuals and without consent. 
Obtaining consent from a missing person is clearly impractical at best and impossible at worst.260 
                                                
257 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 10, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 41, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
258 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 11(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 41, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
259 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 11(2), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. Other exceptions cover 
recording or disclosure expressly required by law. In cases where notice is not required, Member States provide 
“appropriate safeguards.” Id. 
260 The 2002 ICRC Workshop discussed the difficulty of obtaining consent. International Committee of the Red 
Cross [ICRC] Electronic Workshop on the Legal Protection of Personal Data & Human Remains, Apr. 2-May 6, 
2002, The Legal Protection of Personal Data & Human Remains: Final Report and Outcome 6 (July 2002), 
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_themissing_072002_en_1.pdf.  (“Given the nature of the 
information relative to missing persons, obtaining the consent of subjects on whom information is collected and 
processed may be inappropriate or impossible. The collection of personal data for the purpose of locating a missing 
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The processing may nevertheless be consistent with the Directive’s policy under the 
impossibility or disproportionate effort standards.   
 
This discussion of the rights of data subjects is not exhaustive. It is foreseeable that not all 
individuals whose information resides in a missing persons database will be missing. A database 
may maintain information on aid workers, individuals who provide data, individuals providing 
assistance (“John Doe is living at the home of Mary Smith”), or others. For some of these 
individuals, missing persons organization may be more able to provide standard data protection 
rights without relying on exceptions or special circumstances. If individuals provide their own 
information directly, it may not be difficult to provide notice at the time of collection through a 
website. If information about aid workers comes through a third-party assistance organization, it 
may take some cooperation to ask the organization to provide the notice.   
4. Export Controls 
 
The international transfer of personal information is a basic activity for all organizations 
involved in missing persons activities. Transfers may not arise in every instance, but many 
disasters affect more than one country, result in the movement of individuals from one country to 
another, or give rise to inquiries across borders. For this reason, the imposition of limits on the 
export of personal data is a significant issue. This section reviews the export restrictions in place 
under both US and EU law. In the United States there are no relevant export restrictions on 
missing persons information systems. The European Union however has complex regulations 
about data export that may limit many transfers of personal information in missing persons 
activities. 
 
a) United States 
 
US privacy law imposes few personal data export restrictions and none known to be relevant to 
missing persons activities.261 The location of data storage may be a disclosure requirement in 
privacy notices under some laws. Security requirements may make some international transfers 
more challenging in some administrative or technical ways. However, in general, nothing in US 
law prevents record keepers in commercial or non-profit organizations from exporting personal 
data collected for missing person purposes to another country regardless of the privacy rules 
applicable in that country. 
 
b) European Union 
 
The European Union treats personal data exports much differently than the United States. The 
European Union limits the export of personal data from the European Union to third countries, 
though personal data can move from third countries to EU missing persons organizations 
                                                                                                                                                       
person can, however, be considered to be clearly in the interests of that person. Hence, personal information to be 
used for that purpose could be collected without the individual’s consent or knowledge.”) 
261 Some data export restrictions exist, but they appear to be rare. For example, Internal Revenue Service rules 
prohibit disclosure of Social Security Numbers to a tax return preparer outside the United States even with taxpayer 
consent. 26 C.F.R. § 301.7216-3(b)(4) (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title26-
vol18/pdf/CFR-2012-title26-vol18-sec301-7216-3.pdf. 
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because EU data protection laws do not specifically restrict data imports. A major part of the EU 
Data Protection Directive specifically addresses the transfer of personal data to third countries 
that are not EU Member States. The policy objective of data export restrictions is clear: personal 
data protected in the European Union may lose its protection if transferred to a third country that 
does not provide similar legal protections. A recital in the Directive states the policy thusly: 
 
Whereas … the transfer of personal data to a third country which does not ensure 
an adequate level of protection must be prohibited.262 
 
Articles 25 and 26 of the Directive establish the principles and procedures behind export controls 
and set out permissible derogations from those controls. The law and practice governing transfers 
is one of the most complex parts of the Directive and national laws of Member States.   
 
Article 25 provides that data transfers to a third country are permissible if the third country 
“ensures an adequate level of protection.”263 The details and procedures for an adequacy 
determination are not simple. The European Commission recognizes twelve countries that 
provide adequate protection. These are Andorra, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, 
Faeroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Jersey, Paraguay, and Uruguay. In addition, the 
Commission recognizes as adequate the transfer of personal data under the US Department of 
Commerce's Safe Harbor Framework and the transfer of Air Passenger Name Records to the US 
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection.264 
 
Data transfers among EU Member States and data transfers from EU Member States to a data 
controller in a country found adequate are permissible. However, that does not end the data 
export inquiry. In order for a third country to be adequate, the third country must itself impose 
data export restrictions. As explained by the Article 29 Working Party, one of the basic 
requirements for a finding of adequacy for data protection in a third country is a restriction on 
further transfers. 
 
[F]urther transfers of the personal data from the destination third country to 
another third country should be permitted only where the second third country 
also affords an adequate level of protection. The only exceptions permitted should 
be in line with Article 26 of the directive.265 
 
                                                
262 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, recital 57, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 37, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
263 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 25(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 45, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
264 European Commission, Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third 
Countries, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/international-
transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm  (last updated Apr. 10, 2012). 
265 Art. 29 Working Party, XV D/5020/97-EN final, WP 4, First orientations on Transfers of Personal Data to Third 
Countries—Possible Ways Forward in Assessing Adequacy 3(i) (June 26, 1997), available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/1997/wp4_en.pdf.  
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Thus, locating a missing persons activity in an adequate country does not completely solve the 
export issue.  
 
In the absence of adequacy, EU law may still allow data exports. Article 26 of the EU Data 
Protection Directive provides exceptions. The exceptions that may be helpful in a missing 
persons context are discussed in the following:   
 
• Consent. Transfers are permissible when the data subject has given unambiguous consent 
to the transfer.266 As previously indicated, consent is not likely to be practical for many 
missing persons disclosures, but might be helpful in the case of personal information 
related to data submitters, such as relief workers or family members.   
• Contractual Performance. Transfers are permissible when necessary for the 
performance of a contract between the data subject and the controller.267 Transfers are 
also permissible when necessary for the conclusion of or performance of a contract 
concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller and a third party. 
Missing persons activities do not involve contracts with data subjects, but transfers under 
agreements between controllers and missing persons organizations to help locate missing 
persons may qualify for this exception. 
• Contractual Clauses. Transfers to a data controller in a country not found to be adequate 
can occur if accomplished pursuant to contractual clauses meeting standards established 
by the European Union.268 Missing persons organizations sharing information among 
themselves might use the model contracts approved by the EU Commission.269 An 
alternative is to develop contracts specifically for transfers among missing persons 
organizations.270 However, contracts would allow transfers only between the parties to 
the contracts. Contracts might not authorize disclosures to others (e.g., individuals, public 
health agencies, other disaster relief organizations, health care providers, etc.) so that the 
benefits of exports via contracts would be limited. 
• Register. Personal data from a public register may be transferred to the extent allowed by 
law.271 A recital in the Directive states that “a transfer should not involve the entirety of 
                                                
266 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 26(1)(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 46, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
267 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 26(1)(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 46, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
268 European Commission, Model Contracts for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/international-transfers/transfer/index_en.htm  (last updated Feb. 
3, 2012). 
269 Commission Decision of 15 June 2001, 2001/497/EC, On Standard Contractual Clauses for the Transfer of 
Personal Data to Third Countries, Under Directive 95/46/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 181) 19,  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:181:0019:0031:en:PDF. 
270 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 26(2), (3), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 46, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
271 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 26(1)(f), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 46, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
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the data or entire categories of the data contained in the register.”272 Information from a 
public register may be useful to a missing persons organization on occasion. 
 
Two remaining provisions in Article 26 offer some prospect of help for missing persons data 
exports. The first allows a transfer necessary or legally required on important public interest 
grounds.273 The second provision allows a transfer necessary in order to protect the vital interests 
of the data subject.274 
 
Both of these transfer permissions share some common characteristics. First, the standards in 
both cases are quite high. In one case, the standard is “necessary or legally required” and in the 
other case “necessary.” Since missing persons disclosures are not likely to be legally required, 
this leaves the necessary standard as a hurdle for both. Second, both authorities use broad and 
uncertain phrases as the touchstone for disclosure, “public interest grounds” in one instance, and 
“vital interest of the data subject” in the other. Third, there appears to be little in the way of 
commentary or explanation for either transfer authority. Fourth, transfers allowed under the two 
provisions do not appear to have downstream controls that limit use of the information by the 
recipients. Thus, if missing persons can transfer personal information under this authority, 
recipient organizations would not face controls over use and redisclosure of the information.   
 
These two transfer permissions are, in any case, subject to national interpretations as indicated by 
two recitals to the Directive. One recital addresses a similar public interest standard in a different 
context and states that it is for national legislation to determine whether a controller carrying out 
a task in the public interest should be a public administration or another national or legal 
person.275 A second recital also using the public interest standard in another context suggests that 
it is up to Member States to decide when the public interest authorizes derogation from a 
provision of the Directive.276 Together, these two recitals suggest that Member States have broad 
authority to decide about interpretation of the public interest standard.   
 
A third recital in the Directive addresses the data transfer issue directly. It gives an example of an 
important public interest that may require protection: “for example in cases of international 
                                                
272 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, recital 58, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 37, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
273 This section also allows transfers necessary or legally required for the establishment, exercise, or defense of legal 
claims. This authority is not useful in a missing persons context. Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 26(1)(d), 
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 46, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
274 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 26(1)(e), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 46, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
275 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, recital 32, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 34, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
276 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, recital 34 (processing sensitive categories of data), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 34, 
available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
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transfers of data between tax or customs administrations or between services competent for 
social security matters.”277 While there is nothing directly addressing missing persons transfers 
in the Directive, there is no specific reason to think such transfers would be outside the scope of 
permissible public interest transfers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
277 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, recital 58, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 37, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
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Box 3: The US–EU Safe Harbor Framework 
 
Could the Safe Harbor Framework operated by the US Department of Commerce help with the transfer 
of personal information from EU Member States to a missing persons organization located in the United 
States? The answer is clearly no for non-profit organizations.    
 
The Safe Harbor Framework resulted from negotiations between the Department and the European 
Commission278 to address problems with the international transfer of personal information from the 
European Union to the United States. It allows some US organizations to publicly declare that they will 
comply with the requirements. A data controller can transfer personal data from Europe to a US 
company in the Safe Harbor because the European Commission found the Safe Harbor program 
adequate.279 
 
However, only organizations subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) are eligible to participate.280 Action by the FTC or by DOT is the 
principal means of enforcing compliance with a Safe Harbor promise. This limitation means that many 
companies and organizations that transfer personal information internationally cannot qualify for 
participation either in whole or in part.  
 
The Safe Harbor Framework cannot help any non-profit because non-profits do not fall within the 
jurisdiction of either agency. A private sector company in the Safe Harbor could cite its membership as 
grounds for accepting data exports from an EU Member State. However, the Safe Harbor Framework 
itself includes restrictions on onward transfer of personal information that roughly approximate 
requirements under the Safe Harbor Framework.281 No one in the Safe Harbor is free from restrictions on 
forward transfers of personal data, and even those commercial companies in the Safe Harbor would face 
data export challenges. 
 
Within the context of the Missing Persons Community of Interest (MPCI), Google is an example of an 
organization providing missing persons information services that is both a commercial company subject 
to FTC jurisdiction and on the US–EU Safe Harbor Framework list.282 Thus, information sharing 
companies like Google may be able to rely on the Safe Harbor to support data exports from EU Member 
States to the United States. 
                                                
278 US–EU Safe Harbor documents are at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/eg_main_018237.asp (last updated Apr. 
11, 2012). 
279 European Commission, Commission Decisions on the Adequacy of the Protection of Personal Data in Third 
Countries, accessed May 24, 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/international-
transfers/adequacy/index_en.htm. 
280 “Any US organization that is subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or US air 
carriers and ticket agents subject to the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation (DoT) may participate in the 
Safe Harbor. Organizations generally not subject to FTC jurisdiction include certain financial institutions, …, 
telecommunication common carriers, labor associations, non-profit organizations … ” [emphasis added]. “Welcome 
to the US-EU & US-Swiss Safe Harbor Frameworks,” US Dep’t of Commerce, Export.gov, last updated Apr. 11, 
2012, http://export.gov/safeharbor/.  
281“To disclose information to a third party, organizations must apply the notice and choice principles. Where an 
organization wishes to transfer information to a third party that is acting as an agent, it may do so if it makes sure 
that the third party subscribes to the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles or is subject to the Directive or another 
adequacy finding. As an alternative, the organization can enter into a written agreement with such third party 
requiring that the third party provide at least the same level of privacy protection as is required by the relevant 
principles.” “US–EU Safe Harbor Overview,” US Dep’t of Commerce, Export.gov, last updated Apr. 26, 2012, 
http://export.gov/safeharbor/eu/eg_main_018476.asp. 
282 Safe Harbor Google Company Information Page, US Dep’t of Commerce, Export.gov, accessed July 23, 2012, 
http://safeharbor.export.gov/companyinfo.aspx?id=13346. 
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5. Sensitive Data (Health, Race, Ethnicity, Religion, Political Views) 
 
It is inevitable that missing persons organizations will process some sensitive data. Basic 
identification information about individuals will often include racial or ethnic descriptions. 
Health information will also be part of some records. Privacy rules often regulate the processing 
of sensitive data, and missing persons organizations need to be aware of how their activities may 
implicate these laws. In the United States there are few, if any, restrictions on how missing 
persons organizations may use or process sensitive data. By contrast, the European Union and its 
Member States have carved out several categories of sensitive data and have place restrictions on 
how that information may be processed. 
 
a) United States 
 
US law does not define any general categories of sensitive data. Each sectoral privacy law 
defines the terms for specific types of records or for specific record keepers but most do not 
appear to restrict the processing of sensitive data. Even health data, which most people in the 
United States would likely consider sensitive, is regulated in only limited ways. HIPAA rules 
normally regulate only health data held by health care providers and insurers, and the restrictions 
rarely apply to a third-party recipients.   
 
The HIPAA rule allows a covered entity to make numerous disclosures without consent under 
specified conditions and procedures. For disaster relief, HIPAA permits disclosures about an 
individual without that individual’s consent to a disaster relief entity to notify or assist in the 
notification of a family member, personal representative, or another person responsible for the 
care of the individual.283 Here, too, the HIPAA restrictions do not follow the information 
downstream, and HIPAA penalties do not apply to recipient organizations. Whether a data 
subject or anyone else could enforce the purpose standard in the HIPAA rule against a disaster 
relief entity is speculative.284   
 
In general, however, US law rarely defines or restricts sensitive categories of information, 
though state laws may contain separate restrictive rules. Processing of sensitive information by 
missing persons organizations is not likely to be restricted in any material way.   
                                                
283 45 C.F.R. § 164.510(b)(4) (2012) (“Use and disclosures for disaster relief purposes. A covered entity may use or 
disclose protected health information to a public or private entity authorized by law or by its charter to assist in 
disaster relief efforts, for the purpose of coordinating with such entities the uses or disclosures permitted by 
paragraph [b][1][ii] of this section. The requirements in paragraphs [b][2] and [3] of this section apply to such uses 
and disclosure to the extent that the covered entity, in the exercise of professional judgment, determines that the 
requirements do not interfere with the ability to respond to the emergency circumstances.”). The purpose language is 
at Id. § 164.510(b)(1)(ii) (“A covered entity may use or disclose protected health information to notify, or assist in 
the notification of [including identifying or locating], a family member, a personal representative of the individual, 
or another person responsible for the care of the individual of the individual's location, general condition, or death. 
Any such use or disclosure of protected health information for such notification purposes must be in accordance 
with paragraphs [b][2], [3], or [4] of this section, as applicable.”), available at 
http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=ecfr&sid=0e9e1d1cd738cf748301308c6f8b7d12&rgn=div8&view=text&node=45:1.0.1.3.79.5.27.7&idno=4
5.  
284 Neither the HIPAA statute nor the HIPAA rule provides a private right of action, so a legal basis for an action 
against a disaster relief entity would have to be found elsewhere in federal or state law. 
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b) European Union 
 
The European Union has a broad, and generally applicable, rule about the processing of special 
categories of data, more commonly called sensitive data.285 The basic provision states: 
 
Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data revealing racial or 
ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union 
membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life.286 
 
Definitions of sensitive information vary from country to country and from culture to culture. 
The EU Data Protection Directive allows Member States to add additional categories of sensitive 
information, and some have done so for criminal records, genetic information, and biometric 
data.287 
 
Two provisions in Article 8 are particularly helpful to the processing of sensitive information for 
missing persons purposes. One allows processing when “necessary to protect the vital interests of 
the data subject or of another person where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of 
giving his consent.”288 The precise boundaries of a data subject’s vital interests are not clear. 
Processing of sensitive information in the context of missing persons activities may qualify, but 
the requirement that the data subject be physically or legally incapable of giving consent may be 
harder to satisfy. A data subject unavailable because of a disaster or similar circumstances may 
be incapable of giving consent. It seems possible to read the Directive to support missing persons 
processing, but a physical incapability may not be the same as being unavailable. 
 
A second provision allows Member States for reasons of substantial public interest to establish 
exceptions by law or decision of the supervisory authority.289 This test is likely easier to satisfy 
                                                
285 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 8, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40-41, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
286 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 8(1), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. The definitional 
problems for the various special categories are challenging, but they are not important here based on assumptions 
that some missing persons data will be sensitive and that missing persons organizations will need legal authority for 
processing. The Article 29 Working Party discusses some of the definitional issues in Ref. Ares(2011)444105, 
Advice Paper on Special Categories of Data (“Sensitive Data”) (Apr. 20, 2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/others/2011_04_20_letter_artwp_mme_le_bail_directive_9
546ec_annex1_en.pdf at pt. II.3.2.1 at 8 and III.1 at 10.  
287 See Art. 29 Data Prot. Working Party, Ref. Ares (2011) 444105, Advice Paper on Special Categories of Data 
(“Sensitive Data”) 7 (Apr. 20, 2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/others/2011_04_20_letter_artwp_mme_le_bail_directive_9
546ec_annex1_en.pdf.  
288 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 8(2)(c), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
289 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 8(4), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 41, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
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for the purposes of missing persons activities. Finding missing persons and providing 
information to relatives is likely to meet a public interest test. However, the Directive also 
requires a legally based exception. The exception could potentially be a national law or a 
decision by a supervisory authority. New Zealand offers a precedent for a decision by a 
supervisory authority following a natural disaster, although the temporary Christchurch 
earthquake code did not address sensitive information.   
 
Several other exceptions authorizing the processing of sensitive data are potentially relevant to 
missing persons. Sensitive data may be processed: 
 
1. With explicit consent of the data subject (unless consent is not allowed under national 
law).290 While consent may be a possibility at times, it will certainly not provide a 
complete solution to the needs of missing persons organizations. 
2. If conducted by a foundation, association or any other non-profit-seeking body with a 
political, philosophical, religious, or trade union aim that relates to its members and some 
other persons and disclosures only happen with consent. This provision applies to many 
non-profits, but it covers membership organizations, not missing persons 
organizations.291 
3. If the data subject clearly made the information public or if the information is necessary 
for legal claims. This provision may help, if at all, only in rare instances.292 
4. If processed by a health professional for preventive medicine, diagnosis, treatment, or 
management of health care services.293 This provision will not justify most processing by 
missing persons organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
290 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 8(2)(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
291 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 8(2)(d), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40-41, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
292 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 8(2)(e), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 41, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
293 Council Directive 95/46, On the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 8(3), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 41, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML. 
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Box 4: Children’s Information 
 
Children’s information is sometimes treated differently than adults’ information under privacy laws 
and organizational practice. For example, the US Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act,294 a law 
not specifically relevant to disaster activities, establishes separate rules for the online processing of 
information about children under the age of 13. There is no consensus about the age at which 
children’s information should receive special consideration for privacy. It is not always easy to 
determine if or how an organization treats children’s information, and it is not essential for this report 
to do so as each organization makes its own policy. 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) systematically collects data about children 
separated from their families in order to locate, protect, assist, and reunite them. The ICRC 
distinguishes between data that it publicly displays to help identify a child’s relatives and data 
considered to be sensitive, such as the address or contact details of the child and information 
necessary to check the veracity of a claim. The ICRC does not publicly display sensitive data and 
shares it only with professionals in charge of assisting children and reunifying families.295   
 
The US government also treats personal information about missing children differently, particularly 
in the post–Hurricane Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act. Due to the difficulties displaced 
individuals experienced in reuniting with family and household members during the hurricane, 
Congress mandated the establishment of the National Emergency Family Registry and Locator 
System (NEFRLS), and the National Emergency Child Locator Center (NECLC).296 Following a 
Presidential declaration of national disaster, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
activates the NEFRLS, a web-based system that allows displaced adults297 to voluntarily register and 
share information on their well-being status or location with specified family members or friends. 
NEFRLS is subject to the Privacy Act of 1974 because FEMA, a federal agency, operates it. 
 
 
Continued on next page 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                
294 15 U.S.C. § 6501 et seq. (2006). The regulations are at 16 C.F.R. pt. 312, available at http://www.ftc.gov/privacy 
/privacyinitiatives/COPPARule_2005SlidingScale.pdf. 
295 Romain Bircher (head of Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red 
Cross), interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011, (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC 
Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY.   
296 6 U.S.C. § 774 (2006); U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (DHS), Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency (FEMA), 
DHS/FEMA/PIA-014, Privacy Impact Assessment for the National Emergency Family Registry and Locator System 
(NEFRLS) 1 (2009), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_fema_nefrls.pdf.     
297 The Act defines a “displaced adult” as an individual 21 years of age or older who is displaced from the habitual 
residence of that individual as a result of a declared event. 6 U.S.C. § 774 (a)(3) (2006), available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/6/774. 
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Box 4: Children’s Information continued 
 
FEMA collaborates with the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC)298 to 
activate the NECLC and directs anyone searching for or reporting on a missing child under 21 years 
of age to the NECLC.299 The NCMEC operates the NECLC with an overall mandate to help reunite 
children with their parents and guardians. When a natural disaster occurs, the NECLC establishes a 
hotline to receive reports of displaced children and a website to provide information about them. It 
deploys staff to a declared disaster area to gather information about displaced children; partners with 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies; and gives the public information about additional 
resources. It directs those seeking displaced adults to the NEFRLS system operated by FEMA. 
Because the NCMEC is not a federal agency, its records for children are not subject to the Privacy 
Act of 1974. 
 
 
V. Options and Strategies for Missing Persons Organizations  
and Privacy Policy Makers 
 
Those engaged in missing persons activities and those responsible for establishing and enforcing 
privacy standards can work together to find ways to accommodate all of the interests at stake 
while allowing modern technology to meet the information needs that arise following natural 
disasters. This section sets out options and strategies for consideration by different organizations 
that play a role in missing persons activities and in privacy.   
A. Missing Persons Community of Interest 
 
The MPCI already provides leadership on privacy,300 and that work should continue in the future.  
Specific activities may include: 
                                                
298 In 1984, Congress established a national resource center and information clearinghouse for missing and exploited 
children through the Missing Children’s Assistance Act and designated the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children to fulfill this role. Missing Children’s Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 98–473, Oct. 12, 1984, 98 
Stat. 1837, sec. 404, 42 U.S.C. § 5773 (1984) (prior to 1999 amendment). See	  “The	  National	  Center	  for	  Missing	  and	  Exploited	  Children	  [NCMEC]	  Mission	  and	  History,”	  accessed	  August	  7,	  2012,	  http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=4362. The 
organization works in partnership with federal agencies, including	  the Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, to find missing children, reduce child sexual exploitation and prevent child victimization. NCMEC is 
a private non-profit organization, and receives annual grants from the US Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention. 42 U.S.C. § 5773 (2006), available at 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/5773.	  
299 6 U.S.C. § 775 (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/6/775; US Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 
(DHS), Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency (FEMA), DHS/FEMA/PIA-014, Privacy Impact Assessment for the 
National Emergency Family Registry and Locator System (NEFRLS) 2 (2009), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_fema_nefrls.pdf. 
300 See, e.g., “Missing Persons Community of Interest Code of Conduct, Engagement Framework and Existing 
Resources,” accessed June 19, 2012, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1kDqTVbGraI4x0L-
7UzPDuU2IXxZKpGjcWCFUMpJLxUQ/edit?hl=en&authkey=CKfZlzA.  
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1. Assist in Privacy-Friendly Design Choices 
 
The design of an infrastructure for sharing missing persons information implicates 
different privacy concerns and creates varying legal responsibilities for different parties. 
Some designs more carefully balance privacy interests than others, and some designs 
create more onerous compliance obligations.   
 
Several examples illustrate the point: 
 
• Search protocol. A design that defines a set of data held by each participant and a 
search protocol to display the data online has specific legal implications. The 
participant collecting and storing the data is a data controller with all the attendant 
responsibilities. The participant/data controller would be required to comply with 
the local laws of the place where data is input into the search fields as well as 
where the controller is located. These obligations may include notice to searchers 
of data practices, heightened protection for sensitive data and limitations on data 
exports. The searcher, if an organization, may also qualify as a data controller, 
depending on the search interface and the methods for executing the search (e.g., 
staff member searches or a website makes the results available to anyone). 
• Mirrored common data set. A design that involves sharing a common set of data 
with all participants whereby each participant locally stores the common data set 
would also have context-specific privacy implications. Each participating 
organization is a data controller and subject to its country’s privacy rules and data 
export limitations. Those export limitations might even prevent participation 
because of global sharing. Similarly, notice and disclosure obligations are difficult 
to navigate, as would be data subject access and data security. 
• Central database. A design that involves transferring data to a central repository 
will have clearer lines of responsibility and compliance, but a central repository 
potentially raises more difficult transborder export issues. The jurisdictional 
choice for the location of such a database is critical. For example, if the central 
database is located within the European Union, the legal restrictions on data 
exports will be challenging.    
 
The MPCI should seek to highlight the specific legal needs for any design emerging by 
consensus and encourage the participants to steer toward more carefully balanced designs 
with compliance obligations that can be met. This might be accomplished by use of 
privacy impact assessments of emerging designs. 
2. Coordinate the Privacy Policies of Collaborating Organizations 
 
The MPCI should consider helping coordinate the privacy policies and ethical codes of conduct 
of collaborating organizations that process missing persons information. The coordination efforts 
should evolve over time to reflect the actual processing activities of the organizations and the 
changes in those processing activities. Although each missing persons organization must be 
responsible for its own privacy policies and for complying with applicable national laws, the 
MPCI can sponsor and share best practices for privacy using its existing collaboration methods. 
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Useful areas for best practices may include common definitions for terms, similar procedures for 
the exercise of data subject rights, and compatible rules for data termination. Coordination 
activities might also include an MPCI-sponsored shared library that contains relevant missing 
persons legislation, as well as privacy law interpretations that a collaborating organization 
receives from its Data Protection Authority. A common privacy code for missing persons data 
processing is a possibility and might also qualify for approval by EU data protection authorities 
under Article 27 of the EU Data Protection Directive as compliant with EU legal obligations. 
3. Work with Data Protection Authorities and Other Governmental Agencies on 
Missing Persons Privacy Issues 
 
This report identifies several areas where missing persons activities would benefit from 
authoritative interpretations of the EU Data Protection Directive. Similar issues may arise under 
the law in other jurisdictions. Bringing questions and problems to the attention of data protection 
authorities, including the Article 29 Working Party, can educate data protection authorities about 
the processing needs of missing persons data. Collaboration with data protection authorities can 
help identify ways to address information system needs with data protection objectives. In 
jurisdictions without data protection authorities, the MPCI may find it useful to address legal 
ambiguities with other government entities to help find appropriate responses to privacy and 
MPCI needs.  
4. Be Prepared If the MPCI Ever Takes a Direct Role in the Processing of Missing 
Persons Information 
 
Current MPCI activities do not include the direct or central processing of missing persons 
information by the MPCI itself. It is possible, however, that future developments might lead 
toward a more central structure for information or for information sharing. If missing persons 
activities develop in that direction, an MPCI role as a data controller would create compliance 
challenges. If and when appropriate, the MPCI should be ready to address new privacy 
obligations that would accompany that role. Privacy requirements for any centralized missing 
persons data would take time and effort to address. Selection of a location for any centralized 
functions would require deliberation. It is possible, for example, that a country with broadly 
compatible privacy laws and with a history of organizations engaged in missing persons 
activities might create a legislative environment specifically designed to address the privacy 
needs and requirements of a centralized missing persons.   
5. Develop a Privacy Policy for the MPCI 
 
Even if the MPCI does not directly process missing persons information, it may still need a 
privacy policy and professional code of conduct if the MPCI collects personal information. This 
may include a policy covering MPCI websites, the MPCI roster of participants, individual donors 
to the MPCI, and perhaps others. 
B. Missing Persons Organizations 
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Because this report did not include reviews of individual organizations’ compliance with privacy 
laws, the options listed here for missing persons organizations may reflect activities that many of 
the organizations have already considered and addressed. 
1. Assure Legal Compliance 
 
Each missing persons organization determines the extent to which it is a data controller or 
record keeper for purposes of identifying its legal obligations with respect to personal 
information. The design choices made by the organization will affect this determination. 
Each missing persons organization should then assure compliance with those obligations.   
2. Take Responsibility for Privacy Policy 
 
Each missing persons organization cooperating through the MPCI should have its own privacy 
policy that reflects its own personal data processing activities and its own legal requirements. 
The use of formal privacy impact assessments may be appropriate. 
3. Coordinate Privacy Policies to the Extent Practicable 
 
Each missing persons organization should coordinate its privacy policy with other similar 
organizations. The MPCI might provide the means for coordination and privacy policy document 
sharing. Different operations and different legal requirements may make it difficult or impossible 
for the same privacy policy to work for all organizations. Nevertheless, different organizations 
may be able to use common definitions for terms, similar procedures for the exercise of data 
subject rights, and compatible rules for data termination. 
 
4. Share Official Interpretations and Guidance 
 
Each missing persons organization should share interpretations of privacy law or guidance from 
data protection authorities. Each organization might also share other useful materials related to 
privacy, including new or changed privacy policies. This would be particularly beneficial for 
organizations with fewer resources, because those with greater expertise and funding could 
provide information (and models) that would otherwise be unattainable. 
C. Data Protection Authorities 
 
The world’s data protection authorities created their own agenda for action in the 2011 
resolution of the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners 
on Data Protection and Major Natural Disasters, which called on data protection 
authorities “to review whether their domestic data protection and privacy laws are 
suitably framed and flexible to best serve the vital interests of individuals in the event of 
a major natural disaster.”301  
 
                                                
301 The text of the resolution appears in Appendix 1. 
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In any jurisdiction, the most appropriate response by a data protection authority might vary 
because of legal, structural, or other factors. The best response in any country might require a 
change in legislation, change in a policy directive, or formal publication of an interpretation of 
data protection law. To the greatest extent possible, it would be appropriate for data protection 
authorities to consult with all other relevant parties, including other government agencies, 
disaster relief organizations, and missing persons organizations, while developing a response to 
data protection and natural disaster problems. Consultations may be most effective when done in 
advance of an immediate need. 
 
Other, more specific and more focused tasks might include: 
1. Issue Specific or Generic Data Protection Response to Missing Persons or Natural 
Disaster Activities 
 
While the New Zealand temporary code is a stellar example of an immediate, pointed, and useful 
response by a data protection authority to emergency needs, it will not always be possible for one 
or more data protection authorities to respond so promptly following a natural disaster. Disasters 
may disrupt the functioning of data protection authorities just as much as that of other 
institutions. Communications problems may make it difficult for a data protection authority to 
effectively convey a new policy or policy interpretation to data controllers. 
 
It is appropriate for a national data protection authority to develop and adopt the advance 
guidance called for by the 2011 Data Protection Commissioners’ Resolution.   
 
Generic guidance, applicable to any natural disaster, may be the most useful action. If DPAs 
used their authority to address how data protection rules should be adjusted or interpreted in 
response any natural disaster, data controllers would know in advance what they may do without 
the need for immediate action by or consultation with one or more data protection authorities.  
 
Guidance might take effect following a government’s emergency declaration or equivalent. 
Adjustments authorized under generic guidance might remain in effect until the government 
declares an end to the emergency, a fixed period of time (with the possibility of extensions), an 
announcement by the relevant data protection authority, or other defined circumstances. For 
natural disasters directly affecting more than one country, a coordinated ending period may be 
appropriate.   
 
Further, it may be appropriate to have several levels of generic guidance. A first level might 
apply when a natural disaster has a direct and immediate effect in a particular country and when 
broader relaxation of data protection rules may be more appropriate. A second level of guidance 
might apply when a natural disaster occurs near a country not directly affected by the disaster but 
that still receives refugees from the affected area. In this case, adjustments might be appropriate 
for refugees but not for citizens. A third level of guidance might apply when a disaster occurs in 
a third country geographically remote and the principal local consequences of the disaster are to 
its citizens or relatives of its citizens living in the disaster area. A different level of guidance 
might apply during the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster than during the long-term 
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circumstances that continue after responding to the most urgent consequences of a natural 
disaster.   
 
2. Provide Interpretative Guidance  
 
Action by European data protection authorities might be directly helpful in resolving ambiguities 
that exist in the EU Data Protection Directive. In some instances, action by European data 
protection authorities is required to allow some data processing activities. European data 
protection authorities and missing persons organizations may profitably work together to address 
these issues. 
 
a) Legitimate Processing 
 
The Directive requires that anyone processing personal data must respect privacy, must process 
data fairly and lawfully, and must have consent or a lawful reason to process the data. The 
Directive recognizes several purposes that make data processing legitimate, including when 
processing is “necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject, for the performance of a 
task carried out in the public interest, or for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by 
the controller or by a third party.” Action by one or more data protection authorities to clarify 
that these standards permit the processing needed to allow the work of missing persons 
organizations would be helpful to establish the legitimacy of that processing. 
  
b) Sensitive Information 
 
The EU Data Protection Directive requires Member States to include additional controls over the 
processing of sensitive information. Two provisions may be helpful to allow the processing of 
sensitive information that may be part of missing persons activities. One allows processing when 
“necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another person where the data 
subject is physically or legally incapable of giving his consent.” A second provision allows 
Member States for reasons of “substantial public interest” to establish exceptions by law or 
decision of the supervisory authority. Action by one or more data protection authorities to clarify 
these standards as transposed into national law could provide clear guidance that would allow 
information transfers needed to sustain the work of missing persons organizations.   
 
c) Export Controls   
 
Under the EU Data Protection Directive’s data export controls, two provisions that might 
authorize information transfers use standards that appear to be applicable to missing persons 
activities. The first allows a transfer “necessary or legally required on important public interest 
grounds.” The second provision allows a transfer “necessary in order to protect the vital interests 
of the data subject.” Action by one or more data protection authorities to clarify these standards 
as transposed into national laws could provide guidance that would allow transfers needed to 
sustain the work of missing persons organizations. 
D. Article 29 Working Party 
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The Article 29 Working Party provides advice and opinions regarding data protection issues 
arising under the EU Data Protection Directive and the members of the Article 29 Working Party 
are also members of the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy 
Commissioners. The Article 29 Working Party can fulfill some objectives of the 2011 resolution 
by addressing disasters and data protection in its advice and opinions and by addressing these 
issues in its advice on the evolution of the proposed EU regulation. 
1. Issue Interpretative Guidance 
 
Like the data protection authorities, the Article 29 Working Party could issue interpretive 
guidance to help resolve the ambiguities that exist in the EU Data Protection Directive. 
Specifically, the Article 29 Working Party may consider issuing guidance in the areas of 
legitimate processing, sensitive information and export controls mentioned above. 
2. Issue a Progress Report on the 2011 Resolution 
 
Data protection authorities might regularly review and report on the progress of the action items 
in the 2011 resolution of the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy 
Commissioners. As part of a report on progress toward providing advance guidance, it would be 
particularly useful for data protection authorities to address how they determine which 
organizations are involved in natural disaster responses, how privacy laws affect those 
organizations, and how data protection authorities might encourage those organizations to 
address privacy. 
E. European Commission 
 
In January 2012, the Commission of the European Union proposed comprehensive reform of the 
1995 data protection rules with the goal of strengthening online privacy rights and boosting 
Europe's digital economy.302 The proposal would replace national data protection laws that 
transposed the standards established by the EU Data Protection Directive with a single regulation 
on data protection that would apply throughout the European Union.303 
 
The draft of the proposed rule under consideration refers in a recital to the possible need to 
restrict some data protection principles and rights in certain circumstances, “including the 
protection of human life especially in response to natural or man-made disasters.”304 This 
appears to be a useful step, responding perhaps to the 2011 Resolution of the Data Protection 
                                                
302 Press Release, European Commission, “Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of the Data Protection 
Rules” (Jan. 25, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/120125_en.htm.  
303 Press Release, European Commission, “Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of the Data Protection 
Rules Increase Users' Control of Their Data and to Cut Costs for Businesses” (Jan. 25, 2012),  
http://europa.eu/rapid/searchAction.do (search “Optional Search Criteria: Reference” for “IP/12/46”). 
304 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council On the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data 
Protection Regulation), at Recital 59, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf. 
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Commissioners calling on international organizations to consider the issues arising from major 
natural disasters in their reviews of the international instruments on privacy and data 
protection.305 As the proposed regulation is finalized, more direct statements or provisions 
clarifying the application of data protection rules to missing persons activities would be useful. 
1. Address Personal Information Related to Missing Persons Activities and Natural 
Disasters in the New Regulation 
 
The current focus in the recital on protecting human life in response to a disaster could be 
broadened to more clearly incorporate missing persons activities. Such activities may not 
rise to the level of protecting human life, but they do nevertheless warrant adjustment of 
data protection rules at least during emergency circumstances. 
 
 
2. Provide More Specific Direction on Disaster and Missing Persons Activities                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
 
The development of a new regulation offers an opportunity to address ambiguities in the 
existing policy so that uncertainties do not carry over to a new regulation. It would be 
more efficient if the new EU data protection regulation expressly covered the need for 
temporary adjustments to data protection rules for disasters in general and for missing 
persons in particular. While the draft rule is still in process, it might be appropriate to add 
language specifically addressing disasters and associated missing persons activities. The 
Australian Privacy Act 1988, as amended in 2006, identifies three broad purposes for 
processing in emergencies and disasters: identifying individuals missing, injured, or 
affected by the event; assisting individuals involved in the event to obtain services; and 
informing appropriate individuals of the involvement of others in the event.306 It may be 
advisable for the EU data protection regulation to recognize these three purposes as 
within the scope of allowable data processing. 
F. United States 
 
The US government’s general privacy law for federal agencies—the Privacy Act of 1974—
imposes broad restrictions on disclosure of personal information that might limit disclosures for 
disaster activities, either through substantive standards or procedural requirements. Following a 
disaster, some federal agencies may have personal information useful for missing persons 
activities, but the Act might limit or prevent sharing without additional effort. The law’s limits 
could usefully change in two alternate ways. 
 
                                                
305 International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, Mexico City, Mex., Nov. 2-3, 2011, 
Resolution on Data Protection and Major Natural Disasters, 2011/GA/RES/004 (Nov. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.privacyconference2011.org/htmls/adoptedResolutions/2011_Mexico/2011_GA_RES_004_Natural_Disa
sters_ENG.pdf. 
306 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 80H(2) (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012C00414. The 
text of Australia’s Privacy Act emergency provision appears in Appendix 3. 
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1. Authorize Missing Persons or Disaster Disclosures Using Existing Executive Branch 
Authority 
 
The Privacy Act of 1974 allows agencies to authorize by regulation the disclosure of 
personal information from any system of records as defined routine uses. An agency that 
maintains information that might be useful following a disaster could establish an 
appropriate routine use within the limits of its legal authority.   
 
The US government could also take broader action to allow for disaster or missing 
persons disclosures. One precedent comes from a 2007 Executive Branch response to the 
growing problem of identity theft. A presidentially established identity theft task force307 
offered ideas for agency responses that included the adoption by all federal agencies of a 
routine use to specifically permit the disclosure of information in connection with 
response and remediation efforts in the event of a data breach.308 It may be possible under 
existing authority for agencies to adopt a similar routine use covering disasters and 
missing persons disclosures. A model routine use limited to missing persons activities 
only might authorize disclosure using language similar to this: 
 
Following a presidentially-declared disaster or a comparable disaster in another 
nation and for the purpose of assisting with investigating the whereabouts of, 
locating missing persons, or informing relatives and friends of the location and 
status of individuals affected by a natural disaster, records may be disclosed to (1) 
a federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, international, or foreign agency that 
coordinates natural disaster activities with the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency, or (2) a duly recognized U.S. or foreign entity that provides disaster 
assistance or missing persons services. 
 
The adoption of this or a similar routine use statement could follow an Executive Order, 
instructions from the Office of Management and Budget, or an action taken by the head of any 
agency that maintains records useful for missing persons purposes. Because the promulgation of 
a new routine use can take months to accomplish, it is not practical for an agency to issue a new 
routine use in response to a particular disaster. To be prepared for any disaster, it would be 
appropriate for an agency to establish a routine use for appropriate systems in advance so the 
authority is available when needed. 
2. Amend the Privacy Act of 1974 to Allow Disclosures Following Natural Disasters  
 
The Privacy Act of 1974 restricts disclosure of personal information from systems of 
records maintained by federal agencies. The law allows certain types of disclosures from 
all systems, and these disclosures cover some standard activities, including archiving of 
records, use for research, and disclosure to Congress.309 One provision allows a standard 
                                                
307 Exec. Order No. 13,402, 71 Fed. Reg. 27,945 (May 15, 2006), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2006-05-
15/pdf/06-4552.pdf.  
308The President’s Identity Task Force, Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan (Apr. 11, 2007), 30-31 
http://www.identitytheft.gov/reports/StrategicPlan.pdf.  
309 5 U.S.C. § 552a (b) (2006), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/5/552a. 
  
 
79 
disclosure in compelling circumstances affecting health or safety of an individual. This 
particular disclosure is not broad enough to cover all disaster-related disclosures or 
missing persons disclosures. Congress could amend the Act to allow disclosures 
responsive to disaster or missing persons needs from all systems of records.   
G. Other National or Sub-National Governments 
 
The options addressed here apply to the United States and the European Union and grew out of 
this report’s detailed analysis of privacy laws in those jurisdictions. This report establishes no 
specific analytic foundation on which to suggest detailed options for changes to laws in other 
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, it may also be appropriate that other governments adjust or amend 
their laws to address privacy and missing persons issues to allow for appropriate use of personal 
information for missing persons purposes following natural disasters. 
 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Missing persons activities that occur during natural disasters provide a valuable service to help 
reconnect people affected by disasters with their friends and families. These activities require, by 
their nature, a certain amount of information collection and sharing and this data processing must 
typically be done within urgent time frames.   
 
These activities, therefore, present unique privacy problems. This report encourages missing 
persons organizations to recognize the privacy concerns implicated by their information sharing 
systems and balance the need for accessible data against the privacy interests of data subjects. 
Each entity must determine the system design that will best help it achieve its disaster relief 
efforts without impinging substantially on individual privacy rights. In addition, those involved 
in missing persons activities need to be aware of the privacy laws applicable to their actions and 
ensure legal compliance. 
 
Finally, the various stakeholders and policy makers involved in missing persons activities and in 
privacy regulation should begin to take steps to (1) outline privacy friendly designs and practices 
that organizations can use to effectively share valuable information, (2) clarify the privacy 
obligations applicable to missing persons activities, and (3) amend current law or provide 
interpretive guidance in order to allow missing persons activities to proceed without the threat of 
legal liability.   
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Appendix 1 
Summary of the Design Specifications of MPCI Member Organizations 
 
 
People Finder Interchange Format  
 
Ka-Ping Yee, an engineer from Google, and a group of volunteers created the first draft of the 
People Finder Interchange Format (PFIF) in 2005 as means of assisting in the disaster relief 
efforts of Hurricane Katrina. The guiding purpose of designing PFIF was to reduce the 
difficulties associated with the automated aggregation and sharing of missing persons 
information.310  
 
PFIF also standardizes data retention, which is one aspect of information privacy. To be 
compliant with the standard, all record creators must be able to set an expiration date for the 
permanent deletion of the record.311   
 
Currently, Google,312 the National Library of Medicine,313 and MISSING.NET routinely share 
missing persons information using PFIF, including 60,000 PFIF records created after the 2010 
Haiti earthquake and 600,000 after the 2011 Japan earthquake.314 Ka-Ping Yee continues to 
maintain PFIF, with version 1.4 released May 29, 2012.315 
 
Emergency Data Exchange Language  
 
The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) originally developed the EDXL Distribution 
Element in partnership with private and public disaster response and national security 
organizations. The stated purpose is “facilitat[ing] emergency information sharing and data 
exchange across the local, state, tribal, national and non-governmental organizations of different 
professions that provide emergency response and management services.”316 This EDXL standard 
requires all communications, regardless of purpose or content, to be encapsulated in a defined 
format for forwarding and display by any EDXL compliant device.317  
                                                
310 This purpose was articulated in a personal account of the development of the PFIF standard during the aftermath 
of Hurricane Katrina by David Geilhufe, a fellow participant in the disaster relief efforts. See David Geilhufe, 
“Personal History of the Katrina PeopleFinder Project Part I,” Social Source (blog), Oct. 1, 2005, 
http://socialsource.blogspot.com/2005/10/personal-history-of-katrina.html.  
311 See “People Finder Interchange Format 1.4 Specification,” Ka-Ping Yee, accessed July 23, 2012, 
http://zesty.ca/pfif/1.4/. 
312 “Google Person Finder FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://support.google.com/personfinder/?hl=en. 
313 US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file 
with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY.  
314 Ka-Ping Yee, interview by Adam Elewa, Aug. 11, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), PFIF Questionnaire, 
Fordham Law School, New York, NY.  
315 “People Finder Interchange Format 1.4 Specification,” Ka-Ping Yee, accessed July 23, 2012. 
http://zesty.ca/pfif/1.4/.  
316 Org. for the Advancement of Structured Info. Standards [OASIS], EDXL Distribution Element (2006), 5-6, 
http://docs.oasis-open.org/emergency/edxl-de/v1.0/EDXL-DE_Spec_v1.0.pdf.  
317 Org. for the Advancement of Structured Info. Standards [OASIS], EDXL Distribution Element (2006), 5-6, 
http://docs.oasis-open.org/emergency/edxl-de/v1.0/EDXL-DE_Spec_v1.0.pdf. 
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The standard is currently maintained by OASIS,318 a non-profit consortium that provides a 
structured forum for private and public organizations to reach consensus on guidelines for 
interoperability among products.319 Numerous private and public organizations work within the 
deliberative framework established by OASIS to extend and customize EDXL standards for a 
wide range of emergency communications.320 Given the scope of this report, the focus here 
extends only to EDXL standards for transmission of information about missing persons. Another 
relevant standard still in process is EDXL–Tracking of Emergency Patients (EDXL–TEP).321 
The driving concern in the development of EDXL–TEP was the needs of medical professionals. 
The National Association of State EMS Officials led the effort.322 The types of emergencies for 
which EDXL–TEP could be used is broad, with anticipated uses ranging “across the EMS 
incident continuum of care” from routine car accidents to nationwide pandemics. The standard 
concerns missing persons because it gives medical professionals the ability to report the location 
of those involved in a disaster.323  
 
  
                                                
318 “OASIS Emergency Management Technical Committee,” Org. for the Advancement of Structured Info. 
Standards [OASIS], accessed July 23, 2012, https://www.oasis-
open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=emergency.  
319 OASIS About page, accessed July 23, 2012, https://www.oasis-open.org/org.  
320 “Emergency Data Exchange Language (EDXL) Overview,” Org. for the Advancement of Structured Info. 
Standards [OASIS], accessed July 23, 2012, https://www.oasis-
open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=emergency#overview.  
321 “Emergency Management Tracking of Emergency Patients (EM TEP) Subcommittee,” Org. for the Advancement 
of Structured Info. Standards [OASIS], accessed July 23, 2012, https://www.oasis-
open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=emergency-tep.  
322 Org. for the Advancement of Structured Info. Standards [OASIS], EDXL-Tracking of Emergency Patients (TEP): 
Requirements and Draft Messaging Specification (2010), 7, http://xml.coverpages.org/EDXL-TEP-Reqs-Draft-
Messaging.pdf.  
323 Org. for the Advancement of Structured Info. Standards [OASIS], EDXL-Tracking of Emergency Patients (TEP): 
Requirements and Draft Messaging Specification (2010), 7, http://xml.coverpages.org/EDXL-TEP-Reqs-Draft-
Messaging.pdf. 
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Appendix 2 
 
NZ Christchurch Earthquake (Information Sharing) Code 2011 
(Temporary)   
 
http://privacy.org.nz/assets/Files/Codes-of-Practice-materials/Christchurch-Earthquake-
Information-Sharing-Code-2011-Temporary-incorporating-Amendments-No-1-and-No-2.doc  
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Christchurch Earthquake (Information Sharing) Code 2011 (Temporary)  
 
 
I, MARIE SHROFF, Privacy Commissioner, now issue under section 51 of the Privacy Act 
1993, and in accordance with section 52 of the Act, the Christchurch Earthquake (Information 
Sharing) Code 2011 (Temporary). 
 
Issued by me at Wellington on 24 February 2011  
 
The SEAL of the Privacy Commissioner was  ) 
affixed to this Code of Practice by the       )  [L.S.] 
Privacy Commissioner     ) 
 
 
 
 
Marie Shroff 
Privacy Commissioner 
 
 
 
This version of the code contains notes which are set out in italics. This material is not part of the code 
but is intended to assist users.  
 
 
Note: A code of practice issued under s.46 of the Privacy Act 1993 is deemed to be a regulation for the purposes of 
the Regulations Disallowance Act 1989 – Privacy Act, s.50. 
 
Note: This version of the Code incorporates Amendment No.1 and Amendment No 2. 
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1. Title 
 
This code of practice may be referred to as the Christchurch Earthquake (Information Sharing) 
Code 2011 (Temporary).  
 
Note: The code is identified as temporary as it has been issued under special urgency procedures – Privacy Act, 
s.52. 
 
2. Commencement and expiration 
 
This code will: 
(a) come into force on 24 February 2011 at 5pm; 
[(b) expire on [30 June 2011].]  
 
Note: The Code originally provided that it would expire ‘on 24 May 2011‘or on the date on which the emergency 
declaration terminates, whichever is the earlier’. Amendment No.1 omitted the words ‘or on the date on which the 
emergency declaration terminates, whichever is the earlier’. 
 
Note: Amendment No 2 substituted 30 June 2011 as the expiry date. 
 
3. Interpretation  
 
In this code:  
 
Christchurch earthquake means the earthquake that occurred in Christchurch on 22 February 
2011.  
 
…  
 
permitted purpose has the meaning set out in clause 4.  
 
Note: Several terms used in the code are defined in the Privacy Act including e.g. agency, collect, enactment, 
individual, information privacy principle, news medium, personal information, public sector agency – Privacy Act, 
s.2. 
 
Note: Amendment No 2 deleted the definition of emergency declaration. This had provided ‘emergency declaration 
means the declaration of a state of national emergency made on 23 February 2011 under the Civil Defence 
Emergency Management Act 2002’. 
 
4. Meaning of permitted purpose  
 
(1) A permitted purpose is a purpose that directly relates to the government and local 
government response to the Christchurch earthquake emergency …. 
 
Note: Amendment No 2 deleted the words ‘in respect of which an emergency declaration exists’. 
 
(2) Without limiting subclause (1), any of the following is a permitted purpose in relation 
to the Christchurch earthquake emergency:  
(a) identifying individuals who:  
     (i) are or may be injured, missing or dead as a result of the  
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           emergency;  
      (ii) are or may be otherwise involved in the emergency; 
(b) assisting individuals involved in the emergency to obtain services such  
     as repatriation services, medical or other treatment, health services,  
     financial and other humanitarian assistance;  
(c) assisting with law enforcement in relation to the emergency;  
(d) coordination and management of the emergency;  
(e) ensuring that people who are responsible for individuals who are, or     
     may be, involved in the emergency are appropriately informed of      
     matters that are relevant to:  
     (i) the involvement of those individuals in the emergency; or 
     (ii) the response to the emergency in relation to those individuals.  
 
(3) For the purposes of subclause (2), a person is responsible for an individual if the 
person is:  
(a) a parent of the individual;  
(b) a child or sibling of the individual and at least 18 years old;  
(c) a spouse, civil union partner or de facto partner of the individual; 
(d) a relative of the individual, at least 18 years old and a member of the individual’s 
household;  
(e) a guardian of the individual; 
(f) exercising an enduring power of attorney granted by the individual that is 
exercisable in relation to decisions about the individual’s health; 
(g) a person who has an intimate personal relationship with the individual; or  
(h) a person nominated by the individual to be contacted in case of emergency.  
 
Note: This clause is based upon Privacy Act 1988 (Australia), Part VIA, in particular, s.80H. 
 
5. Authority for collection, use and disclosure of personal information  
 
(1) In relation to the Christchurch earthquake emergency, an agency may collect, use or 
disclose personal information relating to an individual if the agency believes on 
reasonable grounds that:  
(a) the individual concerned may be involved in the emergency; and  
(b) the collection, use or disclosure is for a permitted purpose in relation to the 
emergency; and 
(c) in the case of a disclosure of personal information - the disclosure is to:  
(i) a public sector agency; or  
(ii) an agency that is, or is likely to be, involved in managing, or assisting in                
the management of, the emergency; or  
(iii) an agency that is directly involved in providing repatriation services, 
medical or other treatment, health services or financial or other humanitarian 
assistance services to individuals involved in the emergency; or 
(iv) a person who is responsible for the individual (within the meaning of 
clause 4(3)); and 
(d) in the case of a disclosure of personal information—the disclosure is not to a 
news medium.  
 
Note: This subclause is based upon Privacy Act 1988 (Australia), Part VIA, in particular, s.80P. 
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Note: Questions of disclosure of personal information to the news media are not affected by this code and are 
subject to any normal legal considerations under the Privacy Act or other applicable law such as the Official 
Information Act 1982. This code applies no additional restrictions on such disclosures. 
 
(2) The authority in subclause (1) is in addition to, and does not restrict, any other 
authority for collection, use or disclosure contained in the information privacy 
principles, any code of practice or other enactment.  
 
 
 
 
Explanatory note 
 
This code modifies the application of the applicable information privacy principles by providing that agencies are 
authorised in certain circumstances to collect, use or disclose personal information for certain permitted purposes 
related to the government response to the Christchurch earthquake emergency.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legislative history  
 
24 February 2011  Code issued  
24 February 2011 (5pm)  Code commenced  
3 March 2011   Code notified in NZ Gazette 
9 March 2011   Amendment No.1 issued 
10 March 2011   Amendment No.1 commenced  
17 March 2011   Amendment No.1 notified in NZ Gazette 
13 May 2011   Amendment No 2 issued 
19 May 2011   Amendment No.2 commenced 
19 May 2011   Amendment No.2 notified in NZ Gazette 
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Appendix 3 
 
Privacy Act 1988 (Australia) Part VIA—Dealing with Personal Information  
in Emergencies and Disasters 
 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012C00414  
  
  
 
89 
 
Division 1—Object and interpretation 
 
80F Object 
 
The object of this Part is to make special provision for the collection, use and disclosure of 
personal information in emergencies and disasters. 
 
80G Interpretation 
 
 (1) In this Part: 
 
duty of confidence means any duty or obligation arising under the common law or at 
equity pursuant to which a person is obliged not to disclose information, but does not 
include legal professional privilege. 
 
emergency declaration means a declaration under section 0J or 80K. 
 
permanent resident means a person, other than an Australian citizen: 
 
(a) whose normal place of residence is situated in Australia; and 
 
(b) whose presence in Australia is not subject to any limitation as to time imposed 
by law; and 
 
(c) who is not an illegal entrant within the meaning of the Migration Act 1958. 
 
secrecy provision means a provision of a law of the Commonwealth (including a 
provision of this Act), or of a Norfolk Island enactment, that prohibits or regulates the use 
or disclosure of personal information, whether the provision relates to the use or 
disclosure of personal information generally or in specified circumstances. 
 
(2) For the purposes of this Part, a reference in the definition of personal information in 
subsection 6(1) to an individual is taken to include a reference to an individual who is not 
living. 
 
80H Meaning of permitted purpose 
 
(1) For the purposes of this Part, a permitted purpose is a purpose that directly relates to 
the Commonwealth’s response to an emergency or disaster in respect of which an 
emergency declaration is in force. 
 
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), any of the following is a permitted purpose in 
relation to an emergency or disaster: 
 
  (a) identifying individuals who: 
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(i) are or may be injured, missing or dead as a result of the emergency or 
disaster; or 
 
    (ii) are or may be otherwise involved in the emergency or disaster; 
 
(b) assisting individuals involved in the emergency or disaster to obtain services 
such as repatriation services, medical or other treatment, health services and 
financial or other humanitarian assistance; 
 
   (c) assisting with law enforcement in relation to the emergency or disaster; 
 
  (d) coordination or management of the emergency or disaster; 
 
(e) ensuring that people who are responsible (within the meaning of subclause 2.5 
of Schedule 3) for individuals who are, or may be, involved in the emergency or 
disaster are appropriately informed of matters that are relevant to: 
 
(i) the involvement of those individuals in the emergency or disaster; or 
 
(ii) the response to the emergency or disaster in relation to those 
individuals. 
 
Division 2—Declaration of emergency 
 
80J Declaration of emergency—events of national significance 
 
The Prime Minister or the Minister may make a declaration under this section if the Prime 
Minister or the Minister (as the case may be) is satisfied that: 
 
 (a) an emergency or disaster has occurred; and 
 
(b) the emergency or disaster is of such a kind that it is appropriate in the circumstances 
for this Part to apply in relation to the emergency or disaster; and 
 
(c) the emergency or disaster is of national significance (whether because of the nature 
and extent of the emergency or disaster, the direct or indirect effect of the emergency or 
disaster, or for any other reason) ; and 
 
(d) the emergency or disaster has affected one or more Australian citizens or permanent 
residents (whether within Australia or overseas). 
 
Note: A declaration under this section is merely a trigger for the operation of this Part and is not directly related to 
any other legislative or non-legislative scheme about emergencies. 
 
80K Declaration of emergency—events outside Australia 
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(1) The Prime Minister or the Minister may make a declaration under this section if the 
Prime Minister or the Minister (as the case may be) is satisfied that: 
 
(a) an emergency or disaster has occurred outside Australia; and 
 
(b) the emergency or disaster is of such a kind that it is appropriate in the 
circumstances for this Part to apply in relation to the emergency or disaster; and 
 
(c) the emergency or disaster has affected one or more Australian citizens or 
permanent residents (whether within Australia or overseas). 
 
(2) The Minister must consult the Minister administering the Diplomatic Privileges and 
Immunities Act 1967 before the Minister makes a declaration under this section. 
 
Note: A declaration under this section is merely a trigger for the operation of this Part and is not directly related to 
any other legislative or non-legislative scheme about emergencies. 
 
80L Form of declarations 
 
  (1) An emergency declaration must be in writing and signed by: 
 
  (a) if the Prime Minister makes the declaration—the Prime Minister; or 
 
  (b) if the Minister makes the declaration—the Minister. 
 
 (2) An emergency declaration must be published, as soon as practicable after the 
declaration has effect: 
 
  (a) on the website maintained by the Department; and 
 
  (b) by notice published in the Gazette. 
 
 (3) An emergency declaration is not a legislative instrument. 
 
80M When declarations take effect 
 
 An emergency declaration has effect from the time at which the declaration is signed. 
 
80N When declarations cease to have effect 
 
  An emergency declaration ceases to have effect at the earliest of: 
 
(a) if a time at which the declaration will cease to have effect is specified in the 
declaration—at that time; or 
 
  (b) the time at which the declaration is revoked; or 
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  (c) the end of 12 months starting when the declaration is made. 
 
Division 3—Provisions dealing with the use and disclosure of personal information 
 
80P Authorisation of collection, use and disclosure of personal information 
 
(1) At any time when an emergency declaration is in force in relation to an emergency or 
disaster, an entity may collect, use or disclose personal information relating to an 
individual if: 
 
 (a) the entity reasonably believes that the individual concerned may be involved 
in the emergency or disaster; and 
 
 (b) the collection, use or disclosure is for a permitted purpose in relation to the 
emergency or disaster; and 
 
 (c) in the case of a disclosure of the personal information by an agency—the 
disclosure is to: 
 
(i) an agency; or 
 
(ii) a State or Territory authority; or 
 
(iii) an organisation; or 
 
(iv) an entity not covered by subparagraph (i), (ii) or (iii) that is, or is 
likely to be, involved in managing, or assisting in the management of, the 
emergency or disaster; or 
 
 (v) a person who is responsible for the individual (within the meaning of 
subclause 2.5 of Schedule 3); and 
 
 (d) in the case of a disclosure of the personal information by an organisation or 
another person—the disclosure is to: 
 
(i) an agency; or 
 
(ii) an entity that is directly involved in providing repatriation services, 
medical or other treatment, health services or financial or other 
humanitarian assistance services to individuals involved in the emergency 
or disaster; or 
 
(iii) a person or entity prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of 
this paragraph; or 
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(iv) a person or entity specified by the Minister, by legislative instrument, 
for the purposes of this paragraph; and 
 
 (e) in the case of any disclosure of the personal information—the disclosure is 
not to a media organisation. 
 
(2) An entity is not liable to any proceedings for contravening a secrecy provision in 
respect of a use or disclosure of personal information authorised by subsection (1), unless 
the secrecy provision is a designated secrecy provision (see subsection (7)). 
 
 (3) An entity is not liable to any proceedings for contravening a duty of confidence in 
respect of a disclosure of personal information authorised by subsection (1). 
 
 (4) An entity that is an agency does not breach an Information Privacy Principle in 
respect of a collection, use or disclosure of personal information authorised by subsection 
(1). 
 
 (5) An entity that is an organisation does not breach an approved privacy code or a 
National Privacy Principle in respect of a collection, use or disclosure of personal 
information authorised by subsection (1). 
 
 (6) A collection, use or disclose of personal information by an officer or employee of an 
agency in the course of duty as an officer or employee is authorised by subsection (1) 
only if the officer or employee is authorised by the agency to collect, use or disclose the 
personal information. 
 
 (7) In this section: 
 
designated secrecy provision means any of the following: 
 
(a) sections 18 and 92 of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 
1979; 
 
  (b) section 4 of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986; 
 
  (c) section 39, 39A, 40 and 41 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001; 
 
(d) a provision of a law of the Commonwealth prescribed by the regulations for 
the purposes of this paragraph; 
 
(e) a provision of a law of the Commonwealth of a kind prescribed by the 
regulations for the purposes of this paragraph. 
 
entity includes the following: 
 
  (a) a person; 
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  (b) an agency; 
 
  (c) an organisation.  
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Appendix 4 
ICRC Recommendations for the Development of a Domestic Law 
on the Missing and Their Families 
 
This Appendix reproduces "Recommendations for the Development of a Domestic Law on the 
Missing and Their Families." ICRC prepared these recommendations in a 2003 report entitled 
The Missing and Their Families: Summary of the Conclusions Arising from Events Held Prior to 
the International Conference of Governmental and Non-Governmental Experts. The ICRC report 
resulted from studies and workshops the ICRC conducted with government representatives; other 
components of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement; international, regional 
and national governmental and non-governmental organizations; experts; and families of missing 
persons to address the plight of persons missing as a result of armed conflict and internal 
violence and their relatives. The part of the recommendations geared towards domestic law was 
then reproduced in an October 2003 report, entitled Recommendations for the Development of a 
Domestic Law on the Missing and Their Families. Part 9 of the recommendations from the 
October 2003 report is included here because it relates to the management and protection of 
personal data in determining the fate of missing persons. While missing persons arising from 
armed conflicts or internal violence does not fall within the work of the MPCI, the proposed 
standard reflects basic data protection principles. 
 
The recommendations on the protections for genetic information are included because genetic 
information may become more relevant in the future to "routine" missing persons activities. 
 
Thirty-seven countries implemented some of these recommendations into their domestic laws 
relating to missing persons.324 For example, Kyrgyzstan implemented ICRC’s model provisions 
on personal data retention, recommended data processor access controls, as well as the rights of a 
data subject.325 Bosnia and Herzegovina implemented recommended provisions on maintaining 
the accuracy of data, adding a verification process to ensure accuracy.326  
  
                                                
324 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law National Implementation: Implementing Laws 
and Regulations, http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/ (follow “Implementing Laws & Regulations by keyword” 
hyperlink; then follow “Missing” hyperlink). 
325 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on Information of a Personal Nature, bishkek  
no. 59 (2008), (Kyrg.), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/ (follow “Implementing Laws & Regulations by 
keyword” hyperlink; then follow “Missing” hyperlink; then follow Kyrgyzstan; then follow Law on the Kyrgyz 
Republic on Information of a Personal Nature). 
326 Law on Missing Persons, art. 22 (2004) (Bosn. & Herz.), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-nat.nsf/ (follow 
“Implementing Laws & Regulations by keyword” hyperlink; then follow “Missing” hyperlink; then follow Bosnia & 
Herzegovina; then follow Law on Missing Persons). 
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Recommendations for the Development of a Domestic Law on the Missing and Their Families 
 
This document is an extensive reproduction of Chapter V of the ICRC Report: The Missing and their Families. 
Summary of the Conclusions arising from the Events held prior to the International Conference of 
Governmental and Non-Governmental Experts (19-21 February 2003). The present annex corresponds to 
paragraphs 28 to 36 of the original Report; the paragraph numbering hereunder has been modified to make the 
recommendations easier to follow. 
 
1.  KNOWING THE FATE OF THEIR RELATIVES 
***  
2.  GENERAL PROTECTION 
***  
3.  USE OF FORCE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS 
*** 
4.  PROTECTION OF PERSONS DEPRIVES OF THEIR LIBERTY 
*** 
5.  COMMUNICATION BETWEEN FAMILY MEMBERS 
*** 
6.  TREATMENT OF THE DEAD AND GRAVES AND IDENTIFICATION OF HUMAN 
REMAINS 
*** 
7.  IDENTIFICATION AND THE COLLECTING AND FORWARDING OF INFORMATION 
*** 
8.  THE LEGAL SITUATION OF MISSING PERSONS AND OF THEIR RELATIVES 
*** 
9.           PROTECTION AND MANAGEMENT OF PERSONAL DATA 
 
 
Protection of personal data: the principles described below should be incorporated into domestic law. 
 
A.  Personal data should be collected and processed fairly and lawfully. 
     a.           The method of collection should not be deceptive, fraudulent or contrary to the law. This         
                            implies that consent with respect to the collection of the data should not be obtained 
                            through deception. 
 b.  This principle should not prevent the collection from a third party of data that may have 
               been gathered improperly or unlawfully, when the purpose of the data collection is 
               considered to be overriding. 
 c.  It may be appropriate to make it mandatory to register certain databases containing 
  personal data with a public authority. 
 
B.  The collection and use of personal data should be subject to the consent of the individual to whom the data relate. 
 a.  Consent should be freely given and informed. In particular, the purpose of the collection 
  and the destination of the data, including their transfer to a third party, should be disclosed. 
 b.  In certain circumstances, the consent of the individual may be presumed or implied, in 
  particular when the individual to whom the data relate cannot be reached and the collection 
  of data is considered to be clearly in his/her best interest in the circumstances. 
 c.  The data may not be used, disclosed or transferred for purposes other than those for which 
  they were collected without the consent of the person concerned, except if required by a 
  substantial public interest or for the protection of the vital interests of the person concerned 
  or of others. 
 
C.  The collection and processing of personal data should be limited to that which is necessary for the 
 purpose identified at the time of collection, or beforehand. 
 
D.  Personal data should be collected, processed and stored with appropriate safeguards. 
 a.  Sensitive data should only be collected and processed with safeguards commensurate 
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  with their sensitivity. 
 b.  Personal data should be protected by physical and technical security measures to prevent 
  loss and unauthorized access or disclosure. 
 c.  The data controller should be accountable for compliance with the rules governing the 
  protection of personal data. 
 d.  A supervising authority should be established to monitor respect for data protection rules 
  and to prescribe appropriate remedies in the event of a breach. 
 
E.  The personal data collected should be accurate, complete and updated as is necessary for the 
 purpose for which they were used. 
 
F.  Personal data may not be used, disclosed or transferred for purposes other than those for which 
 they were collected without the consent of the person concerned, except if required by a substantial 
 public interest or for the protection of the vital interests of the person concerned or of others. 
 a.  When the consent of the person cannot be practically or legally obtained, personal data 
  may be transferred or disclosed without explicit consent where: 
  I.  disclosure would serve a substantial and overriding public interest; 
  II.  disclosure is required to prevent or lessen a serious or immediate threat to the 
   health or safety of the individual concerned, or of other persons; 
  III.  disclosure would clearly benefit the individual concerned. 
 b.  When the consent of the person cannot be practically or legally obtained, public disclosure 
  of personal data should be considered only if it manifestly serves to protect or to ensure 
  the vital interests of the person concerned or of another person. 
 c.  Personal data may only be transferred to third parties that respect the international 
  standards applicable to the protection of personal data. 
 
G.  Personal data should be destroyed as soon as the purpose of their collection has been fulfilled, or 
 when they are no longer needed. They may, however, be retained for a given period (to be defined) 
 if required for the benefit of the individual to whom they relate or if they are essential for the 
 performance of the humanitarian tasks of the organization that collected the data. 
 
H.  Access to personal data should be granted to the individual to whom the information relates. A right 
 to challenge the accuracy and completeness of the data and to have them amended as appropriate 
 should also be provided for. 
 a.  The following general principles should govern access to personal data by the individual 
  concerned: 
  I.  all persons have to be informed of the existence, use and disclosure of personal 
   information relating to them; 
  II.  on request, a person has a right of access to that information and the right to 
   obtain a copy; 
  III.  all persons have the right to challenge the accuracy and completeness of the 
   personal information relating to them and to have it amended as appropriate, or at 
   least to have a notation placed on their file indicating their desire to have the 
   information corrected; 
  IV.  remedies should be provided for in case those rights are denied. 
 b.  The controller of the files should be allowed to deny access, in part or totally, where the 
  information sought: 
  I.  contains references to other individuals or sources of information received in 
   confidence, including information protected by confidentiality agreements 
   concluded for a humanitarian purpose; 
  II.  could be expected to seriously threaten an important public interest (national 
   security, public order, etc.); 
  III.  could be expected to be seriously detrimental to the interests of other persons; 
  IV.  could impede or jeopardize the purpose for which the information was collected, 
   including humanitarian purposes. 
 
I.  Where relevant, exceptions to the above-mentioned principles should be provided for   
 when the purpose of the data collection and processing is the protection of the human   
 rights and fundamental freedoms of the individual concerned or is connected to the    
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 mandate and activities of the ICRC or an intergovernmental humanitarian organization. 
   
J.  In the context of the clarification of the fate of missing persons: 
 a.  the collection and processing of personal data should be considered a lawful purpose; 
 b.  the primary objectives of collecting data are: 
  I.  to establish the identity, location, conditions and fate of: 
   i.  living persons who are unaccounted for; 
   ii.  deceased persons who are unaccounted for; 
  II.  to give information to the families on the whereabouts, condition and fate of their 
   lost relatives; 
 c.  the personal data collected (for instance, ante mortem and post mortem data) on: 
  I.  living persons who are unaccounted for might include: 
   i.  administrative data (name, place of residence, etc.); 
   ii.  qualitative data (professional details, activities, known whereabouts, 
    etc.); 
   iii. physical and biological data (sex, age, description, etc.); 
  II.  deceased persons who are unaccounted for (human remains) might include: 
   i.  administrative data (name, place of residence, etc.); 
   ii.  qualitative data (professional details, activities, known whereabouts, 
        etc.); 
   iii.  physical and biological data (sex, age, description, etc.), including DNA 
    information; 
  III.  families and relatives might include: 
   i.  administrative data (name, place of residence, etc.); 
   ii.  DNA information collected and used in conformity with applicable 
    principles; 
 d.  data collected for purposes other than to clarify the fate of missing persons may be 
  disclosed or used only if: 
  I.  their disclosure and use are not incompatible with the purpose for which the data 
   were collected or obtained; or 
  II.  the data were derived from publicly accessible sources (such as public registers, 
   professional registers or published directories); or 
  III.  their disclosure and use are in the vital interest of the individual to whom the data 
   relate or of a close relative, and the individual is physically or legally incapable of 
   consenting to the disclosure; 
 e.  once the data have been collected, their processing may include: 
  I.  matching of information from different sources; 
  II.  public disclosure of collected information, subject to the applicable rules; 
  III.  ante and post mortem data analysis and matching; 
  IV.  DNA analysis and matching; 
  V.  providing information on the results of the process, subject to the applicable rules, 
   possibly to: 
i.  living persons who are unaccounted for (when found); 
   ii.  families and relatives; 
   iii.  the public authorities; 
   iv.  private organizations. 
 
Protection of genetic information: the following principles should be incorporated into domestic law. 
 
A.  The collection, use and disclosure of DNA profiles should be subject to the rules relative to the 
 protection of personal data, in particular the management, use, storage and transfer of DNA 
 samples and profiles. 
 
B. Identification of human remains through DNA typing should only be undertaken when other 
 investigative techniques of identification are not adequate. The application of this principle does not 
 preclude the taking of samples in order to perform DNA analysis at a later stage, in the event that 
 other investigative techniques prove fruitless. 
 
C.  DNA information collected to identify missing persons or human remains may only be used or 
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 disclosed for that specific purpose. In particular, the use of DNA analyses to derive or disclose 
 health information or personal characteristics (except gender) other than those required for the 
 purposes of identification should be prohibited. 
 
D.  DNA samples may only be collected and analysed with the informed consent of the individual, 
 except where an overriding public interest dictates otherwise. 
 a.  Consent should be freely given and informed. 
 b.  Consent may be implied when it cannot be physically or legally obtained, in particular in 
  circumstances where human remains are unidentified. 
 c.  DNA samples and analyses may not be used, disclosed or transferred for purposes other 
  than those for which they were collected without the consent of the person concerned, 
  except if required by a substantial public interest or for the protection of the vital interests 
  of the person concerned or of others. 
 
E.  DNA samples and profiles should be destroyed / deleted when the missing persons have been 
 identified, unless they are required for related purposes. 
 
F.  Forensic procedures should be carried out by an appropriately qualified person. Domestic law and 
 regulations should determine the categories of persons authorized to carry out forensic procedures. 
 
G.  DNA samples, profiles and records should be adequately protected from unauthorized access and 
 use. 
 a.  Protection should include both physical and technical / electronic security measures. 
 b.  The processing of DNA samples and profiles should be independent of the processing of 
  ante and post mortem data. 
 c.  A unique anonymous reference should be the only link between DNA samples and profiles, 
  on the one hand, and ante or post mortem data on the other. The link should only be 
  accessible to the controllers of ante and post mortem data. 
 
H.  DNA analyses should only be performed by certified or accredited laboratories. A procedure for the 
 regular supervision of accredited laboratories should be established. Certified laboratories should 
 meet the following criteria: 
 a.  high level of professional knowledge and skill, scientific integrity, and appropriate quality 
  control procedures; 
 b.  adequate security of the installations and of the substances under investigation; 
 c.  adequate safeguards to ensure absolute confidentiality in respect of the identity of the 
  person to whom the DNA analysis relates. 
 
I.  DNA profiles or samples should only be disclosed, transferred or compared in the context of 
 international cooperation for the purpose of identification, and only with the consent of the persons 
 concerned. 
 a.  The authorities who transfer data should specify the permissible uses and disclosures by 
  the recipient and receive valid assurances from the recipient that the information will be 
  used and disclosed accordingly, and that applicable standards on the protection of 
  personal data will be respected. 
 b.  DNA samples should not be transferred abroad except where the analysis is to be 
  performed abroad. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5 
Details and Specifications for Missing Persons Systems in Use 
 
Policies and Procedures of Database System Controllers  
 
 Google Person Finder  
 
American Red Cross 
“Safe And Well”   
 
Family Links 
Database  
 
Lost Person 
Finder Project  
 
MISSING.NET  
 
Controlling 
Organizatio
n  
 
Google, Inc.  American Red Cross  International 
Committee of The 
Red Cross (ICRC) 
US National 
Library of 
Medicine (NLM) 
Red Helmets 
Foundation  
Physical 
Location  
 
Data could be stored in any 
one of Google’s data 
centers.327 
Denver, Colorado328  Geneva, 
Switzerland  
 
Bethesda, 
Maryland  
Paris, France  
Web 
Address  
http://google.org/personfinder
/ 
global/home.html  
https://safeandwell. 
communityos.org/cms/
index.php 
 
http://www.icrc.or
g/familylinks 
 
http://lpf.nlm.nih.
gov  
http://www.missin
g.net/ 
disasters/ 
 
Privacy 
Polices  
Google’s Universal Privacy 
Policy: 
https://www.google.com/intl/
en/policies/privacy/ 
 
No system specific policy. 
However, FAQs addressing 
privacy issues:  
Red Cross’s Universal 
Privacy Policy:  
http://www.redcross.or
g/ 
en/privacy/ 
 
No system specific 
policy. However, 
ICRC’s Universal 
Privacy Policy: 
http://www.icrc.or
g/eng/ 
home/privacypolic
y/index.jsp 
 
System Specific 
System Specific 
Privacy Policy:  
https://pl.nlm.nih.
gov/privacy 
 
System Specific 
Privacy Policy: 
http://www.missin
g.net/media/ 
files/Confidentialit
y-Charter-
MISSING.NET.pd
f  
                                                
327 Dorothy Chou (Google), interview by Adam Elewa, Aug. 15, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), Google Interview, Fordham Law School, New York, NY.  
328 Sharon Hawa (senior associate of mass care, American Red Cross), interview by Adam Elewa, July 20, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), Red Cross 
Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
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https://support.google.com/ 
personfinder/?hl=en 
 
FAQs addressing 
privacy issues:  
https://safeandwell.co
mmunityos.org/ 
cms/faq 
Policy:  
http://www.icrc.or
g/familylinks 
(See right: 
“Privacy and 
Accuracy”) 
Data 
Sources 
People impacted by disasters 
enter information into Person 
Finder. Data is available to 
the public and viewable and 
usable by anyone. Google 
does not review or verify the 
accuracy of this data and 
users can update their records 
at any time.329 
Individuals affected by 
disasters report their 
status by using either 
web interface or paper 
form with assistance 
of Red Cross 
volunteer. Data is 
never verified, and it 
can be modified by 
data subject at 
anytime. 
Publication of 
Missing Person 
List: The main 
sources of 
testimonies are 
families of the 
missing 
interviewed by 
ICRC staff. ICRC 
also collects data 
from various 
humanitarian 
agencies such as 
UNICEF, Save the 
Children, as well 
as National 
Societies volunteer 
groups, and local 
authorities. ICRC 
verifies that data to 
the greatest degree 
possible under the 
circumstances 
Hospital-Based 
Events: Medical 
personnel submit 
data about 
incoming patients 
through 
the website or a 
specialized 
application 
developed by 
NLM.332 
 
Community-
Based Events: 
Voluntarily 
submitted by 
medical and relief 
personnel or 
members of the 
public who are 
seeking family 
members, friends, 
or other loved 
Data submitted by 
unverified, 
registered internet 
users seeking 
missing persons or 
professional 
emergency 
personnel.335 
MISSING.NET 
confirms the 
identity of any 
user claiming to 
be a professional 
emergency 
worker, and 
denotes the source 
of submitted 
information in 
each missing 
person record.336   
 
 
-OR-  
                                                
329 Dorothy Chou (Google), interview by Adam Elewa, Aug. 15, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), Google Interview, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
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before publishing 
it.330 
 
User Driven 
Service: 
Unverified, 
registered internet 
users submit data 
either about their 
own status, or as a 
means to inquiry 
about the status of 
a person thought to 
be missing.  
 
ICRC will also 
input data from 
official list 
published by other 
organizations.331 
 
However, only 
ones, through the 
website or by 
means of either a 
specialized 
application 
developed by 
NLM for the 
iPhone (other 
platforms are 
under 
development) or 
submit to NLM 
by e-mail via 
computer or cell 
phone.333  
 
The system also 
routinely pulls 
information from 
other publicly 
available systems 
that collect and 
 
Pulled from the 
Google Person 
Finder database 
using API.337   
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
332 US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, 
Fordham Law School, New York, NY.    
335 MISSING.NET, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), MISSING.NET Questionnaire, Fordham Law 
School, New York, NY. 
336 Sarah Aizenman (MISSING.NET), interview by Adam Elewa, Aug. 13, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), MISSING.NET Interview, Fordham Law School, 
New York, NY. 
330 Romain Bircher (head of Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red Cross), interview by Missing Persons 
Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
331 Romain Bircher (head of Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red Cross), interview by Missing Persons 
Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
333 Proposed Collection: Lost People Finder System, 75 Fed. Reg. 6207 (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-02-08/pdf/2010-2691.pdf. 
337 Sarah Aizenman (MISSING.NET), interview by Adam Elewa, Aug. 13, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), MISSING.NET Interview, Fordham Law School, 
New York, NY.  
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ICRC workers, 
after performing 
due diligence, can 
change a record to 
deceased. ICRC 
does not typically 
display deceased 
status on the web, 
instead working 
with local 
authorities to find 
a more appropriate 
and sensitive way 
to make the 
announcement.  
 
 
store missing 
person 
information (i.e., 
Google Person 
Finder 
instances).334   
 
 
Limitations 
and 
Restrictions 
on Accessing 
Data 
Accessing Data From 
Internet:  
 
Database allows “wildcard” 
searches, allowing multiple 
records to be returned by 
inputting the first few letters 
of name of missing person.338  
 
Receiving Copy of Entire 
Database:  
Accessing Data From 
Internet:  
 
Records are not 
displayed unless user 
knows the name and 
either address or 
phone number 
contained in the 
record.341 
 
Accessing Data 
From Internet:  
 
All records can be 
displayed without 
knowing any 
information. 
 
Receiving Copy of 
Entire Database:  
 
Accessing Data 
From Internet:  
 
Hospital-Based 
Events: Viewed 
in the context of 
hospital policies, 
reflective of US 
HIPAA privacy 
constraints and 
HIPAA waivers 
Accessing Data 
From Internet:  
 
All records can be 
displayed without 
knowing any 
information. 
 
 
Receiving Copy 
of Entire 
                                                
334 Proposed Collection: Lost People Finder System, 75 Fed. Reg. 6207 (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-02-08/pdf/2010-2691.pdf. 
338 For example, searching for “Ad” would display all records for a missing person by the name of “Adam” as well as records for those with the first name 
“Adly”. The exact number of letters required to display all relevant records varies according to language of submitted names. Dorothy Chou (Google), interview 
by Adam Elewa, Aug. 15, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), Google Interview, Fordham Law School, New York, NY.  
341 “American Red Cross FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://safeandwell.communityos.org/cms/faq.  
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Google issues Application 
Programming Interface (API) 
keys, granting third party 
software developers the right 
and ability to make copies of 
all records in the database.339 
Google generally requires 
those requesting API keys to 
be a government 
organization, quasi-
governmental entity, or 
established non-profit 
actively responding to the 
crisis in question. The Person 
Finder API TOS requires that 
recipients of the data use it 
only for non-commercial 
purposes, abide by Google’s 
API Terms of Service, and 
commit to storing records 
obtained through the API in 
compliance with the expiry 
mechanisms set forth in 
Section 3.3 of the PFIF 1.3 
specification.340 
Receiving Copy of 
Entire Database:  
 
Data is not released to 
third parties. However, 
there are 
circumstances where 
the Red Cross might 
share some 
information with 
emergency personnel 
if it will be of use in a 
life-threatening 
situation. 342 
Publication of 
Missing Person 
List: 
 
Data may be 
disclosed to third 
parties, but only 
after the ICRC 
performs an 
investigation into 
how the third party 
plans to use and 
store the data, and 
an agreement is 
made limiting the 
use of the data.343 
 
User Driven 
Service: 
 
Data is not 
released to third 
parties.344    
available during 
large-scale 
disasters.345  
 
Community-
Based Events: 
Public portions of 
all records can be 
displayed without 
knowing any 
information.  
 
Receiving Copy 
of Entire 
Database:  
 
Hospital-Based 
Events: Only 
partnering 
hospitals can 
receive data.346  
 
Community-
Based Events: 
Information 
submitted directly 
Database:  
 
MISSING.NET 
issues Application 
Programming 
(API) keys, 
granting third 
party software 
developers the 
right and ability to 
retrieve records 
from database. All 
third parties who 
retrieve records 
must comply with 
certain terms and 
conditions. 
Notably, all 
parties who 
receive a copy of 
the database must 
delete the data two 
months after 
MISSING.NET 
determines the 
disaster to be 
                                                
339 “Google Person Finder API Key Request,” accessed July 24, 2012, https://support.google.com/personfinder/bin/request.py?&contact_type=pf_api.  
340 Dorothy Chou (Google), interview by Adam Elewa, Aug. 15, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), Google Interview, Fordham Law School, New York, NY.  
342 Sharon Hawa (senior associate of mass care, American Red Cross), interview by Adam Elewa, July 20, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), Red Cross 
Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
343 As a general principle, ICRC will share a set of data with a party only after an agreement and when (1) the scope, objectives and processes (notably for data 
publication, deletion, correction, transfer, archiving and for communication to beneficiaries and other actors) are clear; (2) the purpose is humanitarian only and 
not different from the purpose under which these data were initially collected by ICRC; (3) it is in the best interest of the beneficiaries; (4) beneficiaries are 
informed and consent; 5) it is not detrimental to ICRC activities and reputation (as an independent, impartial and neutral humanitarian organization); 6) the party 
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 to NLM’s Lost 
People Finder 
System could be 
transferred to 
other systems that 
are endorsed by 
US government 
agencies. 347 
ended and the 
MISSING.NET 
service no longer 
useful to disaster 
relief efforts.348 
Policies 
Regarding 
Cross-
Border Data 
Exports 
N/A N/A The sites privacy 
policy does not say 
anything about 
cross data exports. 
The MPCI doc 
simply says that 
third parties, 
among other 
things, must 
respect data 
protection 
principles/regulatio
n before they can 
N/A Yes, privacy 
policy 
guaranteeing a 
level of security at 
least equivalent to 
that offered by 
European 
regulations on the 
protection of 
personal data.349 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
respects data protection principles/regulations; and (7) the party commits to not share data with other actors without ICRC prior consent. See Romain Bircher 
(head of Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red Cross), interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, 
Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
344 Romain Bircher (head of Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red Cross), interview by Missing Persons 
Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
345 US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, 
Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
346 US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, 
Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
347 Proposed Collection: Lost People Finder System, 75 Fed. Reg. 6207 (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-02-08/pdf/2010-2691.pdf.  
348 Sarah Aizenman (MISSING.NET), interview by Adam Elewa, Aug. 13, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), MISSING.NET Interview, Fordham Law School, 
New York, NY. 
349 “MISSING.NET Confidentiality Charter,” accessed July 24, 2012, http://www.missing.net/media/ 
files/Confidentiality-Charter-MISSING.NET.pdf.  
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receive data.” 
Data About 
Children 
 
Users are not required to 
submit age information about 
individuals they are searching 
for, and Google does not 
verify the accuracy of the 
information submitted. 
Google does not segment the 
database based on age.350 
No set policy.351 Data is collected 
about children, but 
the ICRC does not 
display the 
location or contact 
details of 
children.352 
 
  
Data is collected 
about children.  
 
Hospital-Based 
Events: NLM 
supportive of 
hospital policies 
that treat data of 
children more 
sensitively.353 
 
Community-
Based Events: No 
set policy yet.354   
Data is collected 
about children.355   
Database 
Becomes 
Active 
(accepts new 
Discretion of Google Crisis 
Response team. Team 
considers usefulness of tool 
for given disaster.356  
Always active.357  Discretion of 
ICRC team. Team 
considers the 
risk/utility of 
Hospital-Based 
Event: No set 
policy yet. Never 
launched before, 
Overall database 
always active, but 
event allowing 
submission of data 
                                                
350 Dorothy Chou (Google), interview by Adam Elewa, Aug. 15, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), Google Interview, Fordham Law School, New York, NY.  
351 Sharon Hawa (senior associate of mass care, American Red Cross), interview by Adam Elewa, July 20, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), Red Cross 
Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
352 Romain Bircher (head of Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red Cross), interview by Missing Persons 
Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
353 US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, 
Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
354 US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, 
Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
355 MISSING.NET, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), MISSING.NET Questionnaire, Fordham Law 
School, New York, NY. 
356 “Google Person Finder FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://support.google.com/personfinder/?hl=en. 
357 Sharon Hawa (senior associate of mass care, American Red Cross), interview by Adam Elewa, July 20, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), Red Cross 
Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
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data)  
 
launching. 358 only used in 
drills.359 
 
Community-
Based Event: The 
creation of a new 
“event” allowing 
the submission of 
data occurs at the 
discretion of the 
NLM staff.360  
started at 
discretion of 
MISSING.NET 
team.361   
Database 
Becomes 
Non-Active 
(no new data 
accepted)  
 
Discretion of Google Crisis 
Response team. Team 
considers whether “normal” 
forms of communication have 
resumed.362  
Always active.363 Publication of 
Missing Person 
List: No set limit. 
Persons will be 
added to the list as 
they are reported 
missing.364  
 
 
User Driven 
No set policy yet. 
Preliminary 
policy of 1 – 2 
years.366   
  
After 
MISSING.NET 
determines a 
disaster to be 
ended for the 
purposes of the 
service, no new 
records can be 
submitted 
concerning that 
                                                
358 Romain Bircher (head of Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red Cross), interview by Missing Persons 
Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
359 US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, 
Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
360 US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, 
Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
361 MISSING.NET, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), MISSING.NET Questionnaire, Fordham Law 
School, New York, NY. 
362 “Google Person Finder FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://support.google.com/personfinder/?hl=en. 
363 Sharon Hawa (senior associate of mass care, American Red Cross), interview by Adam Elewa, July 20, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), Red Cross 
Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
364 Romain Bircher (head of Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red Cross), interview by Missing Persons 
Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
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Service: Database 
is taken offline at 
the discretion of 
ICRC team. Team 
considers whether 
normal 
communications 
have resumed, and 
whether the 
database is still 
needed.365  
 
disaster event.367   
 
New user accounts 
containing 
information of 
submitting party 
can always be 
created.368  
   
Data 
Contained 
in Database 
No Longer 
Publically 
Readable/Se
archable  
 
Record can be submitted with 
expiration date, after which 
the record is deleted in 
accordance with Google's 
Privacy Policy.369  
 
-OR- 
 
After the immediate crisis has 
passed and more usual forms 
of communication are able to 
serve users' needs, Google's 
Crisis Response team takes 
Records expire, and 
are permanently 
deleted, after 365 
days.371  
Publication of 
Missing Person 
List: No set limit. 
Records can stay 
online indefinitely. 
ICRC respects 
wishes of the 
missing person’s 
family.372  
 
 
User Driven 
Service: Database 
No set policy yet. 
Preliminary 
policy of 3 
years.374  
Records regarding 
missing person 
deleted two 
months after 
MISSING.NET 
determines the 
disaster to be 
ended and the 
MISSING.NET 
service no longer 
useful to disaster 
relief efforts.375 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
366 US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, 
Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
365 Romain Bircher (head of Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red Cross), interview by Missing Persons 
Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
367 MISSING.NET, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), MISSING.NET Questionnaire, Fordham Law 
School, New York, NY. 
368 MISSING.NET, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), MISSING.NET Questionnaire, Fordham Law 
School, New York, NY. 
369 “Google Person Finder FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://support.google.com/personfinder/?hl=en. 
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down the Google Person 
Finder instance, and deletes 
the data in accordance with 
Google's Privacy Policy.370 
is taken offline at 
the discretion of 
ICRC team. Team 
considers whether 
normal 
communications 
have resumed, and 
whether the 
database is still 
needed.373 
 
User accounts 
containing 
information about 
submitting party 
are never deleted, 
but are also never 
publically 
viewable.376  
Data in 
Database 
Permanently 
Deleted  
 
Record can be submitted with 
expiration date, after which 
the record is deleted in 
accordance with Google's 
Privacy Policy.377  
 
-OR- 
 
Records expire, and 
are permanently 
deleted, after 365 
days.379 
After closure of 
family links 
website, ICRC 
decides whether to 
archive records at 
ICRC headquarters 
in Geneva. ICRC 
has no policy 
No set policy yet. 
No preliminary 
policy either.381 
 
 
 
Records regarding 
missing person 
deleted after two 
months two 
months after 
MISSING.NET 
determines the 
disaster to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
371 Sharon Hawa (senior associate of mass care, American Red Cross), interview by Adam Elewa, July 20, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), Red Cross 
Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
372 Romain Bircher (head of Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red Cross), interview by Missing Persons 
Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
374 US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, 
Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
375 Sarah Aizenman (MISSING.NET), interview by Adam Elewa, Aug. 13, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), MISSING.NET Interview, Fordham Law School, 
New York, NY. 
370 “Google Person Finder FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://support.google.com/personfinder/?hl=en. 
373 Romain Bircher (head of Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red Cross), interview by Missing Persons 
Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
376 Sarah Aizenman (MISSING.NET), interview by Adam Elewa, Aug. 13, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), MISSING.NET Interview, Fordham Law School, 
New York, NY. 
377 “Google Person Finder FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://support.google.com/personfinder/?hl=en. 
379 Sharon Hawa (senior associate of mass care, American Red Cross), interview by Adam Elewa, July 20, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), Red Cross 
Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
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After the immediate crisis has 
passed and more usual forms 
of communication are able to 
serve users' needs, Google's 
Crisis Response team takes 
down the Google Person 
Finder instance, and deletes 
the data in accordance with 
Google's Privacy Policy.378 
regarding how 
long data should 
be archived.380 
 
 
 
ended and the 
MISSING.NET 
service no longer 
useful to disaster 
relief efforts.382 
 
User accounts 
containing 
information about 
submitting party 
are never deleted, 
but are also never 
publically 
viewable.383   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
381 US National Library of Medicine, interview by Missing Persons Community of Interest, Nov. 10, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), NLM Questionnaire, 
Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
378“Google Person Finder FAQs,” accessed July 23, 2012, https://support.google.com/personfinder/?hl=en.. 
380 Romain Bircher (head of Data Management and Restoring Family Links unit, International Committee of the Red Cross), interview by Missing Persons 
Community of Interest, Nov. 29, 2011 (on file with Fordham CLIP), ICRC Questionnaire, Fordham Law School, New York, NY. 
382 Sarah Aizenman (MISSING.NET), interview by Adam Elewa, Aug. 13, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), MISSING.NET Interview, Fordham Law School, 
New York, NY. 
383 Sarah Aizenman (MISSING.NET), interview by Adam Elewa, Aug. 13, 2012 (on file with Fordham CLIP), MISSING.NET Interview, Fordham Law School, 
New York, NY. 
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Notable Data Fields of Database Specifications and Database Systems 
 
KEY 
 
Limitations and 
Restrictions on Accessing 
Data 
 
Data Is Publicly     
Searchable 
P  
 
Data Is Private/Not 
Disclosed  
X 
Data Is Not 
Disclosed/Treated 
Sensitively When 
Concerning A Child 
x 
Data Entry  
 
 
Required  
 
R 
Optional  
 
O 
Data Entry Method 
 
 
User Must Select From 
List  
 
( ) 
User Can Enter Any 
Text  
 
__ 
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 Google 
Person 
Finder  
 
Red 
Cross 
“Safe 
And 
Well”   
 
Family Links 
Database  
 
Lost Person 
Finder Project  
 
MISSING.NET  
 
People Finder 
Interchange 
Format  
(PFIF) 
Emergency Data 
Exchange 
Language (EDXL): 
Tracking of 
Emergency 
Patients (TEP) 
 
Data  Collected 
Regarding 
Missing Person 
 
   
Publication 
of missing 
person list:   
 
 
“Self 
Registration” 
Service: 
 
 
 
Hospital 
Based Events:  
 
 
 
 
 
Community 
Based Events:  
   
First Name  
 
P, R, __ P, R, __ P, R, __ 
 
 
P, R, __ 
 
X, O, __ 
 
 
P, O, __ 
P, R, __ P, R, __ X, O, __ 
Last Name P, R, __ 
 
P, R, __ P, R, __ 
 
 
P, R, __ 
 
X, O, __ 
 
 
P, O,  __ 
P, R, __ P, R, __ 
 
X, O, __ 
Farther or 
Mother’s Name 
/ ”Family 
Name”  
P, O, __  P, R, __ 
 
 
P, R,__ 
  P, O, __  
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Sex/Gender P, O, __  P, R, ( ) 
 
 
P, R, ( ) 
X, O, __ 
 
 
P, O,  __ 
P, O, __ P, O, __ 
 
X, R, __ 
Age/Date of 
Birth 
P, O, __ 
 
P, O, __ P, O, __ 
 
 
P, R, __ 
X, O, ( ) 
 
 
P, O, ( ) 
P, O, __ P, O, __ 
 
X, R, __ 
Hair Color P, O, __ 
 
  X, O, __ 
 
 
P, O, __ 
P, O, __ P, O, __ 
 
X, O, __ 
Eye Color P, O, __ 
 
  X, O, __ 
 
 
P, O, __ 
P, O, __ P, O, __ 
 
X, O, __ 
Weight P, O, __ 
 
  X, O, __ 
 
 
P, O, __ 
P, O, __ P, O, __ 
 
X, O, __ 
Distinguishing 
Marks/Clothing 
P, O, __   X, O, __ 
 
 
P, O, __ 
P, O, __ P, O, __ X, O, __ 
Nationality     P, O, __  X, O, __ 
Home Address: 
Street 
 
P, O, __ X, R, 
__ 
 X, O,__  
 
 
X, O, __ 
P, O, __ P, O, __ X, O, __ 
Home Address: 
City 
P, O, __ 
 
X, R, 
__ 
 X, O, __ 
 
 
P, O, __ P, O, __ 
 
X, O, __ 
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X, O, __ 
Home Address: 
State 
P, O, __ 
 
X, R, 
__ 
  
 
 
X, O, __ 
P, O, __ P, O, __ 
 
X, O, __ 
Home Address: 
Country 
P, O, __ 
 
X, R, 
__ 
  
 
 
X, O, __ 
P, O, __ P, O, __ 
 
X, O, __ 
Home Address: 
Zip 
P, O, __ 
 
X, R, 
__ 
  
 
 
X, O, __ 
P, O, __ P, O, __ 
 
X, O, __ 
Photo P, O  P, O, __ 
 
 
 
X, R 
 
 
P, O  
P, O  P, O X, O  
Status (e.g., 
alive, dead, 
found,etc.)  
 
P, O, ( ) P, R, ( ) 
or __ 
P, R, ( ) 
 
 
P, R, ( ) 
X, R, ( ) 
 
 
P, O, ( ) 
 P, O, ( ) X, R, ( ) or __ 
Medical 
Needs/Allergies 
      X, O, __ 
Current/Last 
Seen Location  
P, O, __ 
 
X, R, 
__ 
P/x, O, __ 
 
 
P/x, R, __ 
X, R, ( ) 
 
 
P, R, ( ) 
P, O, __ P, O, __ 
 
X, O, __ 
Email P, O, __ 
 
X, O, 
__ 
 
 
 
P/x, R, __ 
  P, O, __ 
 
X, O, __ 
Phone # P, O, __ X, O,    P, O, __ X, O, __ 
  
 
115 
 __  
 
P/x, R, __ 
 
Language 
Spoken 
 
 
   P, O, __  X, O, __ 
Data Collected 
Regarding 
Seeker 
 
       
First Name P, O, __  P or X, O, __ 
 
 
P, R, __ 
 
 
 
X, R, __ 
 
 
X, O, __ P, O, __  
Last Name P, O, __  P or X, O, __ 
 
 
P, R, __ 
 
 
 
X, R, __ 
X, O, __ P, O, __  
Relationship to 
Missing 
  P, O, ( ) 
 
P, R, ( ) 
 
 
 
   
Email P, O, __ 
 
  
 
 
X, R, __ 
 
 
 
X, R, __ 
X, R, __ P, O, __ 
 
 
Phone # 
 
P, O, __   
 
X, R, ___ 
 
 
X, O, __ P, O, __  
Home Address: 
Street 
   
X, O, __ 
 X, R, __   
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Home Address: 
City  
   
P, R, __ 
 X, R, __   
Home Address: 
State 
   
P, O, __ 
 X, R, __   
Home Address: 
Country 
   
P, R, ( ) 
 X, R, __   
Home Address: 
Zip 
   
 
 X, O, __   
 
 
    
  
 

